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Abstract  
 
 
This thesis presents an ethnographic study of a small local non-government 
organisation (NGO) negotiating its way through the complex, multi-layered, post-
conflict, post-emergency environment of Timor-Leste. This is an environment that 
remains dominated by the aid industry, an industry that initially came to restore 
order and provide humanitarian support in the violent aftermath of the 1999 
independence vote and stayed on to build a new Timor, in many ways created in its 
own image. In this environment a small local NGO struggled to maintain not only its 
vision and mission, but to fit within a new set of externally imposed conditions and 
regulations in order to serve its communities’ needs.  
Using ethnographic data gathered in the field over eleven months, this study paints 
a picture of a post-emergency environment on the ground and in the daily life of a 
local NGO within that environment. Combining ethnographic and interview data from 
local and international aid and development practitioners, the study also identifies 
the internal and external challenges faced by the local NGO in navigating its way 
through this environment. The internal challenges faced are largely in response to 
externally imposed conditions, and include the adaptation to new language and 
communication technologies, new styles of leadership and organisation 
management, new financial accountability processes and procedures. All of these 
challenges are coupled with the lack of experienced and skilled staff. The external 
issues relate to interactions and relationships the local NGO has with the aid 
industry, and the issues arising out of these engagements including ideological 
differences, donor dependency, unequal relations, and externally imposed 
directives. 
While acknowledging that these are very real challenges, this thesis argues that it is 
the underlying factors behind the presenting challenges that are the real barriers to 
the effective participation of a local NGO in the post-conflict, post-emergency 
environment. Using post-development writings and Foucauldian theories as a 
theoretical framework, this thesis explores how thought, ideology and action are 
governed and controlled by the subtle mechanisms of liberal governance, 
(particularly in their redefinition), and local language is appropriated and 
reconceptualised as a tool of governance. It is the inability to understand or detect 
these subtle mechanisms of governance that often limits the degree to which an 
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NGO can be said to act self-determinedly, or in full awareness of the situation, as 
they navigate a path through this foreign and often baffling post-emergency 
environment.  
This research adds to the emerging academic body of research on NGOs in post-
conflict, post-emergency environments. On a practical level it provides aid and 
development organisations and aid practitioners with a detailed ‘insider’s’ view of the 
operations of a local NGO and the impacts on a small organisation of externally 
imposed conditions, regulations and hidden agendas. Finally, it provides field 
workers intending to conduct research in post-conflict, post-emergency 
environments with an introduction to the issues and problems associated with this 
type of research. 
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 Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1 General Introduction  
This thesis presents an ethnographic study of Knua Buka Hatene (KBH) a small, 
local, Non-Government Organisation (NGO) based in Dili, the capital city of Timor-
Leste1. The research data were gathered over eleven months from April 2004 to 
July 2005, two years after Timor-Leste became a sovereign state and four years, 
five months after the United Nations Security Council authorised a humanitarian 
intervention in Timor-Leste following the violent aftermath of the 1999 independence 
vote. This period also represented a time of transition for Timor-Leste as it moved 
from a stage of post-emergency recovery to a stage of long term development and 
reconstruction2.  
The purpose of the research is to gain a detailed understanding of how an 
indigenous NGO survives in the post-emergency, reconstruction environment of aid 
and development. The study focuses on how a local NGO navigates its way through 
the changing environment and the challenges and issues it faces as it balances and 
reconciles its own needs, and the needs of its community, against the external 
conditions and regulations of the aid industry.  
1.2 Background 
To speak of a post-conflict or post-emergency environment is a broad 
categorisation. Post-conflict environments are never truly free of violence and the 
threat and menace of newly emerging conflict is never far from the surface 
(McKechnie 2004). For Timor-Leste visible violence erupted suddenly again in April-
May, 2006, over 5 years after relative calm nevertheless punctuated with spasmodic 
episodes of conflict, and violence continues to play a debilitating role in peoples’ 
lives today. As a result of the 2006 crisis, over 150,000 people were displaced, over 
6000 houses burnt, and 37 people were killed. In September 2007, UN sources 
(Security Council Report: September 2007 Timor-Leste 2007) claimed that over 
100,000 people remained displaced in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps or 
in the districts and at least 30,000 of this group were located in camps in Dili.  
Knua Buka Hatene as a local non-government organisation (LNGO) was born out of 
a history of political and social insecurity, de-stabilisation and conflict, similar to most 
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local NGOs in Timor-Leste. The people that staff local NGOs, particularly those 
under 30 years of age, were born into that history and are in many ways a product of 
it, just as their parents were born into and are a product of colonialism, as were their 
parents and many generations before them. Today those who have survived the 
occupation, civil unrest and colonisation periods have done so by adapting to, 
negotiating with, and resisting, both passively and actively, the rules and conditions 
of the colonisers and occupiers. The resultant behaviours and adaptation strategies 
are not easy to understand or interpret, particularly by those coming from the 
‘outside’ who have not experienced a similar environment or a similar history. Any 
understanding of a local NGO and its members, must be viewed in the context of the 
country’s complex social and political history.  
1.3 Political History  
For over four centuries Timor-Leste, then known as Portuguese Timor, existed as a 
Roman Catholic Portuguese colony. In 1975, with limited preparation for 
independence, Portugal under domestic political pressure made an abrupt exit 
leaving Timor-Leste to make its own path to statehood. On 28 November, 1975, an 
unprepared Timor-Leste, still divided by internal political and social cleavages, 
declared itself independent. Nine days later with the declaration still unrecognised 
internationally, Indonesia seized the opportunity to invade Timor-Leste and annex it 
as an Indonesian state, citing internal disintegration and instability as its justification 
for doing so 3. 
Twenty-five years of Indonesian occupation followed, marked by violence and 
brutality as Timor-Leste nationals continued to fight within the country for 
independence (CAVR 2005). In 1997, following a change of government in 
Indonesia, talk of an independence vote for Timor-Leste grew in strength both 
nationally and internationally. In August 1999, following the UN sponsored vote for 
self-determination with 95% participation, Timor-Leste won its fight for 
independence. This long struggle, culminating in the post-independence violence 
unleashed by Indonesian supported militias, resulted in not only the deaths of many 
thousands of people but the destruction of nearly all existing infrastructure as people 
fled to the mountains for safety or were forcibly deported to West Timor. On 23 
September 1999, International Peacekeepers (INTERFET), led by Australian forces, 
arrived in Timor-Leste to restore order. The United Nations Transitional 
Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) was quickly established to provide a 
transitional government. The first elections were held in August 2001, and in May 
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2002 Timor-Leste finally became a sovereign state, the first new nation of the 
twenty-first century (CAVR 2005). 
Despite achieving international legitimacy as an independent state, Timor-Leste 
remained, in many ways, an occupied country. As the Indonesians fled and the 
peace keeping forces arrived, the ‘aid world’ as Brunnstrom (2003) noted, soon 
followed. The new occupiers in this case came to bring emergency assistance; 
restoring basic infrastructure and ensuring safety so that people could return from 
exile, whether from the mountains or overseas, to begin re-establishing their lives. 
The relatively conflict free zone created by the UN peacekeepers, also allowed 
existing local (indigenous) NGOs to resume their activities and newly developing 
NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)4 to contribute to the reconstruction 
work alongside the international aid agencies and organisations (Hunt 2004; 
Brunnstrom 2003)5. 
Although initially seen as a liberating force, the international aid and development 
industry, or what Escobar (1987) terms ‘the apparatus of development’, had a 
profound impact on every facet of Timorese life: socially, politically and economically 
(UNTAET report to Donors, World Bank Report, 2000). As Guttal (2005, p. 73) 
describes “[P]ost-war/post-conflict reconstruction literally involves everything from 
demobilizing armed groups and peace-keeping, to writing new constitutions, 
formulating new national laws and fast-tracking foreign investment”. Many local 
organisations and their members consequently found themselves negotiating vastly 
new territories where the priorities, processes and procedures were being defined 
by new stakeholders with new agendas6.  
Timor-Leste is not alone in experiencing the profound impact of international 
assistance. Aid and development is a multi-million dollar industry and many millions 
of dollars in international donor funding are spent every year assisting ‘poor’ 
countries or ‘fragile states’ to re-establish infrastructure after dramatic national 
upheaval as a result of conflict or war. This ‘assistance’ is not applied in a 
haphazard way but rather follows what Guttal (2005, p. 73) terms the emerging 
‘development model’ which generally includes:  
a UN-led mission for ‘transitional’ administration, peacekeeping 
and donor coordination; donor support for electoral, constitutional 
and governance activities to shape new national leadership; 
formulation of national development plans and policies by foreign 
experts; national institutional ‘capacity building’ by private 
(usually foreign) firms; the transfer of key services and assets to 
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private sector firms; and a plethora of international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and newly emerging 
national/local ‘civil society organizations’ (CSOs) engaged in 
activities ranging from micro-credit and primary health care to 
democracy education and human rights training.  
The major international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the IMF, The World Bank 
and in terms of Timor-Leste, the Asian Development Bank, are also important 
players in this picture, as are other multilaterals agencies7, and bilateral8 donor 
nations. All have a clear set of economic and political principles and priorities 
attached to their assistance (see for example East Timor: United Nations 
Development Assistance Framework (2003-2004) n.d.; CAPET: Capacity Building 
Program for East Timor Project n.d; 'WORLD BANK: Independence planning for 
East Timor -- A road map for the future' 2001).  
1.4 The Aid Community and Local NGOs in Timor-Leste 
In Timor-Leste an interdependent relationship exists between international and local 
NGOs involved in the reconstruction or rebuilding of civil society. This relationship 
presents challenges for local NGOs which, despite their local knowledge and 
expertise, often work within an environment over which they feel they have little 
control. Brunnstrom (2003) who studied the relationship between Timor-Leste and 
international NGOs post-independence, states that while the international aid 
community is publicly committed to developing programs based on trust and respect 
for local cultural and historical knowledge and practices “… there is still a 
considerable gulf between rhetoric and practice” (2003, p.318). In more general 
terms, Brunnstrom claims “[s]ocieties in transition often experience the arrival of 
international agencies as an invasion that threatens local control over the 
development process” (Brunnstrom 2003, p.320). 
In the transition from the emergency/crisis phase to the post-emergency/post-crisis/ 
long term reconstruction phase of development, the number of NGOs in Timor-Leste 
fell dramatically from 271 in 2002 to 137 in 2004 (NGOs in East Timor 2004). This 
contraction in numbers happened at a time when World Bank research shows that a 
post-conflict country is most able to absorb and utilise aid (McKechnie 2004). The 
high attrition rate among indigenous NGOs during the transition phase is often 
viewed by international aid agencies and organisations as inevitable and even 
desirable, a view grounded in the belief that the strong will survive and the weak will 
fail. While this view may contain truths, it fails to acknowledge that during the 
emergency stage international agencies actively encourage and support the 
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proliferation of local NGOs and to some extent contribute to the organisational 
weaknesses they later criticise. Local NGOs during the emergency phase are 
valued for their assistance at the grass roots level. To these ends they are 
characteristically ‘flooded’ with funds and resources while minimal restrictions, 
guidelines and financial accountability processes are applied. Often international 
agencies in the rush to distribute funds and assistance for humanitarian reasons, as 
well as to appease organisation and donor expectations at home, give less thought 
than is needed to the long-term sustainability and strengthening needs of local 
NGOs and the long term adverse impact of ‘unequal relationships’ upon them. 
1.5 Problem Statement  
There is a dearth of independent, long-term ethnographic research that studies the 
impact of the aid industry on local NGOs in post-conflict environments, particularly 
during the transition phase from post-emergency recovery to long-term 
development. While there are studies that pin-point weaknesses and strengths in 
the structures, processes, and accountability procedures of local NGOs few 
elaborate the less tangible issues and challenges faced by local NGOs as they 
navigate the changing environment.  
1.6 Aims and Objectives  
The major aim of this study is to gain a detailed understanding of how a local NGO 
in a post-conflict environment balances and reconciles its own needs and the needs 
of its community with the externally imposed conditions and regulations of the aid 
world in the post-conflict, post-emergency environment of Timor-Leste.  
The three main objectives of the thesis are to:  
1. Document the operations of KBH, including its historical and ideological 
underpinnings, values and beliefs, to understand how these elements shaped 
and continue to shape the work and structure of the organisation.  
2. Identify and describe the organisation’s interactions and co-relationship with 
the international aid world, focusing on how the organisation is shaped by, and 
in turn shapes that interaction.  
3. Identify the major challenges faced by the NGO in maintaining its vision and 
mission and conducting its activities as it navigates the transition from post-
emergency to long-term development.  
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1.7 Argument  
The thesis argues that it is not the obvious challenges, such as the lack of strong 
leadership and financial management, which present the greatest barriers to the 
effective participation of local NGOs in the post-conflict, post-emergency 
environment of Timor-Leste but the less tangible barriers, the unseen agendas. 
There is a ‘gulf’ between rhetoric and practice as Brunnstrom (2003) suggests, but it 
arises from the ‘gap’ in the understanding - of international workers and local NGOs 
alike - about the operations and mechanisms of governance that go on behind the 
scenes in the post-emergency environment and are embedded in every facet of 
NGO life. It is the inability to understand or detect these subtle mechanisms of 
governance that often limit the degree to which an NGO can be said to act self 
determinedly or in full awareness of the situation as they navigate a path through 
this complex and multilayered post-conflict, post-emergency environment. 
1.8 Significance of this Research  
This research will add to the emerging body of academic research on reconstruction 
after social upheaval (Arnold 1998). Presently, limited work exists in this area 
outside of United Nations agencies, the World Bank and other aid and humanitarian 
organisations. The thesis also contributes to the growing body of literature on the 
role of local NGOs and the State in development, particularly in areas of 
empowerment and capacity building in post-conflict, post-emergency environments. 
On a practical level, a detailed ethnographic study of an NGO operating in a post-
crisis situation will provide western aid organisations with what Spradley (1980) 
describes as an ‘alternative reality,’ a view that is not completely culturally bound by 
western values, knowledge and understanding (Knauft 2002). This alternative reality 
may, in turn, assist aid organisations, and aid and development practitioners, to 
reflect on their own operations and actions within the post-conflict, post-emergency 
environment.  
At a local level, for the local NGO involved in the research and similar NGOs, the 
research findings will provide useful and practical information for improving their 
capacity to negotiate the aid world in a way that maximises the benefits for 
themselves and for their client community in the long-term.  
Finally, at a research level, the thesis provides new field workers intending to 
conduct research in post-conflict countries, particularly where there is a heavy 
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international aid presence, with an introduction to the issues and problems related to 
this type of research.  
1.9 Overview of the Thesis  
This thesis is presented in nine chapters.  
Chapter Two: provides the background to the choice of research topic and chosen 
research subject and also introduces ethnography as the method for conducting the 
research. It gives the author’s own account of conducting research in a post-conflict 
environment dominated by the international aid industry, and drawing on current 
literature, defines and characterises some of the issues and challenges 
encountered. Lastly, it outlines the research methods including the data collection, 
data organisation and analysis and the format for the presentation of the findings 
and discussion.  
Chapter Three: paints a picture of the post-conflict aid world on the ground in Timor-
Leste, what it looks like and how it is experienced at a local level. The chapter also 
outlines the history of local NGOs and civil society organisations in Timor-Leste prior 
to independence and up to the present long-term development phase, to provide a 
context in which to understand the present study.  
Chapter Four: seeks to place the Timor-Leste aid intervention experience within the 
greater context of the discourse of development. In doing so it examines the 
historical and ideological underpinning of development. It then explores post-
development theory and its critics, as a means of challenging pre-conceived notions 
of development as well as constructing a framework for examining development as 
a discourse, and as a model of intervention. Lastly it looks at the role of local NGOs 
within the development context, as a means of understanding the issues and 
challenges faced by these NGOs in the larger picture of development.  
Chapter Five: addresses the first objective of the research by introducing KBH, its 
historical and ideological underpinnings, values and beliefs, and how these have 
shaped the work and structure of the organisation. It also begins to address the 
second objective of the thesis by providing an ethnographic account of the 
organisation as it functioned from April, 2004 to August, 2005, and the issues it 
faced during that time as it tried to develop new relationships with international 
donors. The ethnographic account is augmented by short scenarios which appear in 
boxes throughout Chapter Five and in following chapters.  
 8 
Chapter Six: continues to address the second objective of the thesis as well as 
addressing the third objective which is to identify the major challenges faced by KBH 
in maintaining its vision and mission and conducting its activities in the post-conflict 
environment of aid and development. Drawing on data collected as a participant 
observer during my time in the field, and interviews with local staff working for KBH 
and other local NGOs, it presents an ‘insiders’ view of the main challenges as seen 
from the perspective of local NGO workers.  
Chapter Seven: presents an ‘outsiders’ perspective by examining the findings from 
interview data from international aid workers and the issues and challenges they 
identify as impacting on local NGOs.  
Chapter Eight: brings together the findings from Chapter, Five, Six, and Seven and 
seeks to discuss these findings within the greater context of development as 
examined in the literature review and preceding chapters.  
Chapter Nine: concludes the thesis by summarising the main issues and reflecting 
on lessons learned. 
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 Chapter Two 
Doing Fieldwork in Timor-Leste 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides the background to the research and to the choice of the 
research subject. It also introduces ethnography as the research method employed 
in the study. It gives a personal account of conducting this form of research in the 
field as well as exploring some of the issues and problems encountered in doing so. 
Lastly, the research method is outlined including an explanation of the way in which 
the research objectives were approached and the way in which the data obtained 
were organised and presented.  
2.2 Background to the Research  
This research project emerged in November, 2002 when I visited Timor-Leste for 
two weeks on a small study grant. As a vocational education and training 
practitioner with 15 years experience in indigenous training as well as being a long-
term committee member of several Australian NGO Boards, I was interested in the 
work of local NGOs involved in livelihoods training in the non-formal sector9. More 
specifically I was interested in local NGOs, who, influenced by socialist ideologies 
coming from Cuba and Brazil, were using ‘popular education’ or ‘education for 
liberation’ practice, a methodology based on the theories of South American, Paulo 
Freire. Freire’s theories espouse the use of education as a tool for emancipation 
through collective action. This type of education practice is often seen as running 
counter to the mainstream and I was interested to see how it would adapt itself to 
the development environment, and more particularly how local groups using this 
methodology interfaced with the more westernised model of development and 
reconstruction.  
During my visits to different agencies and organisations, international and local I 
was struck by the overwhelming presence of the international aid industry and how 
seemingly separate it was, socially, economically, culturally and ideologically, to the 
lives of local people. This observation re-affirmed my earlier decision to focus my 
research on the interface between a local NGO and the aid industry  
Through my initial exploration of the various agencies and organisations operating 
within Dili, I came across Knua Buka Hatene (KBH) a small local Timor-Leste NGO 
which was conducting vocational training and popular education activities 
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throughout the district of Dili and surrounding areas. The organisation well 
encapsulated principles of liberation and social justice that had originally drawn me 
to the research area. Whilst the organisation itself was relatively new (KBH was 
officially established in 2001), it was made up of staff who had extensive experience 
in the non-formal sector having come from other NGOs or who had a background in 
student solidarity and resistance groups.  
KBH had other qualities, which typified local NGOs operating in Timor-Leste at the 
time, making it an appropriate subject for the study. The organisation was made up 
of a mixture of paid staff and volunteer staff who worked with the organisation 
periodically (when a project was running), full-time, and part-time often holding down 
jobs in other organisations. Its activities were overseen by a board of management 
made up of people from related NGOs and it had an executive committee, mission 
and objectives. As with many local NGOs at this time, it also was engaged in a 
partner relationship with an international NGO which provided technical and financial 
support to the organisation. 
Perhaps most importantly KBH, because of its affiliations and networks, and its 
close physical proximity to many other local NGOs, was not only an ideal subject but 
an ideal vantage point from which to observe the operation, experience, and day-to- 
day activities of other local NGOs and their interaction with the international aid 
industry in Timor-Leste. 
2.3 Why Long-term Fieldwork? 
Another issue that I was confronted with in my 2002 visit was the staggering number 
of ‘fly-in-fly out’ consultants and researchers like myself, who were arriving for a few 
weeks, doing the rounds of similar organisations, often interviewing the same limited 
group of people, and then departing. My conversations with fellow researchers and 
consultants did not ease my qualms. My concerns, and ones shared with 
researchers across a range of disciplines (Dowler 2001; Markowitz 2001; Sanjek 
2000; Cole 1988; Marcus & Fischer 1986; Spradley 1980), were for the limitations of 
the picture being captured in such a restricted time, and for the reliability of the data 
gathered, particularly in such a complex and multi-dimensional post-conflict 
situation. I therefore decided that my research should take place over an extended 
period of time and that I would situate myself in the field as an observer and as a 
participant in order to gain an holistic view and understanding of the world from the 
perspective of a local NGO. Another important consideration for me was that by 
situating myself with an NGO whose core work was training, I would be able to offer 
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some type of a contribution to the work of the NGO in exchange for my data 
gathering.  
2.4 Ethnography as a Method for Studying NGOs  
Having decided to embark on long-term field work involving a small local 
organisation, ethnography seemed the obvious choice of methodology to employ. 
Ethnography is literally a written account of the way of life of a group of people, their 
customs, beliefs, and behaviour, which is based upon information collected in the 
field (Harris & Johnson 2000). Although it originated as a form of anthropological 
inquiry, today ethnographic research is used across disciplines and in a variety of 
situations and contexts to investigate a broad range of communities and 
organisations. Ethnography takes as its purpose the understanding of people in their 
social environment. It does so by documenting their lives and their activities, 
attempting to understand their experience or reality from their own point of view. It 
also allows for this behaviour to be conceptualised as an expression of wider social 
themes or contexts (Reinhartz 1992).  
Ethnography is an appropriate methodology for studying communities, groups, and 
cultures for four main reasons. Firstly, it is long term; it involves the observation of a 
group over an extended period of time allowing for in-depth analysis of the group, its 
activities and the broader context in which its activities occur. Secondly, 
ethnographic research is responsive and adaptive, its “learning to testing nature” 
(Agar 1996) means it can follow the direction that the research is going or follow the 
researchers’ own path allowing them to narrow in on different research subjects or 
areas of interest. Thirdly, it is also flexible. An ethnographic approach can change to 
suit the conditions, use different techniques, methods and draw upon a range of 
qualitative and quantitative research methodologies (Sarantakos 1998). Fourthly, 
ethnography is especially amenable to studies which are exploratory or descriptive 
in nature (Genzuk n.d). Exploratory studies are well suited to the style of 
ethnography because it has the ability to gain general information for the purpose of 
describing the way things are or describing a reality as it is experienced by 
individuals.  
Ethnography also allows for information on the aspects of an environment or its 
variables to be gathered and situated (by the researcher) within the context of a 
wider field of debate, but it does so by blending the practical with the theoretical. As 
Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest, ethnographic research might be used to “put 
flesh on the bones of general constructs and their relationships” (p.27). As such 
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ethnographic research provides the kind of information that may be used to 
generate an hypothesis or add insight into areas requiring further research. 
Generally ethnographic research draws on three types of data collection: participant 
observation; interviews; and document analysis. Of these three data collection 
methods it is participant-observation (a key feature of fieldwork) that really 
distinguishes ethnography from other social research methods because it locates 
the researcher firmly within the research site. The ethnographic researcher lives with 
and/or works with the people they are studying for an extended period of time. This 
unique style of data collection which ‘embeds’ the fieldworker within the day-to-day 
life of the community allows the ethnographic researcher to share “as intimately as 
possible in the life and activities of the people they are wishing to study” (Cole 1988, 
p. 7).  
It is this ‘embeddedness’, of the researcher in the community, that helps yield 
research data of the richest kind because people’s behaviour is studied in everyday 
contexts, enabling a view of the community that includes a day-to-day account of its 
operations as well as an individual’s own interpretation of events. Ethnographic 
research, as Clammer (1984) suggests, yields the kind of data that cannot be 
gleaned from document analysis or interviews alone.  
It is, however, this same ‘embeddedness’ that can create for the fieldworker a 
myriad of problems and anxieties. The researcher in the field is forced to continually 
make judgments and decisions about their role within the community and the 
validity, reliability and objectivity of the data gathered as well as the ethical concerns 
of revealing and concealing data. Some of these issues will now be discussed. 
2.5 Situatedness: the Art of Location of Self within the Field  
In many ways the post-conflict, post-emergency, reconstruction environment of 
Timor-Leste renders the dilemma of how a researcher should situate her/his self 
within the research group null and void. The decision is in fact made for you, as in 
this environment there can be no ‘passengers’. There is too much at stake for local 
people, and there is too much that you, as an international researcher/worker, can 
do for them. You may observe, question, discuss, and interview but, as I quickly 
found out, if you intend to spend any time in the field attached to an NGO you will 
definitely participate.  
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I first started my ethnography with KBH as a volunteer and one of the hats that I 
immediately started wearing after entering the field, intentionally or not, was that of 
‘International aid worker’. As an international worker I was one of the ‘privileged’ few 
and therefore presented as a very useful commodity. No matter what your personal 
and professional background might be, you have the advantage of speaking and 
writing English – the language that is used for the majority of the written documents 
and applications submitted for funding. Most NGOs are dependent on foreign grants 
and any engagement brings with it a myriad of report writing, proposal writing, 
monitoring, and meetings, all required to be conducted/submitted in English. This is 
apart from the use of unfamiliar technological equipment such as scanners, email, 
computers, fax and skype which also require English language skills. 
 As an international worker you are also privy to the world of foreign international 
workers that largely direct how money will be spent in the country, where and with 
whom. You move in that world, unreachable to most Timor-Leste NGO workers, of 
visiting the cafes and bars; you talk of work, you receive advice, you receive 
information, you negotiate terms and contracts. In short, you develop a network of 
contacts with other international workers and international agencies that may 
connect you to a source of funding. You therefore become a vital link between the 
two worlds that local people would find very difficult to bridge. 
In the second stage of my fieldwork I began to wear the hat of KBH ‘adviser’, my 
main job being to ‘build the capacity’ of KBH staff in vocational education and 
training. It was a volunteer position sponsored by an Australian aid organisation, 
APHEDA-Union Aid Abroad (APHEDA), and through them partially funded by the 
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). I not only took on new 
roles and new responsibilities but in a very short time went from an independent and 
relatively passive role to a very active one with ties and responsibilities to not only 
KBH but also the international aid community.  
At the same time as I took on this role KBH was going through a major structural 
change stage and as both an international worker and adviser, I had skills and 
experience to assist them through that transition. My fieldwork, consequently, 
became action research as we together designed and implemented new strategies 
and processes for dealing with international agencies and donors and the work of 
the organisation. On reflection, I was playing a part in shaping the NGO into an 
organisation that international agencies and organisations could work with. I 
became, in short, an instrument of the ‘apparatus of development’, an ethical 
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dilemma in itself. However, the shaping process was not one-way and as much as I 
was shaping the organisation, I was also being shaped by it.  
2.6 The Relationship between Subject and Researcher 
As an ethnographic researcher you are located squarely in the field and in seeking 
to place yourself within the community you must negotiate all sorts of personal, 
social, physical and cultural territory. Much of this negotiation involves personal 
decisions about how you will conduct yourself in the field, and to a certain degree 
the form which your personal relations with subjects will take. As Appell (1978) says, 
you must choose the role you will play, how much of yourself and your goals you will 
reveal to the group, as well as being prepared to acknowledge that a consequence 
of making friendships within the group might lead to the distortion of your 
observations.  
My other roles within KBH included: friend; respected senior women; colleague; and 
tutor. Although I did not live with the group, we often travelled and socialised 
together and over time I developed close friendships with the female members of 
KBH in particular, and with staff in several other local organisations. The women not 
only extended their friendship to me in an open, accepting and uncritical way, but 
also invested a great deal of emotional energy in me. All of which provided me with 
a deep insight into their work, family and personal lives and a rich field of data, but 
at the same time bound me with a responsibility to them and their future. This 
personal responsibility presented me with all sorts of questions about what I could 
and should disclose in my research and the extent to which I could use the data 
without harming the people involved, them as individuals or as an organisation.  
Another unanticipated consequence of doing fieldwork, in the post-conflict aid and 
reconstruction environment, was the number of friends and acquaintances I made 
within the expatriate international community, nearly all of whom worked for 
international aid organisations, UN agencies or bilateral agencies. While providing 
me, both informally and formally10, with an enormous amount of information and 
insight into the aid world this also presented me with another layer of responsibility 
and dilemma about what could and could not be said and how to say it, if indeed it 
could be said at all, and where to draw the line between researcher and friend. 
Many of these people were walking a fine line and in their own words “trying to 
balance the needs of the donor against the needs of the communities” with whom 
they were working. This meant I was not only ‘studying down’ but ‘studying up’ and 
‘across’.  
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A more problematic side of ethnographic fieldwork is as Clammer (1984) states, the 
subject/object relationship between the fieldworker and those observed. This 
relationship is often based upon “unequal power and resources” and can be 
“temporary and exploitative for the observer but may have many unforeseen 
consequences for the observed” (1984, p. 65).  
In the post-conflict environment of Timor-Leste where many local NGOs are 
dependent on funds from international donors, to reveal weaknesses of a particular 
NGO may cause a donor to lose confidence in that NGO and withdraw support. 
Similarly to reveal a local NGO’s negative experiences with, or criticisms of, an 
international donor may have the same negative response. The researcher may 
have the data they need and it may enrich academic knowledge but the NGO is left 
worse off.  
2.7 Ethics and Responsibility  
As with all social research, ethics is an important consideration when conducting 
research in the field (Myers 2001; Akeroyd 1984; Ellen 1984; Appell 1978). In Timor-
Leste this is particularly the case with ethnographic research because the 
participatory nature of the research method means the researcher is very much 
bound up in the responsibility of the study. As such, certain precautions, 
preparations and experiences are essential components of doing this kind of 
research and even then, as Barnes (cited by Akeroyd 1984, p. 154) states, “a good 
researcher lives with an uneasy conscience but continues to be worried by it”.  
Ethics is considered by many to be one of the major issues in fieldwork (Myers 
2001; Cole 1988; Akeroyd 1984; Ellen 1984; Appell 1978). It is an area which has 
fluid boundaries and few guidelines. Ethics also cuts across nearly every facet of 
ethnographic research, particularly issues relating to the researchers situation within 
the group, representation and voice (Cole 1988). In discussing ethics, Cole (1988, p. 
12) states that it is a complex issue which many fieldworkers choose not to talk 
about. Some issues can be worked through using a professional code of ethics “but 
others ultimately rest in the conscience (and consciousness)” of the researcher 
(p.12). Fieldworkers, she contends, are always working on three levels: the 
personal, the political, and the academic, and it is the tension between the three 
which causes ethical dilemmas. The problem is less complex for those fieldworkers 
who have a clear affiliation with one level: if they believe their academic results are 
all important then the personal and the political will not get in the way. However, 
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most fieldworkers “respect and value all three” and walk a fine line between 
balancing the needs of all (Cole 1988, p.12). 
Appell (1980) adds another dimension to the debate by highlighting the power 
differential between the researched and the researcher and the ethical problems 
that “unequal” situations create. He notes that when a researcher is working in a 
community that has little power within the greater society, or is at odds with the 
dominant culture, unrealistic expectations might evolve regarding the researcher’s 
access to power and spheres of influence. He adds that a question we should be 
asking is how much does the researcher give to the host community in exchange for 
invading their privacy and opening them up to the possible risk of punishment or 
retaliation. He then poses the question of whether a researcher should directly 
involve him/herself in trying to “change the power relationship between the larger 
society and the host community, when the host community is at a disadvantage” 
(p.14).  
These issues were a constant anxiety for me in the field and anxiety remains in the 
writing of the research. As outlined above, an international worker has special status 
in the reconstruction environment and unrealistic expectations can develop, not only 
on the side of the local NGO. Your position of power and privilege can distort your 
own belief and expectations of what you can do and what you should do. Quite often 
I found myself as the intermediary, the broker, between the NGO and the aid 
industry. I could skilfully take the language and aspirations of the aid industry and 
trim and shape the expectations and actions of the NGO to fit these, or vice versa. 
However, after I had walked away what had changed? Both groups were reasonably 
happy with the outcome – but what had been gained and what had been lost? 
Integrity? Commitment to ideology?  
2.8 Representation 
Representation is the way researchers represent their informants and the research 
situation in text. In discussing representation, Lincoln and Guba (2000, p. 164) cite 
two main concerns inherent in traditional research writing. First, the researcher can 
over simplify complex issues, and second, the writing may reflect the dominant 
culture, fixed views, and embedded ideologies, and overlook other ways of seeing 
and interpreting information. The real danger is that the researcher inadvertently 
substantiates or perpetuates those traditional views and ideologies by their 
research. Lincoln and Guba argue that a way of avoiding the “dangerous illusions” 
that texts might perpetuate is to find new ways of representation, ones that “break 
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the boundary between “science and literature“ and portray the “contradiction and 
truth of human experience” (2000, p.184). They extol us to “break the rules” if that is 
what is needed in order to show, “even partially, how real human beings cope with 
both the eternal verities of human existence and the daily irritations and tragedies of 
living that existence” (p.184). 
For me, the issue of representation has been an almost paralysing phenomenon in 
writing up my research. Local NGOs in the aid reconstruction environment are 
largely dependent on international donor funding for their existence and the 
continuation of donor funding is dependent on outcomes which are embodied in final 
reports and evaluations. As the author/co-author of many such NGO reports, in 
Australia and overseas, I know first hand what is submitted and what is omitted, 
what is embellished and what is minimised, and depending on the audience, how 
the truth is defined and how the outcomes are manipulated. I could simply represent 
the organisation from the basis of a document analysis but the picture I would 
present is a vastly different view and understanding from the one I know from first 
hand experience. The dilemma is how to represent the NGO in text without 
damaging an organisation’s reputation and ultimately their income stream, and also, 
how to tackle difficult issues without white-washing them so that ‘lessons learned’ (a 
phrase heavily used in the development world) can really be understood and 
enacted.  
A further concern about representation is how it relates to translation, not simply as 
it relates to language but to the translation of meaning. This is an extremely 
important issue, as Cole (1988) points out, particularly for those conducting research 
in countries where the language and culture are alien to the researcher (Cole 1988). 
Many times throughout my fieldwork I sat through weekly staff meetings and 
monthly board meetings. While I could speak and understand some Tetun11 and 
Indonesian when people spoke slowly, when things became heated during a 
meeting I would lose track of what was being discussed. In these instances I relied 
largely on my reading of body language as well as having snatches of conversation 
hastily translated by one of the young English speaking staff members. I was getting 
‘some’ picture of what I thought was going on based upon the agenda and the pre-
history to the topic. However, in one instance, after a meeting when I had the 
opportunity to discuss the proceedings in some depth with the young worker, I found 
my assumptions were totally wrong. They were based on my own culturally 
determined experience and prior learning of how people act and react to others and 
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situations within a given social context. Hence being aware of these problems as a 
researcher in a different language and culture is critical.  
2.9 Voice 
“Voice is how authors express themselves within the inquiry” (Lincoln & Guba 2000, 
p. 183). In the past the researcher’s voice was non-existent, it was the “voice from 
nowhere”, nor was the informant’s voice heard but through the researcher’s own 
disembodied text. More recently there is greater recognition that the voices of both 
researcher and researched should be firmly located within the text. Just as I am 
physically located squarely in the research, my voice also comes from there. In 
some instances, cast as an international worker and adviser, I become, as Rosanna 
Hertz (as cited by Lincoln & Guba 2000, p. 183) describes, “the subject of the 
inquiry”. I am not telling a personal story, though there inevitably will be aspects of 
that within the text as: who I am, what I believe in, and what I do. These aspects 
have partly driven my choice of research topic, methods and analysis just as how I 
interact with others has influenced my acceptance within the research group and the 
level of openness with which they respond to me.  
As Myers (2001) reminds us, ethnography is not our personal journey but belongs to 
those we situate ourselves with and expose through our writing to an audience, 
which they, the researched, have little or no choice in determining. “Respect for, and 
intensive collaboration with, people in peripheral societies requires a strategy that 
balances an expression of our situatedness with careful, thoughtful and protective 
silence” (2001, p. 197). The story is primarily the story of the organisation and the 
people within it, set in the specific context of the post-conflict, aid and reconstruction 
environment, but it is their story with me in it. By using my own voice and theirs, I am 
not only exposing them to the outside world but myself also. This action has 
heightened my own sense of accountability and responsibility to the group, the 
actors and the context. After all, I will be judged not merely by a small academic 
circle removed from the research field but by those work colleagues, associates and 
friends who have informed the research and whose everyday lives I have chosen to 
examine and make public.  
2.10 Building a ‘True Story’  
The image of a qualitative researcher as a “bricoleur" or quilt maker who brings 
together pieces of history, politics and everyday life to form a montage or 
representation of reality, as described by Denzin and Lincoln (2000, p. 4) is both 
evocative and provocative. It is evocative because it opens a door to social research 
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that allows that there is not one story or linear representation of life and human 
activity, and provocative for the very same reasons. From the perspective of a 
quantitative researcher this description might provoke claims that the image gleaned 
is unscientific because it is not substantially based on quantifiable data. Rather, the 
research is based on observation and is therefore by nature subjective rather than 
objective, open to interpretation, and prone to having more than one answer.  
The question posed from this dual image is how can qualitative research be both 
multi-lineal, interpretive, and at the same time reliable, trustworthy and value free: 
the answer is probably, in positivist terms at least, that it cannot be. Lincoln and 
Guba (2000) claim that research can never really truly be objective as there are 
many ‘truths’ related to human existence, depending on the way it is viewed. 
However, by the careful use of multiple methods of investigation or ‘triangulation’ a 
particular truth can be exposed that has greater meaning than a linear 
representation can yield.  
2.11 Reflexivity  
One of the most critical activities or thought processes for an ethnographer is 
coming to terms with not only the research problem we choose, but with ourselves, 
and the multiple identities we assume in the research setting. This process is known 
as reflexivity and entails critical reflection on the self as a researcher and knowing 
the self as “inquirer and respondent, as teacher and learner” (Reinhartz as cited by 
Lincoln & Guba 2000, p. 183). Reinhartz suggests there are three main categories 
of “self” we bring to the research and they are the research-based selves, brought 
selves, and situationally-based selves. All these categories must be examined as 
they influence the type of research we do, how we conduct ourselves in the field, 
and what we write. 
Reflexivity is the ethnographic tool used by researchers in the field to deal with the 
questions raised earlier in the ethics section. There is no text book to read or 
supervisor to tell you how to act or what to think. These questions can only be 
answered in the field by constant thoughtful self-examination and reflection and by 
being as well informed and prepared as you can be about the situation, the actors, 
the hidden agendas and your own pre-conceived notions and beliefs.  
In the field I found reflexivity to be unquestionably the most often used process I 
employed and a constant and often irritating companion. After a long and difficult 
day there is nothing like self reflection to sap your confidence and your energy, and 
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to make you rethink your approach, your capabilities and your personal ability. The 
shear drag of being human in a human field can be totally debilitating. On the other 
hand it can be the process by which you can take stock, and from which lessons can 
really be learnt. It provides the space for you to step away and to see not only the 
situation but yourself as an actor in that field in all your various guises. It also allows 
a space to reflect on your priorities and responsibilities to your research, yourself 
and ultimately to your research group.  
2.12 Research Method  
My research design was based on Spradley’s (1980, p. 26-29) circular ethnographic 
research model. This method allows the researcher to act as a ‘bricoleur’, bringing 
pieces of the quilt together as Denzin and Lincoln (2000, p. 4) suggest, sorting the 
pieces, seeing how they fit and what patterns emerge, and then re-sorting them 
again and again until the final pattern emerges and the quilt is stitched into place.  
Spradley’s method is based on:  
• Selecting a research project; 
• Asking questions about that topic; 
• Collecting data; 
• Making an ethnographic record; 
• Analysing data from the ethnographic record; and 
• Going back to step one and refining and redefining the research project at 
each step of the process in an ongoing cyclical fashion.  
This process allows the research questions to evolve within the research rather from 
outside it.  
2.13 Field Design  
This research was conducted with KBH and involved three fieldwork stages from 
April 2004 to July 2005: 
Stage 1: 15 weeks in April – July 2004; 
Stage 2: 16 weeks in September– December 2004;  
Stage 3: 22 weeks in February - July 2005. 
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During each of the three stages of the project I was able to move through Spradley’s 
circular model refining the research questions and gathering and analysing data in 
an on-going process. 
2.14 Data Collection 
Ethnographic fieldwork entails data collection through a variety of methods. I 
employed three types of data collection, namely participant observation, document 
analysis and interviews which included informal and semi-structured design. Each 
method is explained as it relates to the three fieldwork stages. 
2.15 Preparation for Fieldwork  
During the first stage of the study I prepared myself for work in the field by reading 
widely about other people,s experience in the field (Dowler 2001; Gade 2001; 
Matheson 2001; Myers 2001; Kaghan et al. 1999; Pratt 1986) and attended 
workshops on various aspects of qualitative research. Spradley (1980), Hammersley 
and Atkinson (1995) and Ellen (1984) were all helpful texts in drafting the broad 
outline of my research design. Hammersley and Atkinson’s (1995) book was also 
particularly helpful in providing ways of organising data. Ultimately, however, I found 
Nelson’s (as cited by Hammersley & Atkinson 1995, p. 4) following observations 
helpful and liberating in terms of giving me freedom to choose my field approach. 
Nelson notes that the qualitative researcher can use whatever “strategies, methods 
or empirical materials are at hand” and if “new tools or techniques are needed then 
the researcher will do this; the choices as to which interpretive practices to employ 
are not set in advance”; and finally that “the choice of research practices depends 
upon the questions that are asked and the questions depend on their context”, what 
is available in the context, and what the researcher can do in that setting. In other 
words, the research site is fluid and unpredictable and a researcher needs to be 
inventive and flexible as well as reflective and rigorous in their approach.  
2.16 Stage 1: Entering the Field. 15 weeks April - July 2004 
This stage was very much about establishing the research environment and building 
up contacts, identifying key persons, getting to know the staff, the Board and key 
stakeholders, establishing relations and generally settling into the group. I also 
needed to get a clear understanding of: 
• KBH’s history, organisational structure and function;  
• KBH’s ideology, mission statement, values and core beliefs;  
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• The profile of the people within the organisation and its closest partners;  
• The skills and experience of staff and their connection to the organisation and 
to each other;  
• KBH’s client/community base and the type of service provided to them by 
KBH; and 
• The local and international organisations most closely related to and working 
with KBH. 
I did so by working in a voluntary capacity with KBH. My role as a participant 
observer was fully disclosed to the group, the Board of Management and major 
stakeholders including APHEDA-Union Abroad, KBH’s major donor/partner. The 
Board of Management gave me approval to carry out the research and to access 
documents. 
Data collection  
The organisation allowed me access to all their operational, planning and historical 
documents. These included:  
• Flow charts of the structure and functions of the organisation;  
• Profiles of their partner organisations; and  
• Proposals and tenders, budgets, reports to funding organisations, training 
program outlines and guidelines.  
 I also acted as scribe for the strategic planning process the organisation went 
through soon after I arrived. The process was conducted over one week and l was 
given access to these documents. An evaluation session was also held a few weeks 
later by an international researcher undertaking an evaluation of AusAID funding 
projects and again l was invited to participate in this session.  
Internal interviews 
Most of the interviews at this stage were done within the organisation and were 
conducted on an informal basis. For example, I learnt more about the organisation 
and those who worked in the building from sitting on the steps at the front of the 
building, listening and talking to groups or individuals, than from more formal 
interviews. My focus was to get an understanding of each person’s connection to 
KBH and to each other. I also wanted to identify key people from within KBH and 
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outside it for the second phase of my research when I planned to conduct more 
structured interviews 
Journals  
I kept a daily journal to record the day-to-day work of the organisation such as 
activities and meetings and informal discussions with KBH staff and its associated 
organisations.  
I also kept a reflective journal. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, reflexivity is an 
important part of conducting ethnographic fieldwork and the journal helped me 
reflect on my various ‘roles’ within the organisation, such as researcher, 
international worker, colleague, and the ways in which these roles were impacting 
my research.  
Notes from these journals have informed the earlier part of this chapter.  
At the end of this period I refined the questions, in consultation with my supervisor, 
for the next stage. From this process my second and third objectives or questions 
were broadly developed namely 1). How does KBH interact with the international 
world? and 2). What are the major challenges it faces in so doing? 
2.17 Stage 2: Fieldwork. 14 weeks September - December 2004  
During this stage my work role with the organisation changed quite dramatically as I 
took on a technical adviser role at the request of the organisation. This change, 
while giving me greater insight into KBH’s interaction with the international aid 
industry, also challenged me to be more reflective about my part in steering that 
interaction and shaping KBH to a more western model of development.  
Data collection 
I continued to gather ethnographic data through observation, document analysis and 
informal interview. My focus at this stage was on my second objective relating to 
KBH’s interaction with the aid world. I particularly focused on interactions and 
recorded these as case study scenarios (data from these scenarios augmented in 
stage three, are presented in boxes in Chapter Five and following chapters).  
Interviews 
Carrying on from Stage One, I developed eight key local contacts with whom I had 
daily or weekly contact. This group was drawn from within KBH and related 
organisations. These contacts were mostly female and at mostly under 30 years of 
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age. All had worked for local NGOs or international NGOs for more than a two-year 
period and held a variety of positions within their organisations. This group 
represented local workers across a wide field of local NGOs and appear in the 
following chapters as, Key Local (KL.20 - KL.27).  
I also had more formal discussions with six other contacts from various other local 
NGOs. These people were generally from larger organisations and held more 
prominent positions within their organisations and amongst local NGO groups. They 
also had more interaction with international organisations and agencies. This group 
appears in the following chapters under the code, Key Local (KL.27- KL.33).  
Journals  
I continued to keep a daily journal which I combined with the reflective journal 
focusing particularly on my changing role within the group and the ethical 
repercussions of the change; that is, how this might impact on the integrity of my 
research.  
2.18 Stage 3: Exploration. 22 weeks February - July 2005 
In the first three months I continued data collection and informal interviews and 
started to talk around the issues that KBH staff and staff from other local NGOs felt 
were impacting on them. From these informal conversations, as well as issues 
specifically outlined as weaknesses and challenges in the KBH strategic plan, and 
my own observations, I started to draft a table. This table looked at the issues, their 
background and the consequences for KBH. Data from this table form the basis of 
the findings presented in Chapter Six together with the anonymous voices of local 
workers.  
 I also started to refine a set of more focused questions I wanted to ask key local 
and international workers.  
Semi-structured interviews  
In the last month of fieldwork I spent four weeks interviewing key local and 
international staff in a series of semi-structured interviews. My intention was to ask 
both groups a range of questions primarily focused on what they thought the 
challenges were for local NGOs working with international organisations and 
agencies, particularly in the transition phase from post-emergency to long term-
development, and also what they believed to be the major internal and external 
challenges faced by local NGOs.  
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I selected two local staff from my close local contact group (as above) to assist the 
conduct of the semi-structured interviews. Both contacts spoke English fluently (I did 
not understand the local language) and therefore could convey the meaning of my 
questions to the rest of the group. The answers they gave, therefore, often reflected 
the group of eight rather than a single voice. Their specific comments augment the 
many hours of informal discussions with all eight close local informants and six other 
local informants.  
The international interviewees were not chosen randomly. Some I chose because of 
the length and breadth of their experience in the field and some I chose because of 
their position in an organisation or because of the type of organisation/agency for 
which they worked. What I was trying to achieve through the interviews was a 
thoughtful exploration of the issues by a group of experienced people from another 
perspective. 
At the time of the interviews: 
• Four of the international interviewees worked for a multi-lateral agency, (United 
Nations agencies);  
• Three worked for a bilateral agency, for example US Aid, AusAID or New 
Zealand Aid, and two of these were senior managers;  
• Five worked for international non-government organisations;  
• Two worked for local government supported by bi-lateral funding; and 
• One worked for a local NGO. 
Each international interviewee was rated on their importance to my study on a scale 
of 1-5, the criteria being their level of personal experience in Timor and in similar 
post conflict countries, the type of work they were doing and the level at which they 
were working in regards to LNGOs, their core work relationship with LNGOs 
(example: funding, capacity building, partnering, and their ability to speak the 
language).  
Of the 15 interviewees, nine rated five on my scale and of these, seven spoke fluent 
Tetum. In short, the individuals whom I had selected were extremely experienced, 
committed, hard-working and knowledgeable people and, while they were loyal to 
their organisations, they were open and honest about their own and their 
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organisations’ limitations and inadequacies. This group appears in the following 
chapters as Key Internationals (KI.1- KI.15). 
2.19 Data Analysis and Review 
While data analysis was done on a continuous basis throughout the three phases of 
field work, the final organisation of the data took three shapes: document analysis, 
ethnographic and case study description and interpretation, organisation and 
reduction of interview transcripts into themes and threads.  
Document analysis  
As outlined in Stage One most of the document analysis was carried out during field 
activities and forms the basis of the first section of Chapter Five.  
Ethnographic and scenario description  
These data were organised to reflect the research objectives and appear in the 
thesis in two ways: 
• As an ethnographic description of KBH in chapter five, which gives a 
‘snapshot” of the organisation as it was from 2004-2006, and 
• In the form of vignettes or scenarios contained in boxes in Chapters Five and 
following chapters, which attempt to exemplify or relate lived experience to the 
issues discussed in these chapters.  
Reduction and interpretation of interview data  
The interview data from the semi structured interviews were organised around the 
following headings and themes: 
1. Internal challenges to meet external conditions:  
• Language and technology; staffing and recruitment; and governance 
including leadership and management, financial management and 
administration.  
2. Interface issues: 
• Donor relationships; ideological differences; dependency and legitimacy; 
unequal relationships, and networking and transition issues.  
From analysing and reviewing the data I also began to form the ‘bigger picture’ 
questions about what I wanted to explore further in my literature review. While a 
literature review is sometimes done prior to fieldwork, I have used the literature 
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review as part of the exploratory process of this research. As Punch notes (1998), 
how and when to do a literature review is a matter of judgment and can be 
influenced by several things including; the research problem; the research 
questions; and how much the researcher wants to follow established directions. In 
terms of this research it was not until I was in the field that I really understood how 
all encompassing the aid environment is and that a local NGO cannot be viewed as 
separate to that world. Therefore, the major part of my literature review, as it 
appears in Chapter Four, was done during and at the end of my fieldwork study as a 
way of making sense of what was happening ‘on the ground’.  
2.20 Limitations of the Research  
This study focuses on one local NGO in Timor-Leste. It is a particular type of NGO 
that evolves out of the post-conflict, post-emergency and is almost entirely 
financially dependent on international funds. Therefore it is not representative of all 
local NGOs in Timor-Leste or in post-conflict recovery situations but shares many 
similar characteristics with a high percentage of them.  
The international and national interviewees interviewed during the conduct of the 
research were not selected randomly but chosen deliberately by the researcher on 
the basis of their experience and skills or their position within an organisation. The 
conclusions drawn and recommendations made from this research must be viewed 
in the context of these limitations.  
However, an in depth study of a single group can provide important detailed 
information about particular cases.  
2.21 Conclusion  
I have deliberately introduced this chapter before the literature review because I 
believe by doing so it assists the reader to make better sense of the research and 
the context in which the data were collected. This research started with an idea that 
took me into the field with questions and as such became an exploration of not 
simply local NGOs but the world that surrounds them and through which they must 
navigate. The following chapter introduces that world; one dominated by the aid 
industry, and locates Timor-Leste NGOs within it.  
 
 28 
 Chapter Three 
The Aid Industry and local NGOs in Timor-Leste 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes what the aid and reconstruction industry looks like in action 
on the ground in Timor-Leste, its characteristics and the immediate impacts on the 
local community. It then looks at the history of local NGOs from before and after 
1999, paying attention to how the aid and reconstruction industry impacts local 
NGOs, in the varying stages of emergency, post-emergency, and transition into long 
term development.  
3.2 Enter the UN as UNTAET 
In October 1999 the United Nations Security Council officially established the United 
Nations Transitional Administration for Timor-Leste (UNTAET), a United Nations 
mission to oversee the recovery and rehabilitation of Timor-Leste following the 
dramatic violence and devastation unleashed by Indonesian soldiers and militias in 
September 1999. In mid-November this mission began taking responsibility and 
control from the United Nations (UN) Organisation for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) which in turn had replaced the United Nations 
Mission in Timor-Leste (UNAMET). UNAMET had been in Timor-Leste to organise 
and conduct the vote of the Popular Consultation in September 1999.  
By the time the UNTAET arrived in Dili, after the International Force for Timor-Leste 
(INTERFET)12 forces led by the Australian Army had stabilised the city and the last 
Indonesian soldiers had left, the city was virtually empty of people and infrastructure. 
A United Nations report estimates that 500,000 of the territory’s population of 
800,000 were forced from their homes and nearly all infrastructure was either 
damaged or completely destroyed. A whole scale humanitarian relief effort was also 
under way, providing emergency food and shelter and basic services, carried out by 
other UN agencies. In a unique situation UNTAET moved into what could be 
described as a vacuum because for the first time in the history of the UN, a UN 
operation was given license to take control of all government departments including: 
finance, justice, infrastructure, economic and social affairs (Ishizuka 2000). The 
huge recovery and nation-building program, supported by the large UN Peace 
Keeping Force (PKF) of 8,950 troops and 200 military observers, was already set in 
train as local people and expatriates began returning to Dili.  
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3.3 The UN Revisited as UNMISET 
The post-emergency world of aid and reconstruction is a strange one with many 
surreal qualities. Keeping pace with the regular changes of names of missions is 
bewildering enough in itself. My first experience of a post-emergency environment 
was in Timor-Leste in late November 2002, almost 3 years after the independence 
vote (Popular Consultation) and five months after Timor-Leste had become a nation 
in its own right13. The UNTAET mission ended and was replaced by a new mission 
called the United Nations Mission in Support of Timor-Leste (UNMISET). The US 
dollar replaced the Rupiah as the accepted currency and Portuguese became the 
official language, despite the fact a generation of Timor-Leste young people spoke 
only Bahasa Indonesian, Tetun and local dialects. Although Timor-Leste was not yet 
a member of the World Bank or the IMF, both organisations were playing an integral 
role in the reconstruction process. International NGOs from many parts of the world 
were represented and advisers from bilateral donor countries were numerous 
In Dili itself basic infrastructure and services such as water and electricity supply, 
even if haphazard, had been restored and while many buildings remained burnt out 
several had been rehabilitated for use by the government, UN agencies, bilateral 
and multilateral bodies as well as international NGOs. Several hotels had also been 
refurbished catering mainly for international workers, as had restaurants, cafes and 
supermarkets. Consequently the cost of living in Dili, with the influx of international 
workers and American dollars, had risen dramatically. An enduring memory of that 
time was sitting in a café on a main street near the post office in Dili at lunch time. 
The entire street appeared to be lined with new UN four-wheel drive vehicles as the 
international staff both civilian and military, lunched at the cafes and restaurants 
which lined the street. It would have been easy to be persuaded, by the 
cosmopolitan atmosphere of one particular café, that you were on a Melbourne café 
strip or in some European city, if not for the stark contrast of the burnt out buildings 
opposite and the taunting of a young male phone card seller by a relaxed PKF 
soldier, lunching with friends, and all with machine guns over their shoulders.  
Photographing that scene I wondered what sense the young local population was 
making of this new world of which they were now a part. The tensions in Timor-
Leste at that time seemed palpable with unemployment and poverty levels high and 
an uneasy relationship existing between young people and Special Forces including 
the police. It did not seem surprising when two weeks later Dili erupted into violence 
over a demonstration involving teachers and students who were protesting about the 
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aggressive tactics by a special police force when arresting a student accused of 
being involved in a gang killing. During the ensuing riot one student died and shops 
and hotels were looted and torched in the central district.  
3.4 UNMISET Mark II, 2004 
By the time I returned to start my research in April 2004, the situation had changed 
quite dramatically. Timor-Leste was well into a transition phase, what the UN calls 
the post-crisis/emergency stage. By May, 2004 the Peace - Keeping forces had left 
following the Independence Day celebrations which marked the second birthday of 
the republic, leaving a skeleton staff of UN administrators and advisers. Many 
Timor-Leste had lost their jobs as UN support staff, while many international 
advisers were asked to continue, but on much reduced salaries. UNMISET (United 
Nations Mission in Support of Timor-Leste) had officially ended its mission but its life 
had been prolonged for at least another year. While the peace-keepers had 
departed, a strong United Nations Police (UNPOL) presence remained, drawn from 
across the globe (Turkey, Samoa, Zambia, Australia, Brazil to name a few places), 
who were ‘guiding’ the Timor-Leste police force in good policing techniques. Few of 
them spoke Tetun, Bahasa Indonesian or Portuguese.  
3.5 Major Characteristics of a Post-crisis Country 
Countries recovering from long-term conflict, particularly where there has been 
major intervention by the aid world, have several characteristics in common. 
Summarising Mckechnie14 (2004), these characteristics include continuing instability 
and insecurity particularly where reconciliation has not been achieved between 
internal forces which can lead to either “an unstable alliance of competing parties or 
to an uneasy coalition between fighters and technocrats who have sat out the war in 
relative comfort abroad” (p. 1). Furthermore, there is a low capacity to absorb aid in 
the first three years due to institutional and physical constraint, high public 
expectations of the benefits of what peace will bring and unrealistically high 
expectations by donors for quick results where donor policy makers have little 
understanding of the difficulties involved in all aspects of project implementation. All 
of this he argues is worsened by the “CNN” effect, namely that when a post-conflict 
country is least able to effectively absorb foreign assistance it is inundated with it 
and contrarily, just as it reaches the point where it is most able to benefit from help, 
interest diminishes dramatically. 
In Timor-Leste the general characteristics as described by Mckechnie (2004) were 
evident coupled with characteristics more specific to the Timor-Leste experience. 
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First, there was a new and relatively inexperienced government trying to work within 
a new democratic system after a long period of conflict, with a low GDP and a low 
rate of interest in terms of international investment (CAPET: Capacity Building 
Program for East Timor Project n.d). To balance the budget the new government 
was dependent on funding through bilateral and multilateral donors and, as such, 
was subject to the rules, regulations and governance of the IMF, World Bank and 
donor countries (East Timor: United Nations Development Assistance Framework 
(2003-2004) n.d). Second, a large expatriate Portuguese speaking community had 
returned from exile and took up many leadership and public service jobs, from which 
many of the ex-combatants and Indonesian speaking young Timorese were 
excluded. The consequences of this scenario were a tiered society and a degree of 
instability and dissatisfaction with the government, particularly felt by the combatants 
who had fought for liberation with seemingly little reward (Garrison 2005). Third, as 
the huge international presence, including UN agencies, multilateral and bilateral 
donors as well as international aid organisations began to diminish more local 
people lost their jobs in the service and support industries. The cost of living, 
however, remained relatively high and there was enormous disparity between the 
salaries of international and local workers. Fourth, the legacy of a long history of 
colonisation and occupation also manifested itself in a largely unskilled workforce 
(predominantly agrarian based), high rates of illiteracy, a high percentage of the 
population under 25 with few employment opportunities, as well as poor health 
statistics and the majority of the population living in poverty (East Timor: United 
Nations Development Assistance Framework (2003-2004) n.d). Finally, as 
McKechnie (2004) observed, just when Timor-Leste in 2004 was at the peak of its 
ability to absorb foreign assistance a large portion of the aid industry moved on.  
3.6 History of NGOs and Civil Society Organisations in Timor-Leste before 
Independence 
Local NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs)15 have had a long history in 
Timor-Leste and played an important role in the struggle for independence from the 
later half of the 1970s to 1999, not only in terms of resistance but by providing 
education and health services (Hunt 2004)16. As Hunt describes, these 
organisations which include, student groups, youth groups, and women’s groups, as 
well as organisations formed under the banner of the Catholic Church, worked 
courageously under extremely difficult and often dangerous circumstances from 
within a repressive regime.  
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International aid organisations also had a considerable input into Timor well before 
the Independence vote in 1999. In the late 70s the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) 
and the international committee of the Red Cross, entered Timor-Leste and provided 
emergency relief “after the Indonesian invasion and a famine” (Hunt 2004, p. 4). 
After 1989, however, as the Indonesian regime began to allow more contact with the 
outside world more international agencies began to provide support to local groups 
and in the 1990s several international NGOs began working on the ground in Timor-
Leste. During this period, more local NGOs also started to form, focusing on human 
rights, women’s rights and violence against women as well as health and 
emergency relief. In an attempt to establish an organising body, the Timor-Leste 
NGO Forum was started in 1998 by local groups, but their work was hampered in 
1999, as Hunt (2004) outlines, by the worsening security situation.  
Young people in Timor-Leste played a crucial and often dangerous role in resistance 
to Indonesian occupation from 1975 to 1999. In 1998 the Timor-Leste Student’s 
Solidarity Council (ETSSC) staged a demonstration involving 10,000 to 15,000 
people, calling for a referendum and the release of political prisoners held by the 
Indonesians. Students from ETSSC continued to play a prominent part in the lead 
up to, and during, the Popular Consultation, firstly in public education and secondly 
as observers at the referendum, often putting their own safety at risk. In 1996, Jose 
Ramos Horta17, in an interview said it was the youth of Timor-Leste who were 
providing most of the active resistance (Horta n.d). Many students and young men 
and women were also involved as UN volunteers in preparing and registering people 
for the popular consultation and were targeted by the militias in the violence that 
followed the vote. Many were also the first back on the scene to dispense aid and to 
play an active part in the restoration of their country.  
3.7 The Emergency Period and Dislocation of Local NGOs 
As Hunt (2004) observes, local NGOs lost everything in the violence and destruction 
following the referendum and NGO members like the majority of Timor-Leste people 
were forced to flee to the mountains, overseas or across the border into West Timor. 
By the time they were able to return, the aid community, including many 
international NGOs, were already working under the direction of the UN office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) to provide much needed 
emergency supplies including shelter, water, food, medical assistance and water 
and sanitation.  
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Although the intervention was timely and stopped the immediate violence, tensions 
immediately started to grow between the returning locals and the newcomers. Both 
Hunt (2004) and Brunnstrom (2003) have reported on the tensions that arose during 
this time between local NGOs, Timor-Leste political leadership and the International 
community, in particular. In Hunt’s words the “Timorese [local NGOs and political 
leaders] were feeling excluded by the huge international presence” and the situation 
was further aggravated by the “disparity in resources” of the UN compared with 
those of the Timorese leadership and local NGOs (Hunt 2004, p. 5).  
Brunnstrom18 makes two important points regarding the ‘mindset’ and attitudes of 
the internationals relief staff at this stage. First, she observes, the relief 
organisations and their staff initially arrived in Timor-Leste to carry out immediate 
relief operations. They had a specific task; they were focused on that task and were 
trained to conduct those operations according to procedures. Presumably the task 
did not include, or leave time for, extensive negotiations with local leaders and 
NGOs. Second, and more importantly, Brunnstrom comments, that they came with 
“an attitude common to international organisations: namely that of assuming that the 
systems and institutions that function best are those created in the image of those 
dominant in Western countries” (2003, p. 314). In nearly all her discussions with 
local NGO workers, Brunnstrom claims they expressed their disappointment in the 
international NGO’s lack of knowledge and interest in “local circumstances, history, 
culture, traditional social structures, and languages”. Furthermore, little time and 
effort was put into improving their understanding while “standardised solutions and 
approaches reflecting a top-down Western attitude to development applied” (2003, 
p. 314).  
The following comments in a paper evaluating UNTAET’s performance in the 
emergency stage appear to exemplify some aspects of the “mindset” and “attitude” 
to which Brunnstrom referred. The author of the paper, Dr Ishizuka (2000, p. 7)19, 
citing an interview with the Deputy of Civil Military Affairs, UNTAET, states, that 
“failures in implementation of the emergency plans arranged by his department were 
related to difficulties with local NGOs” who were considered “unprofessional and 
untrained” while others “totally lacked communication and coordination skills within 
their organisations”.  
Hunt and Brunnstrom were not alone in reporting on the tensions existing between 
local NGOs and aid industry during the emergency period. Independent reports on 
the work of the United Nations Organisations and the World Bank at that time reflect 
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similar concerns. While acknowledging the difficult circumstances that international 
staff were working under during the emergency period, the reports point to the lack 
of inclusion of local NGOs in the relief and decision-making processes during this 
time and in the lack of prior knowledge about local language and politics and culture 
held by international staff (A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change 2003; 
Hurford 2001). Despite the apparent lack of the engagement of local organisations 
during the emergency, the enormous effort local NGOs had made prior to the 
emergency was recognised as they were responsible for supplying the majority of 
humanitarian assistance.  
This is not to say that local NGOs were without problems and weaknesses. Many 
were flooded with funds without having the proper financial accountability processes 
to deal with the funds or strong and experienced leadership. Criticisms of local 
NGOs came not only from external sources, but from among local NGOs 
themselves. Hunt refers to these criticisms as does Holloway (2004). In several 
interviews I had with local NGO workers, they also pointed to weaknesses in the 
leadership of some of the less experienced NGOs (KL.30, KL31).  
3.8 NGOs in the Post-emergency Period  
It is not easy in aid terms to be exact in defining when the emergency phase ends 
and the post-emergency, reconstruction phase begins, as different agencies have 
different views on this. Some of the bigger organisations like USAID and the UN 
agencies have a clear delineation and as one phase finishes new staff and new 
programs move in. This can cause problems in terms of continuity and consistency 
with partner organisations, particularly local organisations, which struggle to keep up 
with the changing language and criteria of the new group as well as the new faces. 
By the time UNTAET had finished its mission in Timor-Leste in May 2002, the 
number of local NGOs had swelled from the 34 registered with the UN in January 
2000, to 231 registered with the NGO Forum20 in early 2002 (NGOs in East Timor 
2004). These NGOs were working across a wide range of areas including 
agriculture, livelihoods, women’s rights, and human rights, as well as playing an 
important role in education and advocacy. Several NGOs played, and continued to 
play, a ‘watch dog role’, providing critical feedback on how Timor-Leste was being 
re-shaped and advocating continuously for a much greater say for Timor-Leste in 
the development process. Many of those involved in the new and established NGOs 
were young people, often students, who had taken part in the early demonstrations 
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before the Popular Consultation and many had strong ideas of a democratic socialist 
society strongly influenced by Cuban and South American models (KL.32)21.  
3.9 2004: Local NGOs in Transition  
By 2004 the number of NGOs had dropped from 231 in 2002 to 170 (NGOs in East 
Timor 2004). Some that had been set up purely for single projects or to assist in the 
emergency response had come to the end of their life while others struggled with a 
lack of operational funds that would enable them to continue their work. By this time 
many international NGOs had left the country while others continued on but with 
greatly reduced programs. Most local NGOs, no matter how strong, were in a state 
of transition. Dili-based local NGOs particularly those with an international volunteer 
working with them or a local staff member with international experience, were in a 
better position to negotiate the change as they had better links to information 
networks.  
3.10 Shaping the Process of Change 
In the broader picture of how local NGOs were being shaped by, and responding to 
this new environment, Janet Hunt (2004, p. 25) outlines the possibility of donors 
“driving the agendas of local NGOs” as local NGOs struggled and competed for 
funds while trying to come to terms with new ways of reporting and operating as 
required by donor organisations. Richard Holloway (2004, p. 9-10) in his paper on 
Civil Society Organisations in Timor-Leste, also talks about the “new breed” of local 
NGOs that had emerged during the emergency, who were totally dependent on 
external funding and in danger of operating according to donor agendas rather than 
responding to the needs of the communities they represented.  
Whilst communities and individuals are often eager to take on new ways of doing 
things, (new economic systems, ideas, or even interventions to reduce violence, 
etc), it is reasonable that they should want to pick and choose from what is available 
and incorporate the bits they think will fit into their existing ways of doing things and 
do this on their own terms. In many ways it’s all about remaining in control and 
shaping your own future. Hence, whilst Holloway may suggest that NGOs were in 
danger of operating in accordance with donor agendas, he fails to recognise that 
NGOs are equally capable of taking advantage of the additional donor funds to work 
to their own advantage and to the advantage of their communities.  
This thesis adds to the work of Hunt, Holloway and Brunnstrom by representing the 
less heard voices of local NGO workers, the ones who normally would not be 
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interviewed. This is a group who, while they may have problems and criticisms of 
the institutional and systemic rigidity of the aid industry, nevertheless appreciate and 
learn from the human face of aid and development as represented by the many 
international aid actors with whom they interact.  
3.11 Conclusion 
In Timor-Leste local NGOs have had a long history of adapting and shaping their 
operations, firstly under the strict Indonesian rule, then later post-1988 with a more 
‘liberal’ Indonesian government when more NGOs were able to operate, and more 
recently since 1999. All these different stages have required that NGOs negotiate 
with those in power and with external funding agencies to sustain their existence. It 
is how they strategically negotiate, adapt, shape, and bend to the varying political 
and economic situations that are of most interest in understanding the workings of 
local NGOs. Whilst Hunt and Brunnstrom point to how overseas donors were driving 
the agendas of local NGOs, this in itself is not too surprising nor does it reveal much 
about what was exactly happening within the NGOs and how they were adapting to 
these new donor demands.  
The following chapter seeks to place the humanitarian intervention in Timor-Leste 
within the greater context of global development intervention and the role of local 
NGOs in that sphere. 
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 Chapter Four  
Development: From Discourse to Practice  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Long before the crisis situation occurred following the independence vote in 
December, 1999, and the United Nations Security Council authorised an official 
intervention on humanitarian and security grounds, plans were being made outside 
the country for its recovery and long term development22. Who makes these plans? 
What are they based upon? Under whose authority are they implemented? And, 
what historical, ideological, political, economic, security and social agendas underlie 
them? These are some of the questions I explore in the first section of this chapter 
where I examine the history of development to intervention.  
The second section of the chapter looks at post-development theory and its critics, 
not to determine if ‘development’ works or if it is ‘right’, but as a means of firstly 
‘unthinking ‘ and ‘rethinking’ my own notions of development, and secondly, 
constructing a framework for examining development as a discourse and as a model 
of intervention. Similar to post-development writers who have used the work of 
Foucault as a ‘departure point’ for critiquing development, I am interested in the 
extrapolation of his observations on power and governance to the development 
context. More specifically, I am interested in exploring Foucault’s theory of liberalism 
as a rationality or technique of governance, as a starting point for understanding the 
complex set of relationships linking the state, the development apparatus and civil 
society (NGOs) in the aid and reconstruction context, and how this informs the 
language of development.  
The third section of this chapter looks at the ‘Third Sector’, a broad term that 
encompasses non-government organisations in all their various forms, both 
international and national. It looks at how NGOs are defined, their role in 
development, and the issues faced by local NGOs in their ‘partnerships’ with 
international NGOs and multilateral and bilateral agencies. In essence it seeks to 
place local/indigenous NGOs within the broader context of the development 
framework in order to examine the issues and challenges they face on a daily basis 
in a local surrounding from a global perspective. 
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The Development of Development  
4.2 Meanings and Understandings 
There are many meanings and understandings applied to the concept of 
development. It can be used as Huagerud and Edelman (2005, p. 86) describe, to 
“connote improvements in well being, living standards, [and] opportunities” and it 
may also refer to industrialisation, modernisation or globalisation”. Escobar (2005, p. 
432) a post-development writer, states that ‘development’ can be best described as 
“…an apparatus that links forms of knowledge about the Third World with the 
deployment of forms of power and intervention”. From an economic perspective it 
can be seen simply as a “flow of financial resources” linked to a set of conditions, 
priorities and procedures which are determined by a global coordinating body 
(Malmqvist 2000, p. 1). The first definition implies a movement or progression 
towards an accepted goal whether social or economic; the second describes 
development as a totality of information, power and action directed at a defined 
target; the third describes it as a mechanism of economic control from an 
international perspective for the good of all.  
For those of us who have grown up in the West, the Global North, or the ‘First 
World’, or what we might loosely call a ‘developed country’, we may vaguely think of 
development as a state of being that we exist in, and something to which 
‘underdeveloped’ or ‘Third World’ countries should aspire to, or at least be assisted 
in attaining. As citizens we may question our governments’ interventions and 
motives in the name of development, but we rarely confront the notion of 
development itself. Without really understanding or questioning why, we may have, 
as Tegegn (1997, p. 7) remarks, “surrendered” ourselves to the dominant paradigm 
and discourse of development.  
4.3 The Historical Phases of Development  
 While Haugerud & Edelman (2005) propose three historical stages of development, 
and trace the first stage back to the rapid growth of industrial capitalism in the late 
18th century, for many writers the ‘modern’ history of development started in the 
1940s after WW II. For this group the starting point was the Bretton Woods 
conference held in New Hampshire, USA, in 1944, attended by the United States 
and the heads of 43 European countries. It was during this conference that the 
Bretton Woods financial institutions, International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, were established. The initial purpose of the institutions was to support 
European countries, ravaged by war to gain economic security for their citizens. A 
 39 
new economic plan for international economic cooperation was devised which 
included “a system of fixed currency exchange rates, limitations on capital 
movements across national boundaries and the institutionalising of national 
economic planning to promote growth “(Haugerud & Edelman 2005, p. 6). The three 
key architects of this new plan were the US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, 
his chief economic advisor Harry Dexter White, and British economist John Maynard 
Keynes (Bretton Woods Project 2007). As the de-colonisation process started, 
Asian, African and Latin-American nation-states were soon included.  
At much the same time as the talks were going on around the formation of the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, discussions were also being held to 
establish a new international organisation which was to replace the League of 
Nations. On the 24 October 1945, in San Francisco, with the ratification of the 
United Nations Charter, the United Nations officially came into being. It was initially 
proposed and deliberated on by representatives from the United States, the United 
Kingdom, China and the Soviet Union (About the United Nations/History n.d.). Fifty 
countries, predominantly from Western Europe, signed the charter which, while 
proposing to uphold human rights and maintain peace and security, also sanctioned 
the deployment of the ”international machinery for the promotion of the economic 
and social advancement of all peoples” (Charter of the United Nations n.d.). By 1945 
the World Bank and the IMF, supported by the United Nations as the international 
governing body, became the major apparatuses of development with a mandate to 
bring peace and prosperity to all.  
4.4 The Invention of the Third World 
Not all writers see the Bretton Woods conference as the pivotal moment in modern 
development history. Many writers, particularly those critical of development itself 
(for example Escobar 2005; Esteva 1992 and Sachs 1992), see the defining 
moment as United States’ President Truman’s inaugural speech in 1949, in which 
he declared the Southern hemisphere to be ‘underdeveloped’, and it to be America’s 
task to use its technological and scientific expertise to raise living standards in these 
‘underdeveloped’ areas (Esteva 1992, p. 2). For Esteva (1992 p. 6) it was at this 
pivotal moment in history “that two billion people became underdeveloped” and 
under that blanketing label lost their “diverse cultural and social identities”. Escobar 
(2005), Esteva (1992) and Sachs (1992) have described this moment variously as a 
time when the “dream”, “myth”, “fairytale” of ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’ 
became part of the modern discourse and through it the ‘Third World’ was invented. 
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However this was not merely a ‘dream’, as this group of writers observe, it was a 
time when the ‘poor’ suddenly became visible and identifiable as a problem and 
interventions were planned to lift them out of their poverty with America and Western 
European countries as the ‘developed countries’, showing the way.  
4.5 East, West, North, South Relations  
Offering a more geo-political view of development history, Corbridge (1995) sums up 
the post World War II stage in the following way. He describes it as a product of 
largely Western European and North American ideas of progress which emerged in 
the 1940s and 1950s against a backdrop of de-colonisation of the global south, and 
growing tensions between the USA (the West/North) and The Soviet Union (the 
East). As such it was constructed as part of a battle to “win the hearts and minds of 
the rest of the world” (Corbridge 1995, p. 1). The ‘rest of the world’ included the 
newly emerging states in Africa, Asia and South America which were coming out 
from under the mantle of European colonisation. They were being offered, in this 
early stage, two models of development or progress, one based on capitalism and 
the other on socialism (Berthoud 1992, p. 71). However, the breakdown of the 
USSR in the 1990s left one dominant model of development and the geo-political 
language became predominantly North-South orientated rather than East-West 
based. It followed, as Corbridge (1995) states that flows of money, information, 
knowledge and technology, should be south bound and the North held up to be the 
model to which the South should aspire. It was a widely accepted view that 
developing countries “could and should” learn from the “developed or pioneer 
countries” (Corbridge 1995, p. 2).  
4.6 Development, Globalisation and Neoliberalism  
The third stage of development as Haugerud and Edelman (2005) write, began in 
the 1970s and continues today. It began with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
economic controls which they argue, citing Philip Michael, was “the beginning of the 
end of the (national as opposed to global) development project” (2005, p. 17). This 
stage was characterised by “a series of economic policy changes that were known 
(outside the United States) as economic neoliberalism” (2005, p. 7). Neoliberialism, 
in this context meant free market policies where the market, rather than the state, 
determines economic and other outcomes. This new economic rationale was in 
contrast to earlier economic models based on Keynesian theory which advocated a 
much greater role for the state in public spending and as an economic driver and 
regulator for growth. In stark contrast the ‘market’ during this period came to be 
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seen as Gerald Berthoud (1992, p. 70) states, no longer as an “institution which 
must be regulated by external forces” but one that should be used “to regulate 
society as a whole”.  
At the same time as the new free market policies were taking effect the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund adopted a new language and focus, and “poverty 
and equity issues” became their prime concern as opposed to their former emphasis 
on promoting economic growth (Haugerud & Edelman 2005). In line with this change 
in thinking in the 1980s and 1990s, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
embarked on a program to institute in poorer nations a key set of reforms known as 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). As Haugerud & Edelman (2005) describe, 
these reforms embodied many neoliberal economic principles including; reduced 
state spending on social services; the instigation of fee-for-service education and 
health care; deregulation of the financial and labor market, privatisation of state 
owned resources and currency devaluation (Haugerud & Edelman 2005).  
4.7 The Failure of Development  
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) a major plank of the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund policy for development and poverty reduction, have 
been widely criticised from within and without the institutions. Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel 
Prize winner for economics in 2001 and chief economist with the World Bank from 
1996-2000 has been one of the chief critics. He states that the first pressure exerted 
on a developing nation by multilateral institutions and their shareholders, is to 
liberalise their economies to make them more competitive. This liberalisation 
process involves deregulation of their financial markets and the promotion of free 
trade, foreign investment and privatisation of national enterprises. Developing 
nations are also pressured to open up to foreign investment. The negative effect of 
an open free-market economy, however, is that there is no market regulation 
(Stiglitz 2002). 
Stiglitz (2002, p. 3) uses the analogy of a small boat on a big ocean to describe a 
developing country entering the free-market. To quote, “the small boat without 
proper equipment is ill prepared to withstand the storms of the open sea, nor is it 
able to withstand the force of a big wave hitting it broadside”. The crew is untrained 
and ill prepared for the journey and therefore at the mercy of the ocean, which is 
wild and unpredictable. Like the small boat in the analogy, poorer countries are 
more vulnerable to the erratic and volatile nature of global markets. They can suffer 
economic and social disruption as well as the destruction of potentially viable 
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domestic companies. Financial crisis can lead to increased borrowing from the IMF 
but borrowing comes with strict external controls and creating a budget surplus 
becomes mandatory. The IMF is therefore able to impose austerity cuts to increase 
surplus, and cuts in services such as health and education programs result, as they 
are seen as ‘soft targets’ as Barry Eichengreen (2002, p. 3), a former adviser to the 
IMF, concurs.  
The analogy is vivid and disturbing and many believe SAPs have contributed to 
what some describe as development’s ‘greatest failure’, sub-Saharan Africa. 
Hoppers (2001, p. 25), from South Africa, contends that the “inescapable” conditions 
that come with SAPs reduce a weakened state’s ability to respond to internal 
problems and have led, in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, to the decline in adult 
literacy, fewer children attending school, the gender gap widening and low teacher 
morale. An Oxfam International research paper (Aid& education: the squandered 
opportunity (Oxfam Briefing) 2000) also pointed out the debilitating effects of IMF 
policies and programs in sub-Saharan Africa, the world’s poorest region. Of 16 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa undergoing IMF programs during the 1990s, 12 cut 
spending in education at a time when there were 47 million children out of school in 
the region. In East Asia in the 1980s, the report claims, IMF SAP programs 
prolonged and deepened the recession in the early 1980s, placing 20 million people 
below the poverty line and 20 million children out of school. In Thailand, the school 
drop-out rate in 1998 increased three fold after IMF intervention and in Brazil there 
has been a 25% decline in spending on early education programs under SAPs. 
Stiglitz (2002) argues that IMF programs and policies were major contributing 
factors to the social and economic declines in these countries during the late 1990s. 
Given this history it is little wonder that in Timor-Leste in 2002, representatives from 
several NGOs met with representatives of the World Bank and IMF to express their 
serious concerns over the involvement of both institutions in Timor-Leste (Report 
from one-day seminar on East Timor Joining the International Financial Institutions 
2002). 
As their roles changed the World Bank and the IMF have often been criticised for 
being too influenced in their economic policies by wealthy western nations. This 
criticism appears to have some validity when the voting structure of the fund is 
examined. The voting system for both institutions is similar and based on financial 
quotas paid by members. Member countries pay a percentage of their GNP and 
those paying the highest percentage get the highest proportion of votes. The 
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obvious consequence of this system is that poorer nations have very little power 
over how the fund operates and its loan conditions. Another consequence is that 
poorer countries, which are the most likely to be heavy borrowers, but who do not 
‘toe the line’, risk having not only IMF funds withdrawn but other aid and investment 
withheld (Watkins 1999). To be a borrower from the World Bank a country must be 
first a member of the IMF. 
The IMF (Globalisation :Threat or Opportunity? 2001), while accepting that poverty 
has increased and the gap between rich and poor countries and between peoples 
has widened, points to overall figures showing unprecedented growth in many 
areas. It also points to the many advantages that outward-orientated policies bring 
to an economy. By contrast it claims those countries in Latin America and Africa 
which have retained inward-orientated policies have suffered the economic 
consequences of those policies.  
4.8 Humanitarian Intervention in Fragile States and Emergency Situations 
While development theorists might debate the pluses and minuses of the free-
market neoliberal economic structure of development, few dispute that the model 
was developed in the West, by Western architects, and is controlled by institutions 
where the Western countries have the majority vote. While the IMF and World Bank 
are only part of the apparatus of development, they nevertheless have far reaching 
influence that goes beyond economic and financial management. As the discussion 
so far has revealed, development is not simply an economic model or a series of 
processes, it has specific targets and goals and embedded ideologies, knowledge 
and truths which inform the way its major institutions govern themselves and others. 
As has also been shown that small and fragile states are the most vulnerable and 
least able to protect themselves. 
One of the main arms of the United Nations is the Security Council and it is through 
the Security Council that interventions on security or humanitarian grounds can be 
made. Global and regional security is of primary concern and a range of 
interventions may be taken depending on the circumstances and the nature of the 
incident or issue. In emergency situations forces and aid can be deployed quickly 
and dramatically. In 1999 when the UN Security Council authorised an intervention 
in Timor-Leste a peace keeping force from 23 countries, led by Australian forces, 
entered Timor-Leste to stop the bloodshed, they did so backed by a long history of 
global development and intervention.  
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Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Discourse of Development  
Post-development theory is important to my research for several reasons. Firstly, it 
offers a way of deconstructing and reconstructing development as discourse and 
practice which allows us to understand how the ‘apparatus of development’ 
functions and changes as it perpetuates itself. Secondly, it opens up, through its 
application of Foucault’s approach to power, that manifests as ‘rationalities’ or 
techniques of governance, a way of critically analysing the development apparatus 
constructively, without necessarily seeing it as negative or repressive. For those 
immersed in the field, particularly Western aid practitioners (and in this group I 
include myself), it provides a mechanism for consciously evaluating their own role 
within the context of development, as instruments of the apparatus.  
4.9 Post-development and its Critics  
Post-development is the term often used to describe the theories of a group of 
authors critical of the dominant model of development practiced since WWII (Nustad 
2001). In describing the commonalities between post-development writers, Nustad 
(2001, p. 480) notes that most are inspired in various ways by the work of Foucault 
and tend to see development as a discourse that orders and creates the object that 
it pertains to address in this case the under-developed or the ‘Third World’. Post -
development writers are often criticised for not offering an alternative to 
development while at the same time calling for it to be abandoned (see Ferguson 
2005; Nederveen Pieterse 2000). However Nustad (2001, p. 479) argues that this is 
not a good enough reason to dismiss post-development theorists as they provide a 
valuable way of critiquing development. Whether or not they agree with the theories 
espoused by post-development writers or its more extreme call for the total 
abandonment of development, many writers use post-development analysis as a 
starting or departure point for their own exploration of development issues (see 
McGregor 2007; Matthews 2004; Curry 2003; Brigg 2002). 
As Nustad notes, the work of Foucault does indeed seem fundamental to post-
development writers, particularly those from the ‘South’, who see his work as a 
liberating pathway out of a development world which was to them all pervasive. One 
of post-developments most noted writers Arturo Escobar, in his 1987, dissertation 
titled Power and Visibility: The Invention and Management of Development, 
describes the frustration felt by those in the South who were confronted with what 
they saw as the failures of development all around them, yet were helpless to 
challenge it. They felt enclosed within a world where development defined reality 
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and from which “there was no way out” (p. 7). Development had not only “coloni[z]ed 
reality” but had “become reality” (p. 7). It was not until Escobar, in his own words, 
started to think around the term ‘discourse’ that he began to understand how “a 
mode of thought” can become dominant and how reality gets “filled” with something 
in such a way that all other possible ways of thinking are excluded (p. 8). Escobar’s 
reading of Foucault’s work in his text The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Order 
of Things was fundamental to this new way of thinking and understanding and in his 
own words enabled him at last to place himself outside and begin to “explore 
productively the predicament of development” (p. 9). 
To examine development as discourse requires an analysis of why 
they [the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America] came to see 
themselves as undeveloped, how the achievement of ‘development’ 
came to be seen as a fundamental problem, and how it was made 
real through the deployment of a myriad of strategies and 
programs. (Escobar 2005, p. 342)  
Escobar’s analysis of development as discourse is much wider than understanding 
how it is historically and ideologically constructed. It also demands to know how the 
discourse functions particularly in regard to those in the ‘Third World’ who came to 
see themselves as ‘underdeveloped’.  
Post-development writers are not the only group critical of development. Post- 
structuralists and postmodernists, although not addressed in this thesis, also provide 
valuable insights. However, for me, it is the post-development writers that really 
‘shake us up’ and make us look at what is in front of us in new ways. Though post-
development writers may not have succeeded in their call for the ‘end of 
development’, they do ensure that for those who read their work, whether 
sympathetically or critically, that ‘development’ can never again exist in quite the 
same form. By its very resistance to the discourses of development, post-
development writing has not only informed modern discourse of development but 
has become an integral part of it. In doing so, post-development writing provokes us 
to ask new questions about the apparatus of development in terms of knowledge 
formation, power relationships normalisation and problematisation processes. It 
provides us with a mechanism for stepping outside the development world. Most 
importantly for me, post-development writers introduce us to the work of Foucault, 
often acclaimed as the departure point for post-development writers. By doing this 
they open a door to new ways of understanding how the apparatus of development 
operates as both a discourse and as an integrated system of state intervention, and 
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how it exerts power and change in a seemingly benign way and without apparent 
political interference.  
4.10 Foucault, Power and Government  
The study of power in general, according to Foucault, should focus on “the total 
structure of actions brought to bear on the actions of others in particular cases, and 
of the resistances and evasions encountered by those actions” (Hindess 1996, p. 
101). In relation to Foucault’s understanding of power as a structure of actions, 
Hindess states that, “power in this sense is manifested in the instruments, 
techniques and procedures that may be brought to bear on the actions of others” 
(Hindess 1996, p. 100). Foucault’s analysis of power, Hindess continues, moves 
away from the obsession with questions of sovereignty and legitimacy that other 
analyses of modern political power have focused on, and refines it to three specific 
relationships: strategic games between liberties [power in general], domination 
[unequal power relationships] and government (conduct of conduct) (Hindess 1996, 
p. 101). By separating power in this way we can move away from evaluating power 
as legitimate or not legitimate, negative or positive, productive or unproductive and 
can focus on how it is applied and the effects of its application.  
This movement away from the notion of power as essentially negative is in itself a 
liberating factor for those submerged in the field and working for international aid 
agencies as it allows critical examination of institutional and individual action without 
necessarily laying blame. However, it is ‘government’ as a power relationship that is 
of most interest to my study in Timor-Leste, particularly in the sense of it lying, as 
Hindess (1996, p. 97) outlines, “between domination and those relationships of 
power which are reversible. It is the conduct of conduct, aiming to affect the actions 
of individuals by working on their conduct, that is, on the ways in which they regulate 
their own behaviour”. This understanding of power is for me the key to 
understanding the power relationships that operate between the development 
apparatus, the state and civil society in Timor-Leste.  
4.11 Liberalism as a Rationality of Government  
To get a better understanding of the “use and invention of the technologies for the 
regulation of conduct” (Hindess 1996, p. 106) and to see how and why they have 
become part of the operating system of the development apparatus, further 
exploration of Foucault’s breakdown of government into three specific spheres is 
needed. To do this I turn again to Hindess (1996) and his reading of Foucault. He 
reminds us firstly that when Foucault speaks of government it is not simply in the 
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sense of a sovereign institution or body exerting power or control over its subjects 
but the way we might govern ourselves, our family and our relationships: how we 
might conduct our own behaviour and seek to influence the conduct or behaviour of 
others. In this sense within the context of the aid world, individual aid practitioners, 
as the human face of aid, as well as institutions and organisations, are culpable for 
the conduct of conduct within a foreign country. Foucault, according to Hindess 
(1996, p. 98), separates government into three specific rationalities, discipline, 
pastoral power and liberalism, which he regards as having been particularly 
influential in the development of the modern state. The first rationality, ‘discipline’, is 
a form of government exerted on individuals or groups to “provide them with 
particular skills and attributes to develop their capacity for self-control”, to ensure 
their compliance to group activities and “to render them amenable to instruction” and 
check quotation marks to mould their characters in other ways”. Exertion of this type 
of power is often exemplified in schools, prisons and similar institutions. Foucault 
insists, notes Hindess, that, like power in general, discipline can be productive and 
is not necessarily regressive or negative (Hindess 1996, p. 113).  
The second rationality, pastoral power/government, is best understood according to 
Foucault, as described by Hindess, through the metaphor of the shepherd and the 
flock. It is a style of government that promotes governance through the detailed 
regulation and policing of society for the ‘benefit’ of society and is more concerned 
with the overall welfare of the population than with individual freedom. The shepherd 
as leader is imbued with superior power which allows an individual to make 
decisions for the good of the flock (population) without the need for consent (p. 118-
119).  
The third rationality is liberalism and it differs dramatically from the other two types 
of government. In Foucault’s view, liberalism ceases to be simply a political doctrine 
or ideology espousing individual freedom and instead becomes a distinctive 
rationality of government. Liberal government must at the same time create the 
conditions in which individual freedoms can be assured without appearing to 
threaten or limit individual liberty and freedoms. It does this by governing “at a 
distance” and securing the means by which individuals believe themselves to be 
self-governing.  
In the post-conflict world of reconstruction and development in Timor-Leste all three 
rationalities of governance can be observed. This is a result of the volatility of the 
present situation in Timor-Leste and in particular the legacy of colonialism and 
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occupation, the embedded notions of elitism in the actions and attitudes of some of 
the returning Timor-Leste diaspora and some of the international agency staff, and 
the underlying traditional ruling system in the villages and districts.  
I argue, however, it is liberalism that gives the best insight into how the aid world 
operates within an intervention context. When the aid world moves into an 
emergency environment, its entry is legitimised by the United Nations through the 
Security Council, which has overridden the sovereignty of the state because of 
‘special’ circumstances. In doing so, it usually takes temporary control of 
government until democratic elections can be held (in the case of Timor-Leste this 
took two years). However, unlike well established liberal democracies where the 
population has been indoctrinated since birth into a belief in ‘government for the 
people by the people’, the countries where these interventions take place are 
characteristically not based on western democratic principles but have been subject 
to civil unrest and long-term conflict. In these situations the population must be 
‘trained’ to understand and value democracy and how to act ‘democratically’. As 
Matthews (2004, p. 380) contends, “a project premised upon a set of values cannot 
succeed in the absence of those values”. This process of enculturation must be 
achieved not by force or open coercion but as Rita Abrahamsen (2004) notes, 
through “promises of incorporation and inclusion”, and by creating a “shared 
conceptualisation of power” (p. 1454) whereby all players believe they are equal and 
able to influence decision-making and actions. 
In humanitarian interventions, such as in Timor-Leste, liberal governance, thus 
becomes an attractive and legitimate way of ‘conducting conduct’ for those sent to 
restore order and to ‘reconstruct a Nation’. To this end much time and money is 
invested in civic education to bring the population to an understanding of how they 
will participate in governing themselves from here on. This education process is 
vitally important to the overall process as the Timor-Leste Untied Nations 
Development Assistance Framework (2003-2005) explains when describing the 
development setting, Timor-Leste is experiencing a “new form of (democratic) 
governance which has no historical or cultural roots in Timor-Leste” (East Timor: 
United Nations Development Assistance Framework (2003-2004) n.d., p. 1).  
Time and money is also spent in capacity building new government members, 
bureaucrats, NGOs and civil society organisations in the art of ‘good governance’ 
and ‘partnerships’, the new terms for the arrangements and relationships between 
the aid industry and these bodies and the means by which they will be governed. 
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Under the rubric of partnerships and good governance falls the ever increasing 
modern lexicon of development, which includes such terms as participation, 
inclusivity, transparency, accountability, equity, consensus, community 
empowerment, local ownership, and bottom-up decision making. These are all 
powerful and evocative terms that appear to embrace equality and celebrate grass 
roots participation and decision-making.  
Indeed, the aid industry has embraced and utilised the language so convincingly 
that, as Macgregor (2007) observes in citing a World Bank document describing the 
Bank’s Community Empowerment Project, that the description [not to mention the 
title] could be mistaken as a quote from “some radical grassroots NGO or fringe 
alternative community organisation” (p. 155). Ironically, it could also be argued, in 
reading the literature, that it is a language that could have been appropriated from 
post-development discourse itself. Nevertheless, it embeds itself in the psyche of a 
new nation and in the psyche of the aid practitioners who are often its message 
carriers. As Cornwall and Brock (2005) observe in a critical examination at the 
current ‘buzzwords’ in development, “barely any development actor could seriously 
take issue with the way in which the objectives of development are currently framed” 
(p. 1043). 
4.12 The Art of Appropriation  
O’Malley (1998) gives a more detailed understanding of how and why liberal 
government is attracted to and needs to appropriate the language and approaches 
of “indigenous governances’’ (p.158). Liberalism, he argues, is “a regime which 
maximises the freedoms of the subject” or at least gives the impression that there is 
a minimal undermining of individual freedoms, and is therefore attracted to the 
approaches of ‘‘indigenous governances, the forms of government that arise in, and 
are endemic to, the everyday lives of subjects” (1998 p.158). Governing in this way, 
he maintains, is more likely to appear, to both the ruler and the ruled, as originating 
from within, rather than being imposed externally. As an example, he uses 
advanced liberalism’s appropriation of the word ‘community’ as a means of locating 
rule within the everyday lives of individuals. “‘Community policing’ and community 
enterprises may be thought of as the strategic enlistment or alignment of indigenous 
organisation into a governmental program, in order to govern a problem which 
cannot be left entirely to the management of individuals” (O'Malley 1998, citing 
O'Malley & Palmer 1996). This alignment process allows communities to believe 
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that they are in fact in control and exerting rule while the “formal, exogenous 
imposed government” appears to be taking a back step. 
4.13 Fighting a Faceless Tiger  
Foucault’s notion of liberalism as a rationality of governance is used in this thesis as 
a mechanism for firstly, interpreting the gap between rhetoric and practice in the 
post-conflict world of aid and development. That is, why it exists and the reason why 
the gap fails to close. And secondly, for examining how local NGOs get caught in 
the gap and can become the scapegoat for development’s failures. Foucault’s 
understanding of liberal governance allows us to put a face to the tiger. The tiger in 
this analogy is not necessarily destructive but is certainly powerful and shrewd. In 
the ‘old days’ the SAP programs could be pointed to as a concrete example of 
development’s failure and how destructive neo-liberal economic policies could be. 
However, the aid industry in reinventing itself, such as by “abandoning SAPs in 
favour of partnerships” (Abrahamsen 2004, p.1453), has subsumed its opposition 
and taken its language. To make criticism of it then, almost becomes a criticism of 
self. Local NGOs, whose language it most appropriates, can be further 
disempowered as the onus of responsibility for its practice devolves to them. How 
can local NGOs, particularly those in post-conflict situations who are accustomed to 
meeting their adversaries face-to-face, oppose a benign regime that espouses 
community participation and consultation, bottom-up decision making, equal 
partnerships? Is this not what they believe in and stand for? Is this not the way to 
involve communities in decision making? Is this not their bailiwick? The issue is 
further complicated because the tiger in fact does have a face – the thousands of 
mostly well meaning international aid workers (like myself) who do the tiger’s work 
smoothing the rough.  
These questions lead us to a further exploration of NGOs in the aid and 
development context and a careful examination of the complex set of relationships 
that exist between local NGOs and the international aid world and analysis of how 
the language of development informs those relationships.  
NGOs in Development  
4.14 Defining NGOs  
Under the umbrella term of NGOs, increasingly referred to as the Third sector 
(Hemment 2004; Fowler 1997) in contrast to the first sector (government) and the 
second sector (private enterprise), lies an extensive range of non-governmental, not 
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for profit organisations both international and local, secular and non-secular. In 
development terms international NGOs are usually seen as originating in the North, 
the ‘developed world’, while local NGOs are seen as coming from the South, or the 
‘Third World’. Southern NGOs are also commonly known as local NGOs, grassroots 
organisations, indigenous organisations, community-based organisations (CBOs) 
and civil society organisations (CSOs).  
Within the literature on international development the definition of NGOs is as wide 
and as various as the names by which they are known. Aubrey (1997) comments 
that the act of defining NGOs is not only difficult but contentious and warns of the 
risk of ‘Southern’ NGOs being defined by academics and aid practitioners simply as 
‘mimicking’ Northern NGOs, without recognising that the greater number of local 
NGOs have origins within their own country. Bebbington (2004, p. 740), on a 
different note, suggests that rather than trying to define NGOs we enquire how and 
why an NGO exists and for what and for whose purpose they originate.  
Much has been written about the role and purpose of NGOs in development (see 
(Bebbington 2004; Momsen 2002; Sundstrom 2002; Markowitz 2001; Abramson 
1999; Smillie 1997). Holmen & Jirstrom (1994, p. 7), while remaining unconvinced 
themselves, stated that those on both sides of the political divide were beginning to 
see local NGOs as a “panacea for development”. What they questionably termed 
the ‘new’ approach to development was seen to replace the ‘old’ practice of 
development projects dominated by ‘experts’, presumably from the West. Local 
NGOs were seen as a way of empowering and including ‘the poor’ without really 
having to deal directly with them (p. 16). At the same time post-development writers, 
particularly those from the Third World, were hailing grassroots and localised 
movements as a serious alternative to development (1992, p. 27). Markowitz (2001) 
notes that they are widely viewed within the literature as flexible innovators who are 
able to promote local participation and engage the poor, while Aubey (1997) sums 
up the literature by saying that at best local NGOs are seen as advocates of self-
reliance who can bring about policy and institutional change while at worst they are 
seen as conduits through which foreign donors exert influence.  
Regardless of the terminology, definition and discussion on the pros and cons of 
NGOs in development, a close relationship has developed between international 
(Northern) and local NGOs (Southern). It appears that the growth and work of each 
group is contingent, in many ways, upon the other (like a co-dependent 
relationship). In terms of the history of NGOs, both Northern and Southern, the 
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numbers involved in Third World development increased dramatically in the 1980s 
(Fowler 1997). This dramatic increase, Fowler (1997) argues, occurred at the same 
time the amount of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) channelled through 
international NGOs also increased. International NGOs were progressively being 
used by bilateral (donor government aid agencies) and multilateral agencies (such 
as UNESCO, UNICEF, ILO, IOM, FAO), within foreign countries to dispense aid, 
often through local NGOs, as a means of circumnavigating weak government 
structures in targeted countries and ensuring the growth of the Third sector, in those 
countries (1997).  
This funding shift had serious implications for the international organisations and for 
their local NGO ‘partners’. By increasing dramatically the amount of income derived 
from government and multilateral sources, the autonomy of international NGOs was 
threatened. This increased dependency on government funding in turn had an 
impact on their local NGO ‘partners’ who, unaware of the connection to bilateral and 
multilateral agencies, were also unaware of the conditionalities that accompanied 
the assistance (Fowler 1997, p. 32). Fowler contends that the trend continues today 
as international NGOs are more than ever in danger of becoming “quasi-
governmental” organisations and local NGOs entering into partnerships with them 
are more vulnerable to manipulation through hidden agendas.  
4.15 Legitimacy 
In the twenty-first century local NGOs continue to be an essential cog in the 
development wheel, even more so in post-conflict emergencies where aid must be 
disbursed quickly and efficiently to local communities in need. Bilateral, multilateral 
and aid organisations charged with the disbursement on behalf of governments and 
private donors scramble to attract local groups through which they can work. There 
is in this undignified scramble issues relating to legitimacy which Fowler (1997, p. 
37) refers to as development’s “forgotten element”. Aid on the ground must be seen 
to be achieving its goal in order to attract further funding and to justify the huge 
expense of public and private money. Attachments or partnerships with local NGOs 
are therefore an essential part of establishing legitimacy.  
4.16 Partnerships or Dependency 
As already mentioned above, the term ‘development partnerships’ is increasingly 
being used to define the relationship between, the aid world and recipient countries 
and their agencies at all levels (2004). Not only do multilateral and bilateral agencies 
enter into partnership relationships with recipient governments but as with 
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international aid organisations, they also enter into partnerships with local NGOs. 
The question here is what does ‘partnership’ mean? While the term itself implies 
sharing on equal terms and consensus decision making, there is an argument that it 
is simply conditionality in another form (Abrahamsen 2004) and there is much for 
local NGOs to be wary of in entering into these types of relationships. As Fowler 
(1997) has pointed out, the agenda’s of some international agencies are not always 
open and transparent to a local NGO, while Abrahamsen (2004) questions 
altogether the genuineness of a partnership where “one party is in possession of the 
purse and the other the begging bowl” (p. 1454). 
Thus, it could be argued that these development partnerships are one-sided and 
based upon unequal relationships where the partner with the money holds the 
power. However, this is not the full picture. As pointed out above, international 
agencies and aid organisations are reliant in many ways on local NGOs to legitimise 
their existence as humanitarian organisations. They rely on local organisations to 
link them with, and to implement their aid strategies for, the poor, the unemployed, 
and the disabled. Local NGOs also are not helpless victims of the partnerships but 
are capable, in many instances, of managing partnerships to their own advantage 
and to the advantage of their clients. In many instances the partnerships are 
successful, and are based on trust and respect and exemplify the language that 
describes them. 
4.17 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a brief historical outline of aid and development and the 
theoretical framework used in this thesis. I have argued that a post-development 
theoretical framework is particularly relevant to my ethnographic examination and 
analysis of KBH for it provides a means to apply Foucault’s approach to critically 
analyse the aid industry and development efforts without necessarily seeing it as 
negative or repressive. More specifically, as I have outlined in this chapter, I am 
interested in exploring Foucault’s theory of liberalism as a rationality or technique of 
governance for understanding the complex set of relationships that operate between 
the state, the development apparatus, and civil society (NGOs), in the aid and 
reconstruction context and how this theory informs the language of development. 
While a local NGO in a post-conflict environment may appear to act and operate at a 
local level within its own constituency, it is nevertheless influenced by relationships 
outside that sphere. To understand, therefore, the challenges and issues a local 
NGO faces in a post-conflict environment dominated by the aid industry one must 
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understand how a local NGO is tied to the external world through international 
development partnerships, and the attached responsibilities and conditions that go 
with them, as well as how these relationships are governed.  
The previous chapter gave a picture of local NGOs within the context of Timor-
Leste, and this chapter placed local NGOs within a much wider picture. Now that the 
local and global scenes have been set, the next chapter introduces KBH and 
describes its history, and how it goes about its business, on the ground, in Timor-
Leste.  
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 Chapter Five 
Knua Buka Hatene (Place for Learning/Knowing) 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter introduces Knua Buka Hatene (KBH), a small independent vocational 
training and support centre situated close to the centre of Dili, the capital of Timor-
Leste. The first section of the chapter addresses the first objective of the thesis by 
describing the history of KBH’s foundation and its vision, mission, objectives, 
ideological underpinnings, and values and beliefs, in order to understand how these 
elements have shaped and continue to shape the work and structure of the 
organisation.  
The second part of the chapter covers the period from the beginning of my 
placement in early May 2004, to the end of July 2005. It is an ethnographic 
description and introduces KBH from a different perspective - as a place, and as a 
small local NGO operating on an everyday basis as distinct from its operations and 
values as described in its official documents. It also introduces the people who work 
for KBH and those who are closely associated with it – their relationships with each 
other and to the organisation. Finally, it describes the changes KBH made and the 
challenges it faced in adapting to the changing aid environment as it transitioned 
from post-emergency recovery to long-term development. It also begins to address 
the second objective of the thesis by describing some of the interactions and 
experiences between KBH and the aid industry beyond its interactions and 
relationship with APHEDA, its major international partner and donor.  
KBH 2001-2004 
5.2 Establishment and Ideological Underpinnings 
KBH was established formally on 24, October 2001, by three local NGOs: Sahe 
Institute for Liberation (SIL), Grupo Feto Foin Sae Timor Lorosa’e (GFFTL) and the 
Labour Advocacy Institute of Timor-Leste (LAIFET) with the assistance of APHEDA-
Union Aid Abroad23, an Australian international aid organisation. APHEDA had been 
a solidarity24 partner of Timor-Leste through its support of the Conselho Nacionial de 
Resistencia Timorese (CNRT) for many years prior to 1999.  
In late 1999, shortly after the independence vote, APHEDA sent a representative, 
Ramona Matussis, to Timor-Leste to support local NGOs to re-group after the 
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violence and destruction. At this stage local groups, as described by Matussis 
(Parker 2008), were mostly unfunded and staffed by volunteers who were trying to 
sort out what they were going to do on top of re-establishing their own traumatised 
lives. It was the job of Matussis to identify groups and to assist them with resources 
and in locating accommodation from which they could work. GFFTL, SIL and 
LAIFET were three of the groups Matussis worked with during that time. While the 
three organisations were drawn together by a shared ideology and a focus on 
education and training as a means of liberation and independence for their country, 
they lacked the facilities and resources to implement their training plans. APHEDA, 
with its own roots in unionism and solidarity, and an aid and development history in 
vocational education and training support, was a sympathetic and legitimate partner. 
APHEDA also had the funds and support of the Australian union movement to rent 
and rehabilitate a building to be used as a training venue. SIL, GFFTL and LAIFET, 
while each maintaining their identity as autonomous organisations, established KBH 
as a joint organisation for training, with the help of APHEDA.  
In establishing KBH as a separate organisation, a new organisation with its own 
constitution, board of management, vision, mission, aims and objectives was 
established. This type of organisational structure followed a model conducive to 
attracting funding from bilateral, multilateral and international aid organisations25 
while also ensuring, as much as possible, local autonomy through the board of 
management made up of members from the three founding groups, SIL, GFFTL and 
LAIFET.  
The deep rooted socialist democratic philosophy and ideology of all three groups 
underpinned KBH’s aims, objectives, vision and mission and are encapsulated in 
KBH’s broad vision statement which is: to create social order in Timor-Leste based 
on equality, justice, solidarity, prosperity, and progress. These principles are also 
embodied in KBH’s mission statement which is to: develop participatory community 
education; increase the capacity of the community towards self sufficiency and 
sustainability; encourage cultural development; provide education for community 
organising activists; and provide a place for activities in accordance with the vision 
of KBH.  
The teaching methodology of KBH also reflected that of the three founding 
organisations, grounded as it was in popular and liberation models of education that 
came from both Central America and South Africa (interview with Chairperson of 
Board). The emphasis was on community participation and experimental methods of 
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adult learning known as ‘popular education methodology’ (Knua Buka Hatene 
Constitution n.d.).  
5.3 The Founding Organisations  
While KBH could be classified as a local NGO that developed in a response to the 
emergency and post-emergency conditions in Timor-Leste post-independence, its 
founding organisations have a longer history and have been operating in Timor-
Leste since the late 1990s. Of the group of three, the most well known is SIL. To 
appreciate their role in shaping the ideology and practices of KBH, each founding 
organisation is briefly described below. 
SIL  
SIL started as Sa’he Study Club at the end of 1998. The focus of the club was on 
“the development of ideas and practices of national liberation that involved all 
aspects of life” (KBH doc). SIL developed into an NGO in 1999 to assist with the 
country’s recovery, focusing on agricultural training for independence and 
sustainability, community education for liberation, and community activist organising. 
SIL continues to be a leading local voice in Timor-Leste and is often critical of 
government and aid practice. It publishes a monthly newsletter and a four-monthly 
journal, as well as books on alternative developments regarding neo-liberalism. For 
example, SIL was one of three local organisations involved in a discussion group 
with the World Bank and IMF (Report from one-day seminar on East Timor Joining 
the International Financial Institutions 2002) about their role in Timor-Leste. SIL 
presented a critical view of the World Bank’s interventions in African and South 
American countries during the workshop and apposed similar style interventions in 
Timor-Leste.  
LAIFET 
The Labour Advocacy Institute of Timor-Leste (LAIFET) was founded in October 
1999, with a commitment to labour rights in Timor-Leste and assisting and 
empowering small business enterprises in the districts. LAIFET’s activities have 
included advocacy on workers’ rights, small enterprise development and 
empowerment through small business management training programs of small 
business enterprises or cooperatives. LAIFET also established several small 
carpentry and blacksmithing cooperatives in 13 districts and many of the people 
from these collectives received training through KBH. 
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GFFTL  
The third organisation, GFFTL, is predominantly a women’s organisation and was 
founded in October 1989. GFFTL was a foundation member of the Students 
Solidarity Council pre-1999. In 2001, it became independent from the Council. The 
main focus of GFFTL is campaigning for literacy for Timor-Leste people with a focus 
on women and children. Its main activities include literacy learning, sewing and 
sustainable agriculture training with a particular focus on women and children. 
GFFTL relies heavily on volunteers, mostly female university students, who travel 
around the districts providing literacy training (Tetun) to targeted communities. The 
vocational training is usually done in collaboration with KBH with participants coming 
in from the districts for training at the KBH building.  
5.4 KBH Purpose 
The three founding organisations had a very clear idea of the purpose of KBH as 
both an organisation and a training venue. It was envisaged by the groups that the 
building itself would provide a physical and central place for Sa’he, GFFTL and 
LAIFET to conduct training together with KBH as the implementing partner, or 
independently, and would act as a central resource for all the groups. KBH as an 
organisation could develop training in its own right as well as establish training 
methods and resources for groups and communities according to the vision, mission 
and objectives of KBH. The building would also provide a space for outside groups 
for activities including meetings, workshops, training sessions, and conferences, on 
the provision that the philosophy of these groups was in line with KBH’s vision and 
mission.  
5.5 KBH Structure  
The structure of KBH was established so the founding partners would steer and 
direct KBH. The management of KBH, through the coordinator, was directly 
accountable to the Board. APHEDA and other donor/sponsor organisations were 
invited to attend Board meetings but did not have voting powers. Board meetings 
were originally held approximately every two weeks, then on a monthly basis until 
2004 (Knua Buka Hatene Constitution n.d.). It was envisaged by the Board that 
when a partner (founding) organisation took on a particular training project, KBH 
would work closely with the particular partner organisation to propose, implement, 
monitor and evaluate the project. It was also expected that when KBH conducted its 
own training it would employ the trainers from GFFTL, SIL or LAIFET.  
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5.6 Building Rehabilitation and Habitation 
When KBH was established in early 2001, the first year of its existence was focused 
on renovating the KBH building and site (funded by APHEDA). The building, like 
most buildings in Dili after the 1999 violence and destruction, had suffered severe 
damage. The rehabilitation project was funded and supported by the CFMEU 
(Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union of Australia) and APHEDA. The 
building and land were leased in 2001 from the Transitional Authority for Timor-
Leste (TAFET), and after 2002, on a long term lease from the elected government of 
Timor-Leste. In a city where few buildings were left habitable, the building was a 
valuable and useful asset for all three founding groups.  
5.7 Funding 
In April 2002 KBH received operational funding for a two-year period from APHEDA, 
partially from donations from union members and through the AusAID Capacity 
Building Project in Timor-Leste (CAPET). This enabled the organisation to pay the 
salaries of the coordinator, administrative assistant, security and cleaning staff, as 
well as to fund the maintenance and fuel for two motorbikes and to cover costs for 
stationery and the rental charges on the building for two years. The two-year period 
ended in March 2004 but was extended a further six months to September 2004.  
Funding for the purchase of office equipment and two motorbikes was provided by 
Oxfam Hong Kong. This international organisation also provided funding for an 
international consultant to work with the coordinator of KBH to establish 
administrative systems and provide capacity building to the coordinator and 
administration assistant in office management and information technology for a one-
year period.  
Several international APHEDA-placed volunteer vocational training advisers also 
worked with KBH from 2002 to 2004 for periods of six to twelve months. All had the 
task of building the capacity of KBH and partner staff in leadership, administration, 
financial management and project implementation. From 2002-2004 many other 
international volunteers also worked with KBH on short-term training and capacity 
building projects.  
5.8 Projects, Client Communities and Collaborative Training  
Funded by APHEDA and to a lesser extent other international donors, KBH ran 
projects from 2001 to 2004 independently or in collaboration with one of the 
founding organisations. These projects had a focus on giving people the required 
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skills and knowledge to increase their capacity to become economically 
independent. This type of training was very much in line with KBH’s philosophy of 
liberation and independence for all through education. There was a grave concern 
among many of the members of SIL, GFFTL and LAIFET that Timorese had lost 
their capacity to be independent. As the Chairperson of KBH explained, “many 
sustainable agricultural methods used by farmers in the past had been lost during 
the Indonesian occupation and during the emergency period following the vote the 
UN had provided many people with emergency supplies and [a] dependence on 
hand-outs had been developed”. One of KBH’s original beliefs and main tasks was 
to help people be more self-reliant and in control of their own future through 
enabling them to meet their own basic needs The focus therefore was on 
sustainable agricultural-based training (from interview with KBH chairperson) as the 
majority of Timorese are agrarian based. Similar philosophical underpinnings for re-
establishing and building people’s self-reliance can be found in several training 
programs conducted by KBH as described below.  
Plough making  
Plough making and organic fertiliser training were examples of the types of training 
KBH engaged in with their partners which exemplified the objectives outlined above. 
Initial assessment of the farmers’ groups indicated that they did not know how to 
make a simple plough and wanted to learn these skills because they felt it would be 
important for self-sufficiency and would improve their farm management practices 
(KBH evaluation document year, 2004). The plough was a simple design, required 
no petrol, as did tractors and rotary hoes and could be used in a variety of terrains. 
The project ran for six weeks and consisted of a five-day plough-making course. In 
total, 150 people received training through this project. They were able to take home 
the ploughs they made during the training and many continue to use them.  
Organic fertiliser training  
The objective of this training was to train male and female farmers in the making and 
use of three types of organic fertiliser so they could improve their own self reliance 
rather than be dependent on expensive chemical fertilisers introduced in Indonesian 
times. Courses were given initially in four districts, using the central meeting place in 
each community for the training. As many of the farmers were illiterate, the course 
used practical skills and coaching techniques for assisting participants through the 
process of making different types of fertiliser. At the end of the course, participants 
from the different farmers’ groups had the knowledge and skills to build three 
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different working models of composting installations, including the construction and 
maintenance of a composting toilet. In addition, participants were given a simple 
pictorial manual in Indonesian for future reference. In each farmer’s group 
approximately 20 persons participated. In over ten further training sessions 220 
farmers were trained (Plate 5.1).  
 
Plate 5.1 Organic composting training  
 
It is hard to gauge how effective these types of programs were in the long term, 
given the time constraints of this research but in the short-term they appeared to 
meet their objectives by giving farmers new subsistence strategies through 
introducing new techniques and by re-establishing old methods lost during 
occupation.  
Training of trainers 
Carpentry, blacksmithing and sewing collectives from 13 districts were also trained 
using similar methods and by using the Training of Trainers (ToT) method. The ToT 
training involved the coordinator of each collective coming in to KBH for an intensive 
training block of two to four weeks. After completing the course in either sewing, 
blacksmithing or carpentry, the coordinator or nominated collective representative 
would return to the district to train the members of their collective in the newly 
acquired skills and knowledge. ToT is a rapid, and initially cost effective method, for 
getting training out to people in a short time, particularly to those living in remote 
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locations. However, in the long-term it relies for its success on regular and on-going 
support, monitoring and evaluation to ensure that skills and knowledge are being 
transferred in a productive way from trainer to participants. The long-term nature of 
this type of support is not normally reflected in the funding allocations of donors and 
nor are the difficulties faced in providing long-term support understood by most 
donors. The scenario in Box 5.1 gives a realistic outline of what is involved in 
providing on-going support to remote area communities for a small NGO.  
Box 5-1 The reality of representing and serving client communities 
 
KBH implemented training in two ways, either by bringing participants 
from the districts to Dili for training in blocks of two to four weeks or 
sending trainers to the districts to conduct training on site. In either 
situation, community consultations, as well as follow up activities 
including monitoring and evaluation were required, involving a great deal 
of travel by KBH staff. KBH staff managed travel by taking local transport, 
going by motorbike, or when it involved several staff and training 
materials, the APHEDA Troop Carrier was borrowed or hired. This 
vehicle is a very old four-wheel drive with bench seats in the back, bad 
springs and open windows for air conditioning. On other occasions a 
mikrolet, similar to a mini bus, would be hired, but this depended on the 
state of the roads and the weather at the time, as flooding and mud slides 
made some places inaccessible by anything other than a four-wheel drive 
vehicle. Communication with outlying villages was also difficult. In some 
instances, to let the village group know of an impending visit, a KBH staff 
member would visit one of the markets in Dili to find someone from the 
village who could be relied upon to take a message to the village. The 
meeting date would be determined by how long the message would take 
to get there, and the season, as this dictated the agricultural tasks of the 
village and the time the group had to spare for meetings. 
 
The usual pattern for an evaluation, monitoring or training visit was to 
load all the equipment, bedding, and bags of rice into the truck or mikrolet 
and set off as early in the morning as possible, stopping on the way to 
buy bananas, firewood or other goods deemed necessary for the journey. 
While each paid staff member was eligible for a per diem, it usually was 
not enough to cover accommodation costs, even if it were available, and 
the staff would rely on sleeping on the floor of a relative/friend/community 
group and providing the firewood and food for themselves as well as their 
hosts. The mountainous, winding, often badly potholed, roads in Timor 
made travelling to relatively close villages difficult. A 120 km journey in 
Timor-Leste could take six hours, while a visit to Oeccusi (Timor-Leste 
enclave in West Timor), one of the poorest and least serviced places in 
Timor-Leste and where KBH was involved in several projects, took 14 
hours, one way, by ferry.  
 
Continual travel over long periods for staff was often exhausting and 
debilitating and was one of the subjects often discussed by staff in 
informal conversations. Going by UN helicopter or by plane was not an 
option for local NGO workers as it was for many international 
organisations up until 2004.  
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5.9 Community Education  
While most of KBH’s contacts with client communities were made directly through 
the three founding organisations who predominantly worked in the districts, KBH 
also independently engaged with the local community in Dili primarily by delivering 
English language classes and expressional arts training. The English language 
courses were popular in Dili amongst Timor-Leste who saw increased opportunities 
for income earning activities for those who could speak English in an environment 
filled with relatively wealthy English speaking foreigners.  
The first English language course that KBH conducted, with the assistance of an 
international adviser, was targeted at market sellers, mainly women, from the 
various fresh produce markets in Dili, with the focus on specific language for the 
market place. A high percentage of women attended this course. Participants of the 
second course were from various backgrounds including street vendors, young 
unemployed people, staff of local NGOs generally, and staff of APHEDA’s nine 
partner organisations specifically. These courses were well attended and the 
majority of the participants wanted to continue their studies in English. One of the 
outcomes of the project was the establishment of an English Language resource 
centre within KBH, with books, audio tapes and equipment donations from Australia. 
It was envisaged that in the future this would be a shared resource centre for those 
wanting to teach and learn English.  
The Expressional Arts Project (EAP) was another type of training that KBH 
developed independently from SIL, GFFTL and LAIFET, with the support of an 
international adviser. The project provides young people and adult members of the 
Timor-Leste Community with the opportunity to participate in alternative and 
culturally appropriate methods of commentary. These projects invited participation in 
theatre and dramatic expression training workshops, activities and street theatre 
production experiences. At the completion of training, participants performed street 
theatre and stage performances in community locations about community issues. 
Schools were approached and invited to participate in the project by nominating 
students to participate in the training. The students’ training culminated in a 
performance to their school community and surrounding communities.  
The EAP was one of the most successful projects that KBH ran, in terms of 
sustainability and longevity, as it delivered a service for clients, mostly international 
donors and agencies, as well as government departments. These groups would 
approach KBH with ideas for training and performance on specific topics with target 
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groups in mind and KBH would design and implement the training, with technical 
support from the donor relating to the theme covered (Plate 5.2). The range of topics 
covered included child sexual abuse and exploitation, the importance of breast 
feeding, and anti-smoking and nutrition awareness education. During the 2006 crisis 
situation KBH worked with Oxfam and UNICEF to deliver health messages in the 
IDP (internally displaced persons) camps.  
 
Plate 5.2 Expressional arts performance by secondary school students in 
Ermera. 
 
The EAP while not a priority training area in KBH’s initial plan was accepted by the 
Board as a community empowerment tool. Theatre and drama are major tools in 
popular education methodology.  
As with many local NGOs in Timor-Leste at the time, KBH in conjunction with 
GFFTL, SIL and LAIFET, was also involved in the massive civic education campaign 
sponsored by the UN and aimed at preparing people for the democratic elections to 
be held in 2002.  
From November 2001 to November 2004, KBH in collaboration with SIL, GFFTL and 
LAIFET, and with the help of APHEDA volunteers, international advisers, trained: 
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• Over 1500 people in 16 vocational areas including carpentry, blacksmithing, 
tailoring, small business, organic fertiliser production, plough making, 
vegetable production, agriculture and land care (65 % of trainees were 
women). 
• Over 500 people in areas including expressional arts and literacy. 
• Over 1,211 people in civic education. 
• A total of 175 people were trained as trainers; among them 17 trainer 
facilitators within the three member organisations. Another 158 local people 
with specific skills and knowledge were trained as trainers in vocational skills 
to work in the districts (of these, 55% were women). 
• KBH staff members were also trained in designing training programs, 
curriculum, evaluation and report writing. 
5.10 Summary 
In its first two years, KBH, as a local independent training centre with the support 
and leadership of its founding organisations and APHEDA, was able to fulfil its 
vision and its mission to serve the needs of its client communities relatively 
unhampered and in its ‘own way’. Its financial dependence on the international world 
outside APHEDA was limited, and when necessary, was often mediated by an 
international adviser who could advocate on KBH’s behalf. APHEDA, as the major 
international donor with its base in solidarity and unionism, was a sympathetic 
international partner/patron supportive of KBH’s strong ideology and methodology 
and that of its founding organisations. While APHEDA received partial funding for its 
support of KBH (and other NGOs) through AusAID, it was in charge of disbursement 
of the funds, for the evaluation and monitoring of the projects ‘on the ground‘, and 
for reporting to AusAID. It acted in some ways as a buffer between KBH and the 
larger aid community.  
In April 2004, however, as the aid environment was shifting from post emergency to 
long-term development, AusAID’s CAPET funding was discontinued and APHEDA 
was forced, through reduced funds, to re-evaluate its financial support to KBH. 
While it was not APHEDA’s intention to leave KBH unsupported, it nevertheless 
meant dramatic changes for KBH in the way it functioned and accessed its funds. 
Thus by mid 2004, KBH was entering a new phase, one that would bring it into 
much closer contact with the international aid world at large and force it to negotiate 
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and to develop relationships/partnerships’ with a much wider range of international 
aid organisations and bilateral and multilateral agencies.  
The following section describes KBH as it was in April 2004 to August 2005 and the 
changes it made to its structure and service delivery in response to the changing 
funding environment.  
KBH 2004-2006 
5.11 Place and Space  
When I first arrived at KBH in April 2004, I had only a vague idea about how the 
organisation was structured, what it did, how it conducted its community work and 
training, and only sketchy details of the individuals within the organisation, the Board 
and the three partner organisations. What little I knew was gleaned from internet 
sources such as the APHEDA website or the Timor-Leste Action Network (ETAN) 
site and from the short interviews I conducted two years earlier with several staff 
members of the three organisations. The KBH coordinator, whom I had spoken with 
in 2002, had left in 2003 and the new coordinator spoke very little English, and I was 
not fluent in Indonesian or Tetun. Our email conversations, therefore, were short 
and spasmodic as KBH’s email connection (which was later cut altogether) was slow 
and expensive and always tenuous, dependent as it was on Dili’s fluctuating 
electricity supply. This meant it took several months of emailing back and forth 
before things were settled to the point where I could just ‘arrive' and negotiate the 
finer details face-to-face.  
While this seemingly endless process might have been frustrating for me, for local 
people it was just part of the routine and the everyday reality of dealing with yet 
another foreigner, unable to speak their language, and who has an expectation that 
things can be done quickly, descending upon them to ask yet more questions and to 
do yet another study.  
Late April is a hot sticky month in Timor, as are most months. The mountains, which 
rise steeply behind Dili and cover most of Timor and make travel long and arduous 
between towns and villages (as described in Box 5.1), are already turning brown. 
Coming out of the wet season, the muddy streets start to dry and the air is filled with 
dust and dirt stirred up by a multitude of motorbikes and taxis’ ferrying people 
around or sounding their horns to solicit fares from the many foreigners in town. Life 
has changed dramatically for local people in Dili since the arrival of the aid industry. 
The cost of living has risen sharply; while streets and roads remain open spaces for 
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market stalls and social gatherings, and pigs and dogs to wander freely; life goes on 
in competition with the many fast moving UN trucks and four-wheel drive aid 
vehicles.  
KBH is situated close to the centre of Dili, on the main road from the airport and as 
such, much of what goes on in Dili goes past its front door, including celebration 
parades, funeral processions, protests and more volatile demonstrations.  
The KBH training centre is a large airy building with trees in front and lots of 
windows that open out (Plate 5.3). On completion of the renovation in 2002 as 
described above, the then newly appointed KBH coordinator and administration 
assistant moved in, occupying one of two offices at the front of the building, GFFTL, 
with its coordinator, bookkeeper and relatively large volunteer staff of six to ten, 
mostly female university students, moved into the other. The two offices are 
connected by a large foyer area where staff, friends and visitors gather in the 
mornings before work. The big portico at the front of the building, overhanging the 
tiled steps leading to the entrance, is also a popular and cool place for everyone to 
sit in the late afternoons or during the many hours when the electricity goes out. 
Without a fan it is almost impossible to remain inside and oddly enough without 
computers, work also stops – computers have taken hold of work production in a 
surprisingly modern way and without them people seem lost.  
  
Plate 5.3 Knua Buka Hatene, Dili. 
 
KBH is not only a training centre but a building that can sustain a resident live-in 
population. Sometimes up to 20 participants at one time would be undergoing 
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training as well as sleeping, eating, bathing and doing their laundry in the confines of 
the building. The four training rooms are easily converted into sleeping space at 
night and the bathrooms double as areas for washing clothes. 
As part of the building refurbishment in 2001, a large under-cover area had been 
created so that large training projects could take place at KBH. In the wet season 
the under-cover area provided a space to work which was protected from the rain, 
but in the hotter drier months the concrete floor and walls kept in the heat. It was 
often a hot and steamy place to work and was particularly utilised for sleeping during 
training blocks. This area also became an entertainment area, a place for social 
functions and an occasional game of badminton after work on a Friday night, while 
the EAP groups often used it as a rehearsal area.  
In November 2006, after the crisis situation in April-May of that year (see Chapter 1), 
the KBH building became a sanctuary for staff. Both the KBH coordinator, whose 
house had been torched and the GFFTL coordinator and her partner, were too 
scared to return to their house, were living in the KBH building. The security guard 
was also living at KBH. Many of the other staff from GFFTL and KBH had sheltered 
there at various times during the emergency. The building was not merely a training 
facility but a community centre that could be adapted to meet the changing political 
environment and the accommodation and safety needs of its occupants. 
5.12 The KBH Family (Staff)  
At the time of my arrival KBH had only a small salaried staff of five which included 
the coordinator, the administration assistant, a part-time cleaner, and two part-time 
security people. Their salaries were all drawn from the small operational budget 
supplied by APHEDA. There were also two experienced staff from the EAP, who 
were employed on a contract basis when projects were operating. They often 
worked for long periods without pay, doing community consultations and preparing 
proposals. An Australian volunteer adviser was on a six-month placement at KBH 
and was half way through her term. All the Timor-Leste staff, other than one of the 
security men, were younger than 30 and all originally came from districts outside 
Dili.  
Besides the KBH staff, were the young women from GFFTL, the organisation in the 
opposite office. GFFTL had three paid staff and a group of volunteers, mostly female 
and mostly university students. As many as six young female volunteers worked 
there at any one time, coming in between lectures or after classes had finished. The 
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coordinator of KBH was also a previous GFFTL worker, and her cousin was one of 
the trainers sometimes employed by KBH to do joint training projects. This cousin 
later became the KBH training manager. The female Expressional Arts trainer was 
also the sister in-law of the training manager and cousin by marriage to the 
coordinator. Within a few months the administration assistant left to take up a 
position with a bilateral agency which offered three times the salary of KBH and a 
new administration assistant was chosen from the ranks of the GFFTL volunteers. A 
young man employed to assist the EAP group was a brother of one of the young 
GFFTL women whose family was also, in a small way, financially supported by the 
GFFTL trainer who would become the KBH training manager. His employment was 
openly seen as a way of giving him an opportunity to develop skills and to earn 
money. In short, most staff could be traced and linked in some way to each other. 
While not all staff were from the same village many came from Lospalos and 
Viqueque districts in the east of Timor-Leste.  
Most of the time, the atmosphere at KBH was a like a big family. There was lots of 
laughter and chatter between the two offices with people dropping in and out on a 
continuous basis and if tensions did arise they seemed to evaporate relatively 
quickly. It was easy to believe in that environment that the violence and conflict of 
the past was, if not forgotten, at least dealt with in a way that people could move on. 
In the early months of my placement I learnt quite quickly about the deeper 
undercurrents within the organisation as the scenario in Box 5.2 demonstrates.  
Box 5-2 Hidden agendas 
 
During my first few months at KBH I was still struggling with the language 
and had decided to employ a local person who spoke Indonesian, Tetun, 
Portuguese and English to translate documents for me and to act as an 
interpreter during interviews with organisations other than KBH. A young 
man was highly recommended to me by an international friend and after 
an interview where I found him to be suitable for the job I employed him. 
However, when he arrived at KBH to meet me to go to an interview, 
several of the KBH and GFFTL staff became distraught at his presence in 
the building: it emerged that while this young person had no history of 
violence himself, the staff members believed his family were involved in 
the deaths of over 100 of their family members in 1975-89. Within this 
context, it was inappropriate for me to offer him the position.  
 
Later, through informal discussions, I learnt that there were two people 
working in the building who were said to be involved politically, through 
their families, with groups aligned with the Indonesians and the militias.  
 
 
Continued 
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Although their histories were known among staff they appeared to be 
able to co-exist within the organisation. I was unable to understand why 
this was the case, though my observations suggested that the situation 
was managed through an elaborate system of roles and status, and 
family relationships. One was related by marriage to a close relative of a 
KBH staff member while the other was working in a subordinate role 
within the organisation. The two people were allowed to remain in the 
organisation but they were restricted and regulated by these 
relationships. In these instances, family and close relationships provided 
a way of working together and dealing with the past and the present. 
 
 
5.13 Caught in Transition 
In May 2004, one month after I arrived, APHEDA like many other international 
NGOs, was forced, through reduced funding, to reduce its operating costs in Timor-
Leste. It did this by replacing the APHEDA international coordinators position based 
in Timor with a volunteer position which allowed them to maintain all the salaried 
Timor-Leste staff. To reduce costs further, APHEDA relocated its office to the KBH 
building and began renting one of the large classrooms at the back of the KBH 
building26.These rental payments became an important source of steady income for 
KBH particularly as the period of operational funding was drawing to a close and 
KBH was solely responsible for the on-going upkeep and security of the building. An 
added advantage of APHEDA sharing the building was that APHEDA’s computer 
technician (available to all APHEDA local partners) was close at hand to assist with 
the ever failing KBH network system and ageing computers.  
With limited funds to support KBH in the long-term, APHEDA encouraged KBH to 
give more consideration to its long-term financial sustainability by broadening its 
donor base to include a wider range of organisations and agencies and government 
departments as partners and clients. Therefore, in mid-2004 KBH needed to come 
up with new plans, new ideas and new funding opportunities, to cover its operational 
costs and to continue to run training for its client communities in Dili and the districts. 
A strategic planning meeting was held to discuss the issues faced by KBH in 
competing in a changing environment where money was harder to get and came 
with ever increasing regulations and requirements and stringent reporting and 
accounting procedures.  
A list of internal and external challenges that reflected some of the challenges KBH 
faced in the changing environment was drawn up from this meeting, one of the most 
important being the lack of experienced financial management. Box 5.3 describes 
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the way in which KBH managed its finances up until the end of 2005 and gives a 
picture of the difficulties faced by a local NGO in establishing a financial system 
robust enough to satisfy new donor expectations and regulations, and capable of 
handling multiple projects. 
Box 5-3 Filing-cabinet accountancy 
 
Coming from a country with a highly developed economic system and 
with very formal systems and expectations of accountability and 
transparency placed upon NGOs, I was unprepared for the creative 
accountancy and financial management practices of KBH. My taken for 
granted reality was soon shaken as I learnt that in a post 
emergency/conflict country with major infrastructure problems, learning 
how to deal with large sums of money with only meagre banking facilities 
available is a major challenge for local NGOs.  
In late 1999 with the arrival of the peace keeping forces the Rupiah was 
replaced by the US dollar. In 2004, Timor remained working under a cash 
system meaning that few people used cheques or plastic cards except for 
foreigners. Funding bodies made direct deposits into bank accounts and 
transactions were all in cash.  
 
When I first started at KBH relatively large amounts of money were kept 
in the locked filing cabinet in the office. I found out by asking around that 
this was not unusual practice for small local NGOs and perhaps even 
larger ones. A visit to the bank at that time could take a full working day 
depending on the queues. 
 
Consequently, the administration person could spend an entire day at the 
bank without getting money, which in turn meant that projects were held 
up because of lack of pay or lack of money for transport.  
 
As a response to this predicament it became much easier and more 
efficient, if less secure, to withdraw a large amount of money at one time 
and keep this in the filing cabinet. KBH’s accounting and reporting 
system was quite simple and effective and had been set up by an 
international adviser. Subsequent international advisers had contributed 
to the system and in the capacity building of the ever changing 
administration staff (four changes alone in the time I was there) and 
coordinator (three in three years). In the filing-cabinet the money for each 
project was divided into different envelops. As money was needed a debit 
slip was filled out and filed and the transaction recorded in the cash book. 
As a project ended a report was written which included a financial 
reconciliation or acquittal of all expenditure and every receipt and debit 
slip was pasted meticulously into a booklet, usually amounting to a figure 
very close to the total of the original proposed budget cost.  
 
This procedure worked particularly well when KBH was undertaking one 
project at a time, for a single funding body, and was receiving operational 
funding from one source. However, if KBH were to take on multiple 
projects and to derive operational funding as a proportion of each project 
rather than a single source from one donor, a much more sophisticated 
accounting system would be needed as well as a person qualified to 
implement that system — neither of which KBH currently had. 
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Other serious issues KBH faced included: 
• A lack of qualified training staff permanently attached to KBH without constant 
work it was difficult to maintain high quality staff trained in popular and 
participatory education methodology;  
• A high turnover of administration staff led to confusion and lack of continuity in 
understanding office and administrative procedures;  
• A fear and lack of experience by the leadership in managing multiple projects 
which would be necessary for KBH to take on in order to survive; 
• Low staff morale because of job insecurity, low salaries and salaries not being 
paid on time; and 
• Slow and unresponsive decision-making processes. The Board of 
Management members were all coordinators or members of other NGOs and 
as such were also facing similar pressures. Board meetings were therefore 
often cancelled and decisions not made quickly and efficiently.  
To address these problems several strategies were agreed to by the Board on a 
short-term trial basis. These strategies included:  
• Employing a training manager to: 1) oversee all training projects and training of 
trainers in the districts and at KBH; 2) standardise training methods and 
procedures within KBH; and 3) identify opportunities to diversify KBH’s donor 
base; 
• Employing a part-time financial manager to manage multiple project accounts 
so as to ease the pressure on the coordinator and the administration assistant; 
• Undertaking new training courses at KBH, outside the traditional priority 
training area (for example computing courses), so as to engage the local Dili 
community; and 
• Giving the coordinator greater autonomy in decision-making relating to the 
day-to-day running of KBH so that issues could be acted upon quickly.  
To facilitate the restructuring process it was necessary for KBH to seek bridging 
funding from APHEDA. They needed APHEDA to continue paying operational 
funding until June 2005. APHEDA agreed to the bridging funding proposal and to 
the extra money required for the two new positions which gave KBH a nine month 
grace period to implement its new strategies. APHEDA also continued to fund the 
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volunteer position of the international technical adviser for the same period27 to 
assist with the restructuring.  
It was this position, as the volunteer technical adviser, that I agreed to take on 
during the next two stages of my fieldwork.  
5.14 Searching for Funds  
In early September 2004, as the only international worker, and as part of the 
restructuring project, I was asked by the KBH coordinator to accompany the new 
training manager on a visit to all the bilateral agencies and/or their related 
embassies in Dili to gather funding applications and guidelines and to discuss with 
their staff funding opportunities. Most of the Embassies in Timor-Leste at that time 
were heavily guarded and fortified and passing through their security gates proved 
difficult, and impossible without passports and adequate identification. Few Timor-
Leste people had passports at that time but usually had an identification card. The 
aim was to identify funding sources that would match the organisation’s general 
criteria for training and fit its ideological vision and mission as closely as possible, 
and to then apply for funding to deliver appropriate training projects.  
KBH was in the same situation as many local NGOs in Timor-Leste at that time, all 
competing for a diminishing pool of funds. It soon became obvious from interviews 
with bilateral agency staff that most available grants and funds were very specifically 
targeted in terms of locations and beneficiaries, and some did not fit easily with 
KBH’s criteria and service delivery, while more and more donors were targeting 
communities directly rather than working through local NGOs.  
By the end of 2004 and in response to the very limited donor funds now available for 
local NGOs, KBH decided to pursue several options. The first option was to re-
negotiate a new contract with a multilateral agency for whom KBH had previously 
provided training and who had expressed an interest in continuing work with KBH 
(Box 5.4) The second option was to make a proposal to a bilateral agency for 
funding to support a five-month agricultural training program in Viqueque, a district 
in the eastern part of Timor-Leste (Box 5.5). The third was to make a proposal to 
develop three community learning centres as a pilot for a multilateral agency who 
had approached KBH to do so (Box 5.6). It was envisaged by KBH that by engaging 
in these three projects they would be able to use a percentage from each for 
operational funding. This combined with extra fee-for-service work, rental income 
and continued (though reduced) financial support from APHEDA, should secure a 
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reasonable income for 2005-2006. The term reasonable income meant enough 
money for operational costs and to maintain the salaries for all the current staff for at 
least one year while they delivered training and monitored and evaluated projects.  
The following three scenarios in Boxes 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 give an outline of three 
different experiences KBH staff had in pursuing these projects. Each scenario 
highlights in different ways the difficulties for a small local NGO in: negotiating 
reasonable and workable projects; negotiating conditions and contracts with a 
multilateral agency; establishing legitimacy, trust and respect with a multilateral 
agency; and building partner relationships, particularly with multilateral and bilateral 
agencies.  
Box 5-4 Negotiating a new project with a multilateral agency 
 
One of the major projects that KBH was engaged in was to deliver a 
specific type of training for a major multi-lateral organisation (MLA). The 
first stage of the project had gone well and the MLA was keen for KBH to 
deliver the second stage. This stage involved selecting three new districts 
to work in while maintaining contact and building on the work previously 
started in the first three districts. Part of the negotiations for this stage 
involved deciding on reasonable work outputs, transport costs and time 
allowance for travel to and from and within the districts during the project. 
While I use the word negotiation it is not descriptive of the inter-change 
that transpired. While the MLA project staff wanted to do the best they 
could by KBH they were constrained by institutional rules and formulas 
set by the New York office, and KBH staff could do little but accept these 
conditions or lose the project.  
 
The MLA staff were also unsure how they wanted the second part of the 
project to be implemented and wanted KBH to come up with a new plan 
for how the specific training might be done. While this gave KBH staff an 
opportunity to shape the project it also caused several other problems for 
KBH to overcome. First, the planning task itself was difficult for KBH local 
staff as most of the discussions to that point had been carried out in 
English, making it difficult for KBH staff to grasp what the MLA wanted 
and what would be acceptable to propose. Second, the project staff had 
limited experience in designing projects of this size and scope. Third, the 
planning would involve a great deal of consultation with each of the six 
communities involved, which, as outlined in Box 5.1, was a time and 
resource consuming activity, hampered also by the fact that the two 
project staff had not received a salary for several months. Fourth, the 
logistics of actually negotiating a proposal in the form of a lengthy 
document with a MLA was daunting in itself as it required a lengthy 
process of corrections and adjustments to reach the final draft. As KBH 
was unable to afford the internet connection by this time, they were 
unable to send the document back and forth by email.  
 
The reality of this negotiation for KBH staff meant catching a taxi (which 
needed a receipt) to the office of the agency, waiting for the agency 
contact to see them, returning by taxi (another receipt) with corrections in 
hard copy, and then making manual changes on the computer and 
returning the revised document to the donor.       Continued 
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This set of negotiations took four months of writing and re-writing before it 
met with the approval of all levels of the MLA agency, including its main 
office in New York.  
 
For a small NGO like KBH such long and protracted negotiations outlined in Box 5.4 
could mean the downfall of the organisation, as few small NGOs could have lasted 
that long without financial inputs. Indeed, it was only that KBH was still being 
supported by APHEDA that it did survive through that period and was able to 
implement the training over the next nine months. In the end, the majority of the 
changes favoured the MLA and were made to appease the New York office which 
had strict output regulations and contractual regulations regarding countries in the 
‘long-term development’ stage. However, KBH was able to negotiate with the MLA 
project manager for the MLA to pay part of the salary of the finance manager to 
administer the financial contract and to employ an international mentor for 30 days 
during the life of the project.  
Box 5-5 Establishing a working relationship with a bilateral agency 
 
In late 2004 a community in one of the districts in the eastern part of 
Timor-Leste approached KBH with an initiative to implement a 
sustainable agricultural training program for women and young people in 
their district. It was to be a joint project involving KBH, the community and 
the local high school, and the school would continue to run the project 
after the initial training finished. Two of the people working for KBH came 
from this district so it was not surprising that the community knew about 
the work of KBH or were asking the organisation for assistance. 
Nevertheless, the project was legitimate and interesting and well within 
KBH’s scope and area of expertise. After working out a budget and an 
action plan based on what the community wanted and what KBH could 
reasonably deliver, various international agencies and organisations were 
visited to find one with funding criteria and targets that would fit the needs 
of the project and of KBH, or one to which KBH could adapt its needs and 
the needs of the community.  
 
Eventually after ‘shopping around’ a bilateral agency was found which 
had a program which appeared to be the ‘closest fit’ to what KBH and the 
community needed. The application and guidelines were duly obtained 
and as the project met the first level criteria of the bilateral agency, KBH 
was advised by the agency staff to proceed with the application. The cut 
off date left only two weeks for further extensive consultation with the 
community and with community leaders, from district administrator to 
Chefi de Suku (village head), as specified in the application. This was a 
difficult and time consuming task as the community was ten hours by bus 
from Dili. Nevertheless, a detailed 15 page proposal with itemised budget 
for four training sessions was completed in English and delivered to the 
Embassy by the KBH training manger on the evening of the cut off 
period. As the training manger did not have adequate identification she 
was not allowed into the Embassy and instead had to entrust the 
proposal to a guard at the gate, who promised to deliver it to the 
nominated person within the Embassy.  
 
Continued 
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The following morning the training manger rang the bilateral agency to 
make sure that the application had been delivered and was told that it 
had and that they would contact KBH within two weeks with the results of 
the application. After two weeks of waiting, a call to the embassy 
revealed that there had been a mistake and that the application had been 
lost. The training manager was asked to bring another copy of the  
proposal to the Embassy but was also told that the International Board 
responsible for approving applications had already met and allocated the 
funds for that period. The proposal, however, would be held over for the 
next funding round in three months time when it would be re-submitted.  
Numerous phone calls by the training manager, to follow up the next 
round of funding and the proposal over the next four or five months, 
resulted in nothing.  
 
The training manager then asked me, as an international worker, to ring 
the international staff at the embassy, and I was told that KBH’s proposal 
 did not meet the criteria for the dollars per beneficiary ratio that was 
required. The training manager then, after five months of negotiation, 
sent a message to the community to let them know that KBH would be 
unable to deliver the training.  
 
 
The point of outlining the scenario in Box 5.5 is not to argue that every proposal 
proffered by a local NGO to a BLA should be granted or that all travelling expenses 
should be reimbursed, whether or not the proposal is accepted. Rather, it 
exemplifies the difficulties small local NGOs have in establishing close relationships 
with BLAs which can be both symbolically - as the representative of a foreign power-
and physically - situated behind armed guards and barricades, isolated. In contrast, 
KBH had worked successfully for three years with APHEDA in a very productive 
relationship (see training outputs from Section One) and one based on mutual trust 
and respect. Perhaps most importantly, APHEDA was both accessible and 
approachable. For example, if KBH had an idea for training, the staff could meet 
face-to-face with the APHEDA coordinator on familiar ground and discuss the idea. 
If it was thought worthwhile, KBH would consult further with the community. While 
the project staff would not be paid during this consultation, at least they were 
confident in the fact that the project would go ahead in some shape or other and that 
their time would not be wasted.  
Furthermore, in every instance when the BLA failed to communicate or give 
feedback to KBH about the acceptance or rejection of the proposal, it reinforced the 
unequal relationships between KBH, as a local NGO, and the BLA. As a local NGO, 
KBH was expected to meet the conditions of the BLA but there was no reciprocal 
responsibility by the BLA to comply with its own notification and feedback policy. 
This gap was further reinforced when, as an international worker, I rang the 
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embassy to find out what had happened and was able to get instant feedback after 
the local training manger, despite many calls, was unable to do so.  
Box 5-6 Establishing legitimacy with a multilateral agency 
 
At around the same time as the scenario in Box 5.5 was unfolding, KBH 
received a request by a multilateral agency (MLA) to submit a proposal to 
run a pilot project to set up three Community Learning Centres in Timor-
Leste. The MLA regional Director had visited KBH and, impressed with 
the work KBH did, wanted KBH to run the pilot. He requested that KBH 
consult with three designated communities and write a draft proposal 
which was to be sent to him within two weeks outlining the setting up and 
running of the three centres.  
 
KBH staff discussed the idea and although there were some differing 
opinions over which three locations should be chosen for the community 
learning centres (the MLA had chosen one location that KBH believed 
was already over serviced), it was agreed that a proposal would be 
written. The concept was one that KBH had talked about previously as a 
way of dealing with the problem of being too remote from the 
communities they serviced.  
 
Monitoring visits had revealed that to train people in Dili and then send 
them back to their villages to train others required, adequate ongoing 
support and mentoring to be successful. Yet existing project funding did 
not allow for the intensive follow up and support needed. The 
development of community centres (in existing community buildings) 
where a management committee would represent the community and its 
needs was an attractive idea to KBH and to the communities KBH 
consulted.  
 
As the application was required to be written in English, I became the 
designated writer while the local staff went to the districts to consult with 
the communities and to obtain district level permission for the project. All 
three communities were eager to be involved with the project as were the 
district heads. The proposal and the consultations were completed within 
the time frame by KBH staff, paid and unpaid and friends, working and 
travelling for many hours in their own time, and was sent to Jakarta using 
APHEDA’s internet connection by the due date. After 3-4 weeks of 
hearing nothing and emails not being answered, I was told, unexpectedly, 
by the MLA representative in Timor-Leste that the proposal was 
successful and the funds would be transferred in due course. She told 
me this unofficially and said that official confirmation would be coming 
soon. KBH staff were elated as it meant not only that they could set up 
the community learning centres but that they would also be able to cover 
at least half their operational costs in 2005 with this funding.  
 
I returned to Australia a few days later after committing to return in March 
2005 for a further four months to assist KBH with the process of setting 
up and training the CLCs. However, when the money did not come 
through, it was only after persistent phone calls and emails to the MLA 
representative in Timor-Leste (emails to the Director in Jakarta were not 
returned) that KBH found out that they had changed their minds and 
chosen an international, rather than a local organisation, to pilot the 
project. Later I was told ‘unofficially’ by the MLA representative in Timor-
Leste that when they heard I was returning to Australia, and unaware that 
I was returning, they had decided not to fund KBH. The decision was 
based on the belief that without an international worker KBH did not have 
the staff with the necessary skills to competently conduct the project. 
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Box 5.6 outlines some of the difficulties a small local NGO faces in trying to 
establish its legitimacy as a responsible and competent aid organisation in its own 
right in the minds of international workers and agencies. Despite having a good 
reputation and background experience in implementing many successful projects, 
the single most important factor in winning the tender was having an international 
worker attached to the organisation.  
Again this scenario, like Box 5.5, reinforces the unequal relationships that exist 
between international aid workers and local people in this context.  
These are not the only interactions KBH had with international agencies and 
organisations during this period. KBH did successfully engage in training activities 
with several other international aid organisations which worked in Timor-Leste in a 
similar way to APHEDA. For example, these organisations had international staff on 
the ground who were approachable and easily accessible to local organisations and 
who were also able to represent the needs of local NGOs to their organisations out 
of country.  
5.15 Conclusion  
KBH was built on strong local ideological principles and these shaped very closely 
the work KBH undertook up until mid-2004. APHEDA, as an international 
organisation and the major partner of KBH during that time, allowed KBH, as much 
as possible given its own donor constraints, to steer its own course and supported 
its efforts to do so, both financially and by providing on-going technical support. The 
strength of APHEDA’s support lay in its relationship of trust, respect and 
accessibility to KBH as a partner and as a mentor. This relationship allowed 
APHEDA to play a guiding rather than a dominating role in the partnership. As a 
relatively small international organisation with an international coordinator working in 
Timor-Leste alongside KBH and the other eight local NGOs it was supporting, 
APHEDA was able to respond to the needs of KBH on a daily basis and to 
understand the constraints and challenges it faced.  
Post mid-2004, when it became necessary for KBH to widen its scope and to look 
for other means of providing operational funds and funds to run projects, it came up 
against agencies with whom it had no long-term history of involvement at such a 
close level as it did with APHEDA. Consequently KBH struggled to develop 
partnerships with these agencies that gave it sufficient status and leverage to win 
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the proposals or to negotiate the best conditions. However, while KBH was willing to 
shape itself to a certain degree to fit the criteria of the funding bodies, either by 
accepting to work in districts they felt were over supplied (Box. 5.6), accepting 
conditions that were adverse for them (Box 5.4) or going with the closest fit (Box 
5.5), they did so within the framework of their core beliefs and values. The story may 
have been different without the continued financial and technical support of 
APHEDA during this process. Few small NGOs would have been able to remain 
viable during the protracted and difficult proposal preparations and negotiations 
outlined in the three scenarios.  
This chapter has attempted to show the significant imbalance in the power 
relationships between local NGOs and international NGOs/donors in the post-
conflict, post-emergency period. It has also tried to show how local NGOs can find 
themselves bound up in highly dependent relationships that have the potential to 
shape their strategies, objectives and goals to meet international objectives. In 
Chapter Six this power differential is elaborated further as the issues and challenges 
faced by local NGOs are examined from a local, insider’s perspective. In Chapter 
Seven the same issues are again examined from an external perspective, through 
the eyes of international workers on the ground in Timor-Leste. In Chapter Eight all 
three perspectives are discussed in relation to the issues covered in the literature 
review.  
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 Chapter Six 
Challenges and Issues from a Local Perspective 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter addresses the third objective of my thesis which is to identify and 
explore the major challenges faced by KBH in attempting to maintain its overall 
vision, mission and goals whilst conducting its activities in the post-conflict 
environment of aid and development in Timor-Leste. Drawing on the data I collected 
as a participant observer during my time in the field, I outline the main challenges 
faced by KBH specifically and by local NGOs generally, as seen from the 
perspective of local NGO workers. Data collected from interviews with local Timor-
Leste staff (sourced both from KBH, and other local NGOs) have also been 
included. The data are discussed under two central themes: ‘Internal challenges to 
meet external conditions’ and ‘Interface issues’. The first theme reflects on the 
internal challenges faced by a local NGO in attempting to meet the 
requirements/conditions/regulations of international donors and the difficulties 
encountered in adapting to an environment dominated by the externally imposed 
conditions of the supplanted international aid world. The second theme explores the 
challenges faced by local NGOs in negotiating specific partnerships and 
relationships with international donor agencies and aid organisations. These 
challenges are collectively described as ‘Interface issues’ because they arise from 
the point of contact between the two spheres.  
6.2 Internal Challenges to Meet External Conditions  
As discussed in Chapter Three, when a local NGO operates in the post conflict/post 
emergency phase, it does so in an environment populated by large international 
donor organisations, bilateral, multilateral, and international aid organisations’ which 
have a great deal of control over how funds are dispersed, including to which 
organisations they are dispersed and under what conditions. Most local NGOs in 
Timor-Leste are reliant on international donor funding for a large proportion of their 
recurrent funding and project work which allows them to provide services to their 
communities. In order to attract funding, however, NGOs must first conform to and 
comply with the general expectations and criteria of the funding organisation. This 
means that an NGO must comply with the donor’s governance and financial 
accountability requirements, be able to deliver a service that fits within the donor’s 
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specific scope and target population group, and convince the donor that the NGO is 
a reliable and legitimate local partner with the capacity to carry out project activities. 
The degree to which an NGO is able to conform to the criteria laid down by donor 
organisations often dictates the success of grant applications and the degree to 
which the NGO is able to retain the support once acquired.  
Several major internal challenges that had an impact on the capacity of a local NGO 
to meet donor needs and to successfully deliver services to their community in a 
post-conflict, post-emergency environment are listed below. 
• Language and technology: the need to adapt to new languages and 
technologies. 
• Staffing: a lack of skilled and experienced staff; over-employment of family and 
friends; continual draining of local staff into international jobs; low salaries; and 
reliance on international staff. 
• Governance: learning new styles of leadership and management to meet 
donor expectations. 
• Financial management and administration systems: learning new financial 
management and administration systems to meet donor requirements.  
• These challenges are discussed further below with reference to case study 
material derived from fieldwork.  
6.3 Adaptation to New Languages and Technologies 
Languages 
One of the major challenges faced by KBH in its role as an NGO was adapting to 
new languages and communication technologies. Some of the frustration of having 
to continually navigate their way through a language ‘minefield’ which daily impacted 
on every facet of NGO life, and particularly in their relationships with international 
agencies and organisations and government agencies, is expressed in the following 
statements by local NGO workers. 
There are lots of problems [in working with international 
organisations] but the main problem is that they want us to write 
and speak in English and everything must be done in English so if 
you can’t speak English then you can’t say anything. (KI.20) 
 
Also they [internationals] need to work in Tetun. This is Timor not 
Australia or America, they should speak the language of the 
 82 
country they are working in like a Timorese person would if they 
were working in Australia. (KI.22) 
The reasons behind the strong desire of young people to speak their own language, 
becomes apparent in reviewing the history of language in Timor. Post-1999 local 
NGOs, largely staffed by an Indonesian and Tetun speaking generation of young 
Timorese people, were flooded with old and new languages as Portuguese and 
English-speaking expatriate Timorese returned home and the predominantly English 
speaking aid industry arrived. The official language of Timor-Leste became 
Portuguese in 2002, and while in 2005, Tetun, widely spoken throughout Timor-
Leste, also became a national language it did not have the technical words needed 
for the new environment and relied instead on ‘borrowed’ words from Portuguese or 
Indonesian, depending on the favoured language of the user. Bahasa Indonesian 
and English continued to be treated as working languages during this time. This 
newly imposed multi-lingual situation greatly disadvantaged predominantly 
Indonesian speaking staff of small local NGOs in several ways as described below.  
First, at a functional level, in 2004 most government documents were written in, and 
responses were often required in, Portuguese despite only 5%28 of the total 
population being fluent in Portuguese (East Timor: United Nations Development 
Assistance Framework (2003-2004) n.d). No staff during my time at KBH could 
speak, read or write Portuguese fluently. If a document arrived at KBH from a 
government department, a strategy developed by the organisation was to send a 
messenger with the document to a ‘friend’ of a staff member, working in the 
government, for translation. This was particularly challenging at the time as many 
new and compulsory government regulations regarding the registration of vehicles, 
car licenses, employee tax, and land tax were being reinstated and information 
relating to these services was sent out in Portuguese. On several occasions, 
through lack of understanding, KBH failed to comply with government regulations 
and the motorbikes were not licensed on time making them illegal to ride. More 
seriously, a bill for outstanding tax was not paid which could have led to a fine. 
Lapses or oversights such as these could damage the reputation of a small NGO or, 
in extreme circumstances, force it to close. 
Second, the lack of English fluency greatly restricted KBH’s capacity to develop 
project proposals to access crucial funds for the running of the organisation and to 
deliver services for client communities. Many of the funding proposal applications 
and guidelines of the donor organisations were in English and applications were 
required in English. Only 2% of the population of Timor-Leste spoke English (East 
 83 
Timor: United Nations Development Assistance Framework (2003-2004) n.d) and 
within KBH only two of the local staff (the administration worker and one of the 
project workers) spoke some English. Neither was fluent in writing English. For a 
small NGO such as KBH which relied heavily on donor funding for its everyday 
functioning, this was a significant challenge.  
Third, in this environment, international advisers became important players in the 
negotiation and writing of proposals. The negative impact of this situation was that 
many important meetings with international donors, such as the negotiations in Box 
5.4 relating to contracts, conditions, salaries, reporting mechanisms and timeframes, 
were held in English rather than Indonesian or Tetun. Local staff were left out of the 
loop not completely understanding what was being proposed or what the 
implementation, monitoring and reporting obligations were. This concern is aptly 
expressed by one local worker in the following quote, “So often we don’t understand 
what is happening with the project or the organisation because we cannot speak 
English and they [international workers] just speak English” (KI.20).  
While attempts were made at KBH to translate documents from English into 
Indonesian or Tetun or vice versa, this is a costly and time consuming activity. For 
an organisation like KBH, with few financial resources, translation costs were 
beyond its means. Time was also an issue because with a small busy staff there 
was never enough time to explain fully the situation before staff were rushing to 
meet another externally imposed deadline.  
Depending on the language of the KBH person who attended a meeting or who 
created a document, negotiations or records might be conducted or written in one of 
four languages: English, Portuguese, Tetun or Indonesian. Compounding this issue, 
notifications, bills, advertisements and reports might be equally as varied in the 
language employed. For example, all formal government notifications and policy 
documents are written in Portuguese. Communications between NGOs and most 
NGO organisational policy and regulations are written in Indonesian, and everyday 
spoken communications such as phone calls and meetings are usually conducted in 
Tetun, while directives emanating from the international aid industry favoured 
English. The language difficulties encountered meant that there was limited shared 
understanding of internal (within the organisation) and external communications.  
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The language barrier also had the effect of ‘locking up’ information by limiting the 
degree to which staff might access necessary knowledge and resources. This 
phenomenon is demonstrated in the scenario depicted in Box 6.1.  
Box 6-1 The paradox of the resource room  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, my negotiated role at KBH in the first three 
months of my placement was to re-organise the resource room which 
had reverted to a storage area and temporary sick bay. The idea for the 
resource centre had come out of the earlier English language training 
courses prior to 2004, as discussed in Chapter Five. At the time it was 
envisaged that the centre would continue to be a valuable source of 
information for local students and teachers. Besides the English 
language learning books, it contained many texts and manuals on a 
variety of subjects including human rights education, gender training, 
training for organising, popular education and participatory training 
methods. These books, donated mostly from Australia, had been used for 
training previously conducted by international volunteers supported by 
local staff.  
 
What I found, however, as I started cataloguing the books with the help of 
the cleaner, a part-time University student, was a collection of resources 
largely inaccessible to the current staff as they were mostly written in 
English. Perhaps more importantly, the room also contained records of 
KBH’s history and details of its training methodology and practice, again 
written in English by previous advisers, and equally inaccessible to the 
current staff for that reason. This being the case, the paradox was that 
the resource room was more valuable to KBH as a storage room, sick 
bay or potential extra office space than a repository of knowledge, 
inaccessible as it was by being ‘locked up’ in a foreign language.  
This situation was not limited to KBH – in libraries all over Dili, large and 
small, a similar situation pertained.  
 
 
Language, therefore, presented major challenges to the NGO attempting to 
successfully navigate its way in the post-conflict, post-emergency context. The new 
environment introduced new languages which limited the degree of shared 
understanding between donor and NGO and the degree to which one could 
communicate with the other over important matters such as grant applications and 
financial reporting. It favoured certain languages over others, making the issue of 
language not only a daily inconvenience but a socially contentious issue often 
resulting in exclusion, disadvantage and ill-feeling, as well as impacting negatively 
on internal organisational communications. Lastly it limited the degree to which 
information, knowledge and resources could be accessed and shared within the 
organisation, including access to the NGO’s own records, systems, regulations and 
history.  
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Computer technology 
Language was not the only communication and information sharing challenge faced 
by KBH. The flood of aid money and donations post-1999 brought with it a flood of 
computer technology as well. While issues related to the introduction of computers 
are not specific to a post-conflict, post-emergency environment, the rapid 
deployment of computer technology by aid agencies and organisations to meet their 
own needs, and the reliance upon it as a communication tool for all within the aid 
environment brings with it its own set of issues and problems. This was particularly 
the case for small local NGOs such as KBH. Staff adopted computer technology 
readily and made every effort to bring themselves up to speed with what was to 
many of them a new technology (the software for which was usually written in a 
foreign language). Whilst this broadened accessibility to donors in terms of 
increasing compatibility between the NGO and the donor, the new technology also 
brought with it new pressures as there was now an increased level of expectation by 
donors in the giving and receiving of information. Not only was more expected 
documentation required by donors but the style and formatting of information was 
now prescribed, necessitating use of different programs such as Microsoft Excel, 
Access, Publisher and Word.  
Associated communication technologies, such as email and web research, were 
now also expected to be used by local NGOs. International donors ignored or were 
oblivious of the fact that many local NGOs did not have a phone line, let alone the 
means to pay and service one. What someone might view as easy and achievable, 
a taken for granted reality, sitting in an office in a modern city (as evidenced in my 
description in Chapter Five of my own initial negotiations with KBH) or indeed in a 
well equipped office in Timor-Leste, at a computer with a reliable network 
connection and a paid-up telecom account, was a major feat for a small NGO like 
KBH. As evidenced in Box 5.4, such organisations simply do not have the resources 
to cope with such expectations let alone the related financial costs incurred such as 
printer cartridges, paper, USB flash drives, back-up disks and other expendable 
items. 
There were several other serious consequences for KBH which arose due to the 
organisation’s increased dependency on computer technology without having 
sufficient training in the use of computers or the support to adequately maintain 
them. One consequence was that information vital to the running of KBH was 
continually being lost or misplaced as computers ‘crashed’ or malfunctioned and 
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documents were saved in ‘odd’ places by untrained staff. This predicament was 
partially due to the fact that the computers were second-hand and in need of 
constant maintenance, a situation aggravated by the humidity and dusty 
environment. This issue coupled with a lack of constant technical support and staff 
members unskilled in general computer maintenance or unaware of the need to 
scan for viruses, often resulted in valuable and critical information being lost. While 
staff had received initial training in computers, the rapid turn over of staff left critical 
gaps in the knowledge base.  
In the same way that language affected NGO operations, computer technology too 
brought a new list of challenges to overcome. Whilst it brought with it the potential 
for access to new sources of information and office efficiency, the potential could 
only be partly realised without the necessary training and knowledge, experience, 
financial provisions and suitable equipment, all of which the small NGO in Timor-
Leste at this time did not have. As a result, the new technology in many ways 
became an impediment rather than a support, raising expectations of the NGO’s 
capacity whilst not actually contributing to the building of that capacity in any real 
way. In some cases, it actually reduced that capacity as exemplified by the loss of 
important information files and the increased financial strain. 
6.4 Staffing Related Issues 
The employment of family and friends 
In my experience KBH is similar to many local NGOs in Timor-Leste, Aceh or in 
Indigenous communities in Australia in its family and friendship based employment 
patterns (see Chapter Five). Word-of-mouth recommendation and recruitment is 
used in many contexts and by all sorts of organisations and agencies, international 
and local, as an acceptable recruitment strategy. It is a particularly important 
practice in emergency and post-emergency situations where reliable and trustful 
people must be identified and employed quickly to implement projects and deploy 
emergency supplies and services. In countries recovering from long-term conflict, 
issues such as trust, political and family allegiances and history, dependence and 
obligation are often more likely to be taken into consideration before looking at the 
relevant skills and experience of the person involved. There is also a great sense of 
kinship and social obligations to find paid work for relatives and friends in an 
environment of high unemployment, poverty and high living-costs. 
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At KBH the tight family and friendship bonds within the organisation worked in 
positive and negatives ways. In a positive way friends and family could be relied 
upon to work long hours without pay during situations such as those described in 
Box 5.5 and Box 5.6 when only small amounts of money were coming in. Also new 
proposals relied on staff travelling to the districts for monitoring and community 
consultations. Family and friends could also be called upon as volunteers to 
chauffeur staff members who were without bike or vehicle licenses, to the bank, 
meetings or training venues. Perhaps most importantly, however, the employment of 
friends and family ensured knowledge of the background and connections of the 
person being employed and, to some extent, control of the work-place situation as 
described in Box 5.2.  
In a more negative way employment of family members resulted, at times, in people 
being employed who did not have the necessary skills and education levels for the 
job, or the motivation to do the work. Family disputes were also known to 
occasionally disrupt the work of the organisation as disagreements were brought 
into the office making communication between parties difficult and productive work 
almost impossible. While normally short-lived, family-related disputes added to the 
stress and tension for everyone within the organisation, particularly as an argument 
between two people might escalate and require other members to take sides.  
So, the usual way of conducting staff relations in Timor-Leste, to adopt elements of 
the familial system and extend them to working life, here acted as an impediment to 
successful participation in the aid environment. Donors frowned upon staff familial 
relations for reasons of nepotism and the demand for transparency in all 
organisational procedures. Familial relations in the workplace meant that people 
who were not necessarily the most suited or even capable of doing a job might get 
that job over a more suitable applicant, which in a minimally populated workplace 
operating in a skill shortage environment, affected the organisation’s ability to make 
any real movement forward.  
Skill shortages and the draining of local NGO staff  
Another key reason for employing family and friends was the severe local skill 
shortage in Timor-Leste post-1999. This shortage was the result of the long period 
of colonisation pre-1975 during which Portuguese people filled most of the senior 
and technical jobs followed by 25 years of Indonesian occupation, during which 
most of these jobs were filled by Indonesians. Consequently, the numbers of highly 
skilled and experienced Timor-Leste people in 1999 was very low (East Timor: 
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United Nations Development Assistance Framework (2003-2004) n.d). Post-1999, 
with the rebuilding of government and public service infrastructure as well as the 
need of the aid industry to fill local staff places within their own organisations, local 
NGOs were forced to compete on an uneven playing field, not only to find but also to 
retain staff within their organisations. In November 1999 international aid 
organisations developed a code of pay and conditions for national staff which was 
then adopted by UNTAET. This meant that when a donor was negotiating a project 
with a local NGO there was a set salary cap to be paid for local staff. However, while 
this code of pay kept the rates paid to local NGO workers at a minimum, rates 
continued to be set on a sliding scale for Timor-Leste employed in government 
positions and in international donor agencies and aid organisations. On this scale, 
government salaries were the lowest followed by international NGOs while the 
multilateral agencies, bilateral donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) 
paid the highest salaries (A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change 2003). 
These differential pay rates, coupled with better conditions and better security 
options for local people resulted in a continuous drain of local NGO workers, 
particularly those with specific skills and experience, into international organisations’ 
jobs with MLAs, BLAs and IFIs.  
The consequence for KBH, and other local NGOs, of this drain was is that they were 
constantly losing experienced skilled staff, often with skills developed during their 
employment with a local NGO. Worse still, departing staff took with them the 
knowledge and understanding of the NGO as well as their learnt experience and 
knowledge in managing the NGO. In a small NGO like KBH the consequences of 
staff departures can be severe as it can mean a total change of local staff within a 
short period which can lead to a critical loss of organisational memory including the 
NGO’s vision, mission and goals as this information is not passed on (see Box 6.1), 
‘locked up’ and unattainable.  
Furthermore, the long-term benefits for the local NGO of any training and capacity-
building experienced by departing staff are also lost. In an ironic twist, the benefits of 
that internal capacity building will move with the flow of departing staff to 
government and international agencies rather than to building the potential of the 
less resourced local NGOS. This has serious ramifications, particularly in terms of 
the loss of strong leadership and financial management, as good financial managers 
and leaders are the primary recruitment targets for government and internationals 
agencies. 
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The following examples give an indication of the shifting staff patterns, and the 
reasons for, and impacts of, the departures at KBH within a three-year period. 
KBH’s administration officer left in mid-2004, after six months of employment, to 
take up a position with a bilateral agency at three times the salary KBH was able to 
pay. While she did not want to leave KBH, she felt she had little choice because of 
financial security reasons, “it is my future and my boyfriend doesn’t have 
employment” (KI.32). This particular employee had, in the short time she was at 
KBH, attended three different capacity building training courses, paid for by 
APHEDA. Another part-time trainer also left to work with an international NGO for 
similar reasons saying, “I don’t want to leave because I believe in KBH but I also 
need money to live and for my family” (KI.21). An APHEDA local staff member was 
also offered four times her salary by a multilateral agency to leave her job as the 
APHEDA office manager. Many previous KBH staff members successfully gained 
employment in international agencies or government departments because they 
were equipped with special skills developed while working for the local NGO.  
Of course, local staff also leave local NGOs because of the pressures and stresses 
of working within an under-funded, over-worked organisation with limited long-term 
employment and salary prospects. Local staff also have the right to optimise their 
opportunities. However, there is an inequitable situation when a local NGO in 
partnership with an MLA or a BLA donor is forced to pay project staff under the joint 
agreement, a third of the salary of a local staff member working for the MLA and 
doing a similar job.  
Reliance on international staff 
Having an international staff member is a valuable, if not crucial, asset for a local 
NGO operating within an environment dominated by the international aid industry, 
and is dependent on accessing donor funds for their survival. The international 
worker speaks the language of development, understands, if not embraces, the 
culture of development and can act as intermediary between the NGO and the 
donor, particularly in negotiating funding (although this can lead to a different set of 
issues as outlined above and in Box 5.4). They also open a door to the informal 
networking system of the international world, so important in identifying possible 
funding sources, and can add to the NGO’s legitimacy, an extremely important 
factor as illustrated in Box 5.6. The international worker in the role of capacity 
builder is also vital against a background of continually changing local staff and the 
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consequent leaching of organisation knowledge and skills, which they can ‘top up’ 
as new staff replace old, also as outlined above.  
However, while there are significant advantages, and a high degree of pleasure and 
appreciation felt by local staff in having an international staff member who takes an 
interest in them and their culture, there are also disadvantages. The reality of the aid 
world is that international staff are constantly changing as they finish their contracts 
and move on to new emergency situations or return to their homelands. For smaller 
local NGOs, like KBH, who rely on international staff often working as volunteers, 
the turnover can be as rapid as two weeks, but usually not longer than six months. 
As one local worker said “they could give the adviser not just for one month or six 
months but for three years - this is how long it takes to learn new ways” (KI.21). The 
quick turnover gives the international worker very little time to understand the NGO 
and how it works and, as observed by the local staff member, limited time to 
effectively transfer skills and knowledge to build the capacity of local people. 
International staff often bring with them high expectations of themselves and local 
staff, and firm views on how and what needs to be achieved within the limited time 
frame of their placement. This ‘mindset’ can lead to a perception by local staff that 
international staff have all the answers and are unwilling to listen to local staff about 
their knowledge and skills. As one local staff member commented “sometimes they 
[international workers] just want to advise about their organisation [and] they don’t 
want to learn about a Timorese organisation” (KI.21). Thus opportunities for sharing 
and participatory learning are lost and local staff can be put under extra stress 
accommodating the needs and expectations of the international worker.  
The arrival of international staff, an almost expected part of any successful NGO 
operating in Timor-Leste at this time, therefore brought many challenges to the small 
local NGO. International staff often had a high turnover rate which meant local staff 
would put a lot of energy into building relationships only to have them disconnected 
after six months and have to begin all over with someone new. These staff also 
created new problems as they solved others. Whilst language gaps were bridged, 
the introduction of another new language into the workplace often excluded staff 
from important negotiations, creating for some staff a feeling of disempowerment. 
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6.5 Governance: Learning New Styles of Leadership and Management to 
Meet Donor Requirements 
Maintaining strong leadership and management, or ‘good governance’, is 
particularly difficult for small NGOs in a country where there are few people with 
formal leadership and management experience in the workplace, either as 
organisation managers or Board members. As outlined above, the ability to recruit 
and retain experienced staff in a depleted labour market is extremely difficult. Local 
NGOs compete, not only with government and international agencies, but against 
the growing population of local NGOs which, like themselves, are also in need of 
staff with leadership skills. Leadership not only relates to the coordination or 
management of the NGO but to the leadership exerted by the NGO Board of 
Management or Advisory Board. This body ensures that the NGO is being managed 
in accordance with the vision and mission of the organisation and that the financial 
management and administration of the NGO’s business and activities are 
transparent and compliant. The coordinator is directly responsible to the Board. The 
strength and governance of an NGO therefore can be largely attributable to the 
strength of the Board of Management.  
This model of Leadership and Board Management is very much a western model 
and works well (though this is debatable) in western democracies. It generally 
requires members of an NGO Board of Management in Australia, for example, to be 
drawn from a wide range of backgrounds. While members may share an interest in 
the work the NGO does they also bring skills, knowledge and expertise from a wide 
variety of fields such as law, accountancy, community development, etc. In Timor-
Leste, where the number of independent, experienced, community members 
available for Board membership is very low, a significant gap appears in the 
management structure and governance of small NGOs. In the case of KBH’s Board, 
the members were often, as coordinators of their own NGOs, competing for the 
same work as KBH and by necessity putting the needs of their own organisations 
first. Under ‘good governance’ processes these issues would normally be seen as a 
conflict of interest and strongly discouraged, usually requiring the member in conflict 
to resign. However, with such a small pool of people to draw on it is difficult to avoid 
such situations.  
In the absence of a strong supportive Board, a great deal of power and responsibility 
is shifted to the coordinator who, without the checks and balances of the Board, can 
be blamed for any irregularities and held accountable. Much of pressure is therefore 
placed upon the person in charge, and as Hailey (2006) notes in a survey of the 
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literature on NGO leadership and development, NGO leaders in the development 
environment “can often feel isolated and unsupported” (p.1). They can also be 
‘scapegoated’ as inexperienced Board members see their role merely as monitors 
and policemen rather than active players in ensuring the transparency and 
compliance of the organisation. 
Given the added pressures on coordinators and managers in the post-conflict 
environment, and the low salaries they are paid, it is easy to understand why so 
many show signs of stress (like the coordinator described in Box 6.2) or many 
choose to seek other less stressful positions.  
Box 6-2 The loneliness of responsibility 
 
Financial reporting to donors was a particularly stressful part of the job for 
the KBH coordinator who was accountable to the Board and to the 
donors for any financial discrepancies. In many ways the coordinator 
carried the responsibility for KBH alone and was often stressed to the 
point of illness. She had little previous experience of managing an NGO 
and, as the funding criteria of international donors became stricter and 
accountability expectations rose, she came under more intense pressure. 
If a mistake was made, she felt she would be held accountable by the 
donor as well as the Board.  
 
By mid-2004, Board meetings were happening less frequently as the 
main Board members, coordinators themselves of local NGOs, had less 
time to attend meetings. Like the coordinator of KBH they were facing 
similar demands of increased accountability from their donors and similar 
pressures. 
 
The result was the coordinator of KBH was being increasingly forced to 
make important decisions about KBH and its future without the Board’s 
advice and guidance. Her sense of loneliness and responsibility 
increased significantly. 
 
As she told me on several occasions, “nobody understands, I don’t have 
any support or commitment – I am responsible for everything, I am 
responsible for reporting and finances and staff”.  
 
(Interview with coordinator).  
 
6.6 Learning New Financial Management and Administration Techniques to 
Fit Donor Needs 
Financial management and administration is a considerable problem for small local 
NGOs dependent on international donors, especially those that lack international 
technical assistance in financial management and administration or keep losing 
trained staff to other organisations. For these NGOs, most of the reporting 
requirements and procedures are determined by the donor and in some 
circumstances “an institutional model, complete with prefabricated administrative 
 93 
and managerial procedures may have been imported” (Avina 1993, p. 58). However, 
no system, no matter how clever or efficient is useful if people are unable to use it. 
Again the lack of skilled local people available to learn the system and the continual 
drain of newly skilled people into international organisations and agencies 
contributes to the problem.  
In KBH the administration assistant was responsible for bookkeeping, overseen by 
the coordinator. Former international technical advisers had set up the financial 
management and reporting system and the administration processes and 
procedures, and had taught the existing administration person and coordinator how 
to use the system as described in Box 5.3. However, with an almost six-monthly 
turnover of administration staff and yearly turnover of coordinators, the knowledge 
and understanding of the system was continually eroded. This predicament meant 
that on occasions small mistakes would be made with receipts or accounts which 
could not be explained clearly. When a mistake occurred with an APHEDA report 
the APHEDA finance person would walk the short distance to the KBH office and 
discuss the discrepancy with the coordinator and the issue would be explained and 
rectified. When KBH started to work with much bigger organisations such as a major 
MLA, the resolution of such problems was not so easy, as Box 6.3 illustrates.  
Box 6-3 The consequences of getting it wrong 
 
Towards the end of 2004, KBH made two reasonably small mistakes in a 
financial acquittal statement presented to a multilateral agency they had 
been working with for some months. The work had been completed and 
the MLA senior project officer, the person KBH staff had worked with 
throughout the project, had signed off on the project and financial report. 
Despite the approval of the senior project officer, the final payment was 
delayed. KBH staff were told that the MLA accounts section had detected 
discrepancies in the receipts. KBH had apparently claimed for the full 
price of a photocopy cartridge US$250, and the MLA accountant believed 
that they should pay only a percentage of the costs. The MLA had also 
initially agreed at the beginning of the project to pay US$40 per month 
towards electricity and one of the receipts was missing which meant that 
they would not pay for that month without seeing the receipt.  
 
This problem at first appeared to be simple and easily rectified. However, 
from early March until late June 2005, the coordinator and I visited the 
MLA office on an almost bi-weekly basis in an on-going attempt to 
resolve the issue. After five months of constant negotiating by KBH staff, 
for whom it was a painful task as they lacked confidence and felt unsure 
in dealing with the unfamiliar MLA accounts section, and with lobbying by 
the sympathetic MLA project staff on KBH’s behalf, the money was finally 
paid on the 30 June. The sum of money that the MLA withheld for over 
five months came to US$4500, over a third of KBH’s annual operational 
budget. The total of the receipts in question came to US$290.  
Continued 
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KBH staff survived during this time by sharing their salaries — the strong 
family and friendship bonds managed to sustain them until the money 
was finally paid.  
 
As a postscript to this story, dissatisfied and frustrated by these 
protracted negotiations to resolve the issue, I questioned one of the 
senior MLA project staff about how a smaller, less supported NGO, would 
be able to endure the same process. They replied that often they didn’t 
and simply gave up without getting their money.  
 
 
The consequences for KBH of having such a large proportion of their budget 
withheld, as described in Box 6.3, were dire. As mentioned above, staff did not 
receive their full pay for many months and some bills were left unpaid for months, 
impacting on KBH’s reputation and on staff morale. It could have led to the collapse 
of the organisation. It was a harsh lesson for KBH in terms of learning what ‘getting 
it right’ meant when dealing with major institutions. 
6.7 Interface Issues 
The scenario in Box 6.3 illustrates one of the underlying problems facing local 
NGOs, namely their dependence on international funding. Most local NGOs in 
Timor-Leste are reliant on donor and, to a lesser extent, government funds to 
operate and to implement projects - it is the nature of the environment. Not only do 
they need to support their communities but many need donor funding to keep them 
operational and to maintain inherited or acquired resources and infrastructure such 
as computers, buildings and vehicles.  
It is not easy for a small local NGO to develop a partnership with a bilateral or 
multilateral agency, or with a large international aid agency, based on equality. 
Firstly, they must establish their legitimacy by being a registered NGO and then they 
must comply with the management structure and financial accountability processes 
stipulated by the donor. They must also reveal who they have worked with before 
and who they are working for at present. In fact, in nearly every facet of the 
relationship the onus is on the local NGO to convince the international donor of their 
value. However, as Fowler (1997) observes, there is no responsibility upon the 
international agency or organisation to justify itself or indeed to answer to the local 
NGO as observed in Boxes 5.5 and 5.6.  
While the headings in the first section of this chapter outlined internal challenges 
faced by local NGOs in adapting to and meeting externally imposed conditions and 
regulations, this section deals primarily with the challenges faced by a local NGO in 
negotiating its relationships with international agencies and organisations on whom 
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it must depend to ensure its survival and the delivery of its services to the 
communities it represents. The topics in this section are: 
• Fitting existing ideologies to new externally imposed ideologies;  
• Shaping project implementation and community engagement to donor 
requirements;  
• Unequal relations in negotiation, networking and communication; and 
• Transition issues. 
Each topic is examined below.  
6.8 Fitting Existing Ideologies to New Externally Imposed Ideologies  
Like KBH, many local NGOs in Timor-Leste were born out of the student solidarity 
groups and have a strong socialist or left wing philosophy which does not always sit 
easily with the government or the major donor groups, especially if these local 
NGOs are critical of what is happening in Timor-Leste in terms of aid and 
development. KBH was fortunate in developing a partnership with APHEDA who 
was, as discussed in Chapter Five a sympathetic and in many ways ideologically 
aligned international organisation. However, not all international donors are as 
compliant and concerned about maintaining the integrity of the organisations they 
work with. When two of KBH’s founding organisations (SIL and LAIFET) openly 
criticised the Australian government for its treatment of Timor-Leste over the Timor 
Gap dispute (see letter - open email from the AusAID director of projects in Timor-
Leste), they were removed from the AusAID list of eligible NGOs for support.  
While the AusAID situation is a blatant example of how a donor might choose to 
influence or regulate the behaviour, rights or beliefs of a local organisation often the 
ways in which it is achieved are much more subtle. Often the shaping, or gentle 
process of change comes from within the organisation and is embedded in the silent 
accommodations that a local NGO makes on a daily basis to comply with the donor 
criteria in terms of good governance, financial management, addressing specific 
target groups and working in specific locations. In the initial establishment phase, 
KBH, as outlined in Chapter Five, adopted an organisational structure and 
constitution (guided by APHEDA) that would place it in the best position to attract 
funding, in this case from AusAID through APHEDA.  
An international worker, such as me, working with a local NGO can also act as an 
agent of change or as a ‘Trojan Horse’29 by gaining entry, gaining trust and then 
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slowly, with the ‘best of intentions’, moving the organisation in the direction ‘it needs 
to go’ to obtain funding. Furthermore, in their position as ‘expert’ and with ‘the best 
of intentions’, the international worker has the potential, consciously and 
unconsciously, to impose their ideology, values, methodology and practice on the 
organisation for better or for worse. The result is that the NGO is slowly changed 
from within, with little resistance from staff and management, a problem exacerbated 
by the high turnover of local staff and the lack of strong attentive leadership. One of 
the KBH Board members told me that they had strong ideas but that they believed 
the advisers were doing their best and they didn’t want to challenge them (KL.27). A 
long term consequence of this silent change from within can be a gradual withdrawal 
of interest and lack of ownership and responsibility felt by the Board and staff of the 
NGO. Indeed, the changes can be so incremental that the agent of change - the 
international worker - is unaware of their own impact and the direction in which they 
are gently pushing the NGO.  
6.9 Donor-shaped Project Implementation and Community Engagement 
Geographic dislocation from client communities  
Most international funding bodies in the 2004-2005 transition stage were located in 
Dili. Dili was the first place where buildings were rehabilitated and essential services 
such as water and electricity were restored, if somewhat haphazardly. It was a 
simple equation, if a local NGO wanted to access funding it needed to be near the 
source of that funding. From 1999 to 2005 few villages or towns outside Dili had 
electricity or telephone connections which made it extremely difficult for local NGOs 
based outside Dili to communicate with Dili and to develop networks outside the 
immediate vicinity. Remote communities often relied on local NGOs based in Dili to 
represent their case and to bring assistance, and in KBH’s case, training to them. As 
a result many local NGOs, particularly those that had formed as part of the initial 
emergency relief response of 1999-2002, set up small offices in Dili while continuing 
to represent and deliver services to communities outside Dili. 
This geographical dislocation from client community to NGO presented certain 
challenges in balancing appropriate community representation and consultation 
against the need to acquire sufficient funds to run projects and to meet the needs of 
the donors, both difficult and time-consuming activities. Meaningful community 
participation and engagement requires time, money and access to adequate 
resources to properly service remote communities, which in a country as 
mountainous as Timor-Leste are plentiful and often relatively inaccessible by road, 
 97 
and with out telecommunications (Box 5.1). However, during my time at KBH, few 
proposals allowed a realistic funding allowance to enable KBH to consult with client 
communities effectively. Nor did staff working for international agencies have a 
realistic picture or understanding of what was involved for local staff and the 
financial drain on the limited operational budget of an NGO in trying to achieve an 
adequate level of consultation and support to client communities in remote locations.  
While the need for appropriate community consultation, monitoring and evaluation 
processes is indisputable, the onus for these processes was largely devolved to 
local staff and local NGOs who shouldered the responsibility and financial costs. 
While it is unrealistic that NGOs submitting unsuccessful project proposals should 
be reimbursed for the costs of submitting an application, neither is it realistic that 
local NGOs be wholly responsible for shouldering all the impacts or be expected to 
carry out costly and un-funded consultations with remote rural communities.  
In financial terms, for an international agency or aid organisation to deliver its own 
programs, complying with the same demands it expects of local NGOs, the cost 
would be three to four times the expenditure if the programs were delivered by a 
local NGO. They therefore rely heavily upon local NGOs to do this type of work – 
often the same work for which international agencies and organisations receive 
overseas development funds. As the research in Box 6.4 demonstrates, the ‘bottom-
up/participatory’ approach is the preferred option for community-based projects but it 
is recognised as difficult, slow, time-consuming, and can raise community 
expectations which may not be fulfilled. For these reasons among others, a top-
down ‘packaged’ approach (based on set rather than participatory content) is often 
used. International agencies and organisations need to be more aware of the 
financial and staffing constraints of NGOs so that the extensive preliminary 
consultations required do not act as a disincentive to apply for funding or create 
unnecessary financial stress for the organisation. 
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Box 6-4 Lessons Learned but does anyone listen? 
 
Early in 2004 I was invited to attend an information morning for 
international advisers, international agencies and NGO senior and project 
staff as well as local staff. The title of the presentation was “The Lessons 
Learned in Implementing Community Level Agriculture and NRM 
(National Resource Management) projects in Timor-Leste”. The research 
was a joint collaboration between the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (MAFF) and Oxfam, and it focused on programs being run by 
MAFF, international NGOs and the private sector. The purpose of the 
research was to document lessons learned and to make 
recommendations for future projects.  
 
My interest was in the following slides which provoked me to ask: if 
government departments and major international agencies and 
organisations are unable to deliver on bottom-up/participatory community 
programs because of the constraints as outlined in Slide 2, why is there 
an expectation that local NGOs will be able to do so with less resources, 
money and staff?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From Power Point presentation by Oxfam-led research team presented in 
Dili, May 2004. Lessons Learned in Implementing Community Level 
Agriculture and NRM Projects. 
 
 
1.  
Benefits of bottom 
up/participatory: 
• Uses local knowledge.  
• Reflects community interests 
and priorities.  
• Builds ownership and self-
reliance.  
2.  
Constraints of bottom -
up/participatory: 
• Intensive (staff resources). 
• Had to change attitudes 
from top-down to bottom 
up.  
• Difficult –especially large 
scale.  
• Lack of ideas.  
• Raises expectations.  
• Can be time consuming 
and unproductive.  
• Considered to be slow. 
3.  
Top down versus bottom 
up/participatory: 
• Consultation is essential  
• Programs developed 
consistent with communities’ 
priorities.  
 
But MAFF has limited 
extension capacity: 
• Not enough staff 
resources/experience for 
bottom up participatory 
programs.  
4. 
 Conclusion: for the short 
term and for the service 
delivery to the largest number 
of farmers:  
• More top-down ‘packaged’ 
approach may be more 
appropriate for MAFF. 
 
Other agencies will need to 
weigh up the benefits and 
challenges associated with 
bottom up approaches: 
• Based on their resource 
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Community targeting  
Not only do international agencies dictate the level of community consultation 
required, but they also decide which groups within the community they consider 
important for targeting. So while at one level, donors present the image of practicing 
participatory development in their project funding requirements (for example, 
consultations with communities), the participation is only partial as they are deciding 
which groups in the community are important and worthy of helping. For example, 
during the transition stage, bilateral donors narrowed their targets to specific 
community groups (for example gender, youth, and the disabled) and donors 
became more specific in their criteria for funding. In regard to the specific targeting 
of groups by international agencies, these targets were not always appropriate or 
what the community recognised as important target groups. A sentiment expressed 
by a local NGO worker was “sometimes they [international agencies] want the men 
to be involved in the things when they don’t want to be involved or the women” 
(KI.21).  
Neither are international organisations always clear about what they want (Box 5.4), 
or with whom they want to work (Box.5.5). Donor organisations can afford to ‘pick 
and choose’ and have the power and the authority to do so, but few seem to 
understand the implications of their actions on local NGOs. As a local NGO worker, 
with a wide range of experience working with several different local NGOs and 
internationals commented “they [internationals] say they want something one way 
then they want it another way, or they say they will give us funding and then they 
say they can’t but we have already done a lot of planning — the budget and 
proposal — which is a lot of work and we don’t get paid” (KI.21). The ambiguous 
nature of some proposal guidelines, and in some cases specific directions or 
objectives of some international organisations can prove baffling for some local 
NGOs which, coupled with the language barriers described above, can prove 
debilitating for NGO activities.  
6.10 Unequal Relationships, Networking and Communication  
The strong expatriate community forms the basis of a strong network system for 
those working in the aid industry at all levels, but few locals have access to this. 
Much of the networking is on an informal basis, information being shared and 
passed on over meals or coffee, or during exercise sessions. Local staff on local 
wages cannot afford to frequent the same places as foreign workers do, nor do they 
generally mix in the same social groups or share the same language and worldview. 
 100 
Internationals come from many different countries but most speak English either as 
a first or second language and share the position of being in a foreign country in a 
support and assistance delivery capacity.  
The repercussions for NGOs can mean that they are excluded from the information 
loop at an informal level, particularly if they do not have an international working with 
them. They are not only restricted in opportunities to contribute and comment on 
important issues in informal arenas but often miss out on opportunities for contracts, 
tenders and proposals that they might be able to access.  
6.11 Transition Issues  
May 2004 marked the end of the UN peace-keeping mission in Timor-Leste and it 
also marked the beginning of a new development phase for the aid industry. With 
the post-emergency phase officially over, many international NGOs began leaving 
Timor-Leste while others, including bilaterals, and multilaterals began to apply much 
stricter accountability requirements on local NGOs and became much more specific 
in the groups being targeted30. As a result of these changes funding became 
increasingly difficult to obtain and reporting and accountability procedures became 
much more stringent, particularly for small, local NGOs like KBH.  
In 2004 many small NGOs like KBH were going through difficult times (as outlined 
towards the end of Chapter Five and not dissimilar to the scenarios in Boxes 5.4 – 
5.6). Some were better prepared for the transition while others, without international 
partner support, struggled to make ends meets and many collapsed or disappeared. 
Many diversified their core work and took on different roles.  
6.12 Conclusion  
The post-conflict/post-emergency environment of aid and development in Timor-
Leste brought a new set of external conditions to bear on local NGOs such as KBH 
and their staff. As a result KBH, in attempting to adapt to this new environment, 
whilst staying committed to its overall vision, mission and goals, faced several major 
internal challenges. Firstly, they needed to adapt to the difficulties and complexities 
introduced by the new national languages, not to mention those popularly introduced 
by the various donor bodies operating in the new aid environment. To add to this, 
new technologies were rapidly introduced that were beyond the ability of staff as 
well as beyond their financial capacity to maintain. With these changes, new 
expectations by donors about forms of communication arose, placing further 
burdens on local NGOs.  
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The scale of the rehabilitation program (not to mention the speed with which it was 
introduced) and its ever-changing form - emergency to post-emergency to long-term 
development - also exacerbated problems relating to staffing and skill shortages 
each of which greatly impacted upon the effective functioning of local NGOs. KBH, 
with little technical support and meagre finances, in the changing environment, 
found itself having to compete with larger local NGOs, international NGOs and 
Government bodies which could afford to train staff, offer larger salaries, job security 
and other benefits. This of course made retaining good staff difficult and training 
inexperienced staff fruitless as they would inevitably go to the highest bidder as 
soon as they gathered the appropriate skill set. 
NGOs such as KBH also found themselves working in an environment at this time 
which overwhelmingly used styles of management and systems of finance and 
administration relatively foreign to them. This not only made ‘acclimatisation’ a slow 
and difficult process but was often directly opposed to popular ways of working such 
as using aspects of the familial system in the work place. Staff faced the difficulty of 
going against the grain of their own familial system and suffered the suspicion that 
their usual way of working was somehow corrupt or devious.  
The external challenges of the new post-conflict/post-emergency transitioning into 
the long-term development environment often had the effect that staff and 
organisations would alter behaviour and organisational processes to remain 
competitive in this new environment. KBH exemplified this process in their response 
to changing external conditions. Staff sought to rapidly acquire new language and 
technological skills so that they could communicate with donors and stay abreast of 
changes in their sector. At an organisational level, the NGO adopted new financial 
management, employment and administration systems to meet with the prevailing 
expectations of potential donors. They also modified traditional forms of governance 
and organisational management that were considered inappropriate or impractical in 
the prevailing environment and augmented others where appropriate. 
At the same time, NGOs, primarily staffed by volunteers and largely operating as not 
for profit organisations, faced the problem of catering to the more particular 
demands of the donor bodies. There can be little doubt that the availability of 
funding greatly impacts the reach and effectiveness of NGO project implementation 
and organisational functions, whatever the community and whatever the scope. For 
the NGO, the availability of money directly translates to the availability of time and 
resources to properly plan projects, pay staff to implement them, provide knowledge 
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and training to prepare them, and to fund the equipment to carry the projects out. 
The opportunity to obtain this funding is, however, not necessarily related to an 
NGO’s capacity to do the work it sets itself in its organisational vision, mission and 
goals.  
Instead, the specifications of the particular funding body with which the NGO forms 
a donor relation and an NGO’s ability (or inability) to comply with these stipulations, 
determine whether or not they will obtain funding and the way in which they must 
conduct themselves to retain funding. As KBH moved into closer contact with the aid 
world during the transition from post-emergency to long-term development it faced 
numerous challenges and went to extraordinary lengths to meet the expectations of 
donor organisations. Two examples include adapting receipts to meet the demands 
of the donor, as outlined in Box 6.3, and conducting expensive and time-consuming 
community consultations with limited hope of winning project funding as described in 
Boxes 5.5 and 5.6. 
Perhaps more importantly, the pressures faced in meeting donor demands were 
more often met with a silent acquiescence on the part of the NGO to change or 
shape itself in accordance with donor demands or objectives. Here the NGO faces 
not just the threat of funding cuts but the overwhelming sense that the way that the 
donor wants things done is the ‘right’ or ‘proper’ way to do them. In this context, the 
NGO meets the challenges by shaping (or attempting to shape) itself to fit a 
prescribed model, a model of an NGO that is perceived in this environment to be the 
‘successful’ or ‘correct’ model of an NGO. 
In the following chapter these same challenges are explored from a different 
perspective – an outsider’s view.  
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 Chapter Seven 
Different Perspective, Different Lens 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the data gathered from interviews with international 
workers on their perceptions of the major internal challenges faced by local NGOs in 
the post-conflict post–emergency environment and in their partnerships and 
relations with international agencies and aid organisations. Similar to Chapter Six, 
the data are discussed under two central themes. First, the perceived internal 
challenges faced by a local NGO in meeting the requirements/conditions/regulations 
of international donors and adapting to an environment dominated by externally 
imposed conditions are addressed. Second, interface issues, the perceived 
challenges faced by local NGOs in negotiating partnerships and relationships with 
international donor agencies and aid organisations are discussed. While Chapter Six 
was an insider’s view, this chapter presents an outsider’s perspective of the same 
situation31.  
7.2 Internal Challenges  
While there is an obvious blurring between what is an internal issue and what is an 
external (interface), issue I have maintained these two categories in this Chapter as 
in Chapter Six because the answers given by respondents were largely in response 
to two central questions: 1) what do you see are the major internal challenges faced 
by local NGOs (in the post-conflict, post-emergency environment); and 2) what do 
you see are the major issues for local NGOs in working with international agencies 
and aid organisations. 
The responses by interviewees to the first question, like the responses of local 
respondents, were strongly grouped around, staffing issues (nepotism in particular), 
the lack of strong leadership, lack of experienced and skilled staff, and the lack of 
strong financial management and administration practices. While only two 
respondents spoke of language as a major problem, it is included here as a sub-
heading because, for local respondents it was perceived as one of the major issues 
that they had to deal with, while for outsiders it was not perceived as such.  
Each of these issues is discussed below under the following and sub-headings.  
• Adaptation to new languages and technologies; 
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• Staffing issues: lack of skilled and experienced staff; over-employment of 
family and friends; 
• Governance issues: Lack of strong and experienced leadership; and 
• Lack of strong financial management and administration systems.  
7.3 Adaptation to New Languages and Technologies 
Language  
As mentioned above, while language issues were one of the major problems faced 
by local staff on a daily basis in navigating the aid world, only three international 
respondents out of 15 interviewed, touched on language issues as a significant 
problem for local NGOs. One of the international respondents recognised that for 
local staff having to operate in an environment where the key players (internationals) 
write and speak in a foreign language, writing proposals and networking is a major 
problem (KI.5). The second respondent observed that without a shared language, 
good communication was difficult. The third respondent worked for a large local 
NGO and was much more aware of the difficulties that language issues presented 
for local people. All three were sympathetic to the problems of local staff having to 
operate in languages of which they had limited knowledge.  
International respondents’ lack of perception of language as a major problem for 
local NGOs may simply reflect a different worldview or ‘alternative reality’. For the 
majority of English speaking foreigners language is not a major issue because 
English is an accepted working language in Timor and the language of the aid 
industry, to which they belong. Few foreigners, apart from international volunteers 
such as the US Peace Corp, Australian Youth Ambassadors or Australian 
Volunteers international32, work for small local NGOs, though many of these 
volunteers go on to fill positions with international aid organisations and multilateral 
and bilateral agencies.  
Most internationals do not need to understand or translate documents or write 
documents in a foreign language. At international meetings and events there are 
interpreters. At lower level meetings, if foreigners are present, the meeting is usually 
conducted in English and translated into Tetun or Indonesian. Few internationals 
really get to understand, even at a superficial level as I did in my first days in Timor 
as expressed in Box 6.1, the constraints, frustrations and limitations of working in a 
foreign language.  
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Box 7-1 Lost in translation 
 
One of the things I did as a preparation for fieldwork in Timor-Leste was 
to take Indonesian language classes for a year before I left. I knew from 
my previous visit in 2002 that while Indonesian was considered by many 
to be the language of occupation, it was also the language that most of 
the younger population were schooled in and many of the young student 
activists who were involved with KBH, GFFTL and SIL went to university 
in Indonesia. I would have preferred to learn Tetun, which is the most 
widely spoken local language in Timor-Leste, but classes were not 
available in Perth at that time. When I arrived back in Timor-Leste in April 
2004, despite the classes, my Indonesian was limited to ‘slow’, simple 
conversations and my Tetun was non-existent. 
 
On my first morning at KBH, I was invited to attend the weekly staff 
meeting, the first of many I would attend over the next 15 months. Those 
present included all the local staff. Of the local staff at that time only the 
administration worker and one of the expressional arts trainers spoke 
limited English. The meeting was conducted generally in Indonesian but 
would often switch to Tetun borrowing Portuguese and Indonesian words 
to explain more technical terms. It fell upon the admin assistant to 
translate the proceedings for me. When I wanted to add something, she 
would translate this into a mixture of Indonesian and Tetun and feed it 
back to the group.  
 
The day was hot and humid, and the eight of us were sitting in the small 
main office of KBH with one fan oscillating ineffectually beneath a desk. 
The meeting went on for over two and a half hours as information, 
questions and answers were translated backwards and forwards. As the 
morning progressed the translations became shorter and shorter and my 
concentration decreased as did my interest in asking questions as they 
simply prolonged the session.  
 
I was experiencing firsthand a little of what local people endure on a daily 
basis in their communications with the aid world, the frustration of having 
to rely on others to interpret what is being said and depending on them to 
correctly transmit your message to the group; the tedium of hours spent 
in meetings as each sentence is translated; the often gradual retreat into 
a state of childlike passivity which requires only that you smile once in a 
while as you sit through something you can only guess at understanding 
and to which you can make only limited contributions; and the denial of 
being able to express yourself in an intellectual conversation in the 
language you are most competent and comfortable in and the one that 
reflects your culture and your identity in all its cadences, nuances, 
rhythms, traditions and meaning. 
 
 
While some international workers try to learn Tetun, the majority of international 
workers are not fluent in Tetun. This is particularly the case for career aid 
professionals working for multilateral and bilateral agencies, who regularly move 
from one country to another as needs arise and missions end. While many 
international aid organisation workers, particularly those who stay in-country for 
some years, do attempt to learn Tetun, it remains the exception rather than the rule.  
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Language as argued in Chapter Six can also act as a gate keeping device and can 
reinforce unequal relationships where the dominant culture imposes a language that 
local people in particular cannot take part in, so again those with the least resources 
are most disadvantaged.  
Information technologies 
While two respondents spoke of language difficulties, not one respondent spoke of 
the challenges of new technologies for local groups. Again this probably reflects a 
lack of knowledge and understanding, and ‘lived in reality’. In my experience local 
people do not complain about these issues, but rather, silently acquiesce as 
described in Chapter Six and try to adapt their work patterns around these issues. 
Many international staff therefore are not cognisant of, or fail to recognise the 
challenges and difficulties faced by local people in their navigation around these 
obstacles. 
7.4 Staffing and Recruitment Practices 
In contrast to internationals’ lack of perception of language and technology as major 
barriers to working with local NGOs, the issue that drew by far the most response 
from respondents revolved around staffing and recruitment. The main problems 
identified in the interviews were:  
• The tendency to employ relatives and friends (about one-third of NGOs are 
managed either by a family or a group of close relatives (Belum, NGO capacity 
assessment study, 2005). In most cases relatives and friends were under-
skilled for their duties and their employment left skill gaps in the organisation 
as well as adding to the difficulty of managing performance within the 
organisation (KI.12, KI.5, KI.6, KI.2); and  
• A high turnover of staff which made the building of consistent management 
and administration structures difficult (KI.9).  
In discussing recruitment practices, Informant KI.5 made an important point 
regarding recruitment in a country with low education levels and skill shortages, 
namely that a person may lack the essential skill set or formal education for the job 
but may still have the potential to be capacity-built into the job. Therefore, in 
recruiting people, the focus should be on their capacity to learn rather than what 
they know already. People without the potential to learn high-level skills and 
knowledge cannot but fail (KI.5). Attempting to identify potential staff with the latent 
capacity to learn new skills is missing in some recruiting processes (KI.2). Both KI.5 
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and KI.2 emphasised the necessity for good recruitment practices. However, 
effective recruitment procedures require experience and skill, and in an environment 
with few experienced workers, the problem is exacerbated and leads to 
inexperienced people hiring inexperienced people. The recruitment process is 
further hampered in a post-conflict environment by the fact that, while an applicant 
might be suitable for the job and have the capacity to do it well, historical factors 
such as prior allegiances in conflict may mean the person is not suited to that 
organisation (such as those described in Box 5.2).  
Another issue not generally recognised by international respondents was the 
continuous drain of local staff into international organisations and agencies. 
However, one respondent did mention the unfairness of the wage discrepancy 
between local NGO staff and local staff working for internationals (KI.4) (see 
Chapter Six). This respondent felt that local NGOs were placed in a difficult situation 
as they could not actively and fairly compete for staff with international 
organisations. KI.4 was also concerned that those local staff who were forced to 
take on two or three jobs simultaneously were unfairly branded by international 
workers as having “too many fingers in too many pies” which detracted from their 
work at their primary workplace. KI.4 argued that this branding was unfair in an 
environment which denied local staff a living wage and forced them to take on 
multiple roles simply to provide for their families.  
The reliance of local NGOs on international staff working for them to represent their 
interests was not mentioned as an internal or staffing issue by the respondents. 
Rather several respondents saw this as an issue relating to legitimacy. This is 
discussed further below under ‘interface issues’.  
7.5 Governance  
Lack of experienced leadership and management 
Several respondents (KI.5, KI.6) recognised the lack of strong experienced 
management structures as major issues for local NGOs, while others focused on 
what they saw as the lack of strong leadership (KI.4, KI.6, KI.14). No respondent 
talked directly about how local NGOs were structured and what the role of an NGO 
Advisory Board, or Board of management, was within local NGOs. Rather, issues 
were generally discussed in terms of the lack of strong leadership, convoluted 
decision-making practices, and the lack of strategic focus. From the perspective of 
KI.11, weak leadership led to a lack of focus and prioritisation of aims and objectives 
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that resulted in an emphasis on “chas[ing] donor dollars” instead of adhering to 
organisation objectives. This view is perhaps unrealistic in an environment where 
local NGOs are forced to chase dollars to survive. It could be argued that those 
NGOs best able to chase dollars are the most successfully led. The lack of strong 
leadership or perhaps the lack of understanding who the leaders were, made it 
difficult for donors to understand how decisions were being made and to whom they 
should respond (KI.4).  
Other comments related to leadership represented by an adherence to traditional, 
hierarchical top-down decision-making processes where the ‘head person’ was seen 
as the boss and therefore decision processes were unquestionable (KI.6, KI.14). 
This style of leadership was believed by KI.6 to be a major problem for local NGOs 
and had the effect of blocking “motivation and imagination”. KI.6 also recognised 
that this style of leadership often meant that money was shared by family members 
within an organisation which again blocked individual motivation to achieve but had 
the benefit of ensuring that families survived (in Box 5.4).  
In my own observations of leadership styles within KBH, I noted a style of leadership 
somewhere between what Foucault (see Chapter Four), would describe as ‘pastoral 
care’ (the shepherd makes decisions on behalf of the flock, for the good of the flock) 
and ‘discipline’ (subjects characters are moulded to ensure compliance) in both 
cases placing a great deal of responsibility for the entire organisation upon the 
shoulders of the coordinator in particular, which put her under a great deal of stress 
(as emphasised in Box 6.2), and the Board members to a lesser extent. This style of 
leadership often led the coordinator to take responsibility away from staff members 
by not sharing information and decision making with them, which left them feeling 
disempowered and angry, but at the same time she ensured that everyone received 
enough money on which to live.  
Elaborating on the traditional leadership style as experienced in rural areas, KI.14, 
an experienced multilateral agency worker who spoke fluent Tetun, and who had 
been working in the districts for over a year, and was also engaged in research on 
peace building for a bilateral agency, also described it as a “top-down style of 
working” adding that “if leaders are strong and fair they can have a positive effect 
but in Timor now [after the Indonesian occupation] the local leaders are not strong” 
(KI.14). The respondent also observed that there were many individuals in Timor 
with the capacity to be strong leaders, but in the rural areas particularly, there were 
not enough local leaders left, as many of these people had gone to Dili to find work.  
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None of the international respondents commented on the issue of governance 
directly, or how governance related to prescribed organisational structures, that is, 
the coordinator being responsible and accountable to the Board of Directors or 
similar external governing body who are in turn responsible for ensuring compliance 
and transparency within the organisation. Leadership was viewed, almost entirely, 
as the responsibility of the manager or coordinator of the organisation.  
7.6 Administration and Financial Management  
A lack of experienced and skilled financial management was seen by many as a 
major problem for local NGOs (KI.5, KI.6, KI.2, KI.11, KI.9). Comments related to the 
lack of skilled reporting and acquittal processes, and weak financial management 
skills by local NGOs in particular, which led to gaps in reporting and anomalies in 
financial statements (KI.6, KI.5). However, only one interviewee, referring to a small 
number of local NGOs, related the financial anomalies to a deliberate misuse of 
funds (KI.11). Nearly all respondents, however, related these issues to poor staffing 
and recruitment practices which led to the employment of under-skilled and 
inexperienced staff (KI.5, KI.6, KI.2, KI.11, and KI.9).  
7.7 Summary  
Internal issues were summed up very concisely by the respondents under the above 
headings and were plainly a response to their own contact with local NGOs, on a 
daily basis. While most were sympathetic to the difficulties of local NGOs only one 
respondent placed the perceived ‘internal’ issues within the larger post-conflict/post-
emergency context or expanded on why, for example, the skill shortage existed from 
an historical view point. Adaptation to new language and technology challenges also 
went relatively unnoticed and was not understood. This lack of perception and 
analysis of such fundamentally difficult challenges for local people is not necessarily 
indicative of a lack of thought or interest on the part of respondents but of an 
outsider’s perspective. They simply responded to the questions asked with what 
they had encountered. I did not ask at that time why they thought the skill shortages 
existed, or how difficult they thought working in a foreign language and adapting to 
new technologies might be for local NGOs. The failure on my part to raise these 
questions is interesting in itself, and is perhaps indicative of my own level of 
immersion in the field obscuring my view of the bigger picture at the time. It was only 
once I had removed myself from the immediate environment and started to think 
around the issues I had identified from my observations and participation, and from 
discussions with local people, that I came to see them in a more rounded way.  
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Nearly all, so called, ‘internal’ issues related directly to coming to terms with 
externally imposed pressures including language difficulties, the lack of good 
governance (as defined by external bodies), the lack of sound financial and 
administrative skills (as defined by external bodies), and the over-tendency to hire 
family and friends, all of which related back to the chronic shortage of skilled people.  
7.8 Interface Issues 
While the first part of this chapter has covered responses to questions relating to 
internal challenges for local NGOs, the following section examines the responses 
around a second question which focuses on the contact point between the 
international aid world and local NGOs. The responses in this section demonstrate a 
much more mindful and knowledgeable understanding of the difficulties faced by 
local NGOs in working with international agencies and organisations which the 
respondents essentially represented. The sub-headings for this section are similar to 
the ones defined in Chapter 6: 
• Fitting existing ideologies to new externally imposed ideologies; 
• Donor dependency; 
• Relationships between local and international staff; 
• Transition Issues; and 
• Communication issues. 
7.9 Fitting Existing Ideologies to New Externally Imposed Ideologies  
Few respondents spoke directly about the issues relating to ideologies and imposing 
Western or foreign models over local ones. However, KI.13 went as far as to say 
that some “Western workers” did not understand the Timor-Leste culture, were not 
interested in trying to understand it, and that many programs run rough-shod over 
local interests – their mission being to deliver their own project in their own way. 
KI.13 spoke fluent Tetun and had worked in several of the rural areas of Timor-Leste 
and felt that donor pressures from outside the country often dictated what was done 
inside the country whether or not it was what Timorese people really wanted. This 
situation, KI.13 argued, left local people no option but to “play the game“ and in turn 
use their skills to get what they wanted for their families and their client groups. This 
game playing gave the illusion that local people were willing to do anything to get 
funding, but underneath this façade, they were capable of achieving their own goals 
which may or may coincide with those of the international donors.  
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Another respondent also talked about a similar issue in discussing the difficulties 
faced by people working with two different worldviews (local and international); KI.6 
commented that, while both may have shared goals and expectations, quite often 
the direction and methods for achieving them are different and can be hard to 
negotiate as the indicators of success don’t match. As Box 7.2 illustrates, local 
people are not passive accepters of all international ideas and actions but are active 
players, capable of managing the situation to their own advantage, and to meet their 
own goals and objectives.  
Box 7-2 Meeting the same goals in different ways  
 
In late December 2004, as part of KBH’s application to APHEDA for 
bridging money to cover operational funding until June 2005, KBH 
undertook to do a survey with market women and phone-card sellers to 
see what training they needed to assist them to improve their income 
security. As the training adviser I saw this activity not only as an 
opportunity to improve the incomes of market women and phone-card 
sellers but an opportunity for the staff to learn how to do a ‘training needs 
analysis’ with a target group, and from the data gathered decide ‘when’, 
‘where’, ‘how’ and ‘with whom’ to do ‘what’ training. The staff were 
enthusiastic and we started by compiling a questionnaire that would 
result in quantifiable data from which we could graph trends and 
ultimately prioritise needs and wants regarding type, time and place of 
training. We also went over interview skills and then the six interviewers 
went off in pairs to the three market locations and into the streets to do 
the interviews.  
 
Meanwhile I worked with another staff member on constructing a simple 
data base into which we could put the raw data and produce summary 
graphs and tables. As the interviewers came in with the data we entered 
it in to the data base and almost immediately interesting findings started 
to emerge. For one, the market women appeared to be unusually well 
educated - at least in comparison to the national education levels - most 
had some secondary school education. Another finding was that they 
were quite young relative to the women I had seen in the markets, and 
this seemed odd. The phone-card sellers were all male and 
predominantly young which was in keeping with street observations of 
this cohort. However, like the market women, they were mostly well 
educated. Another question that yielded what I saw as an odd response 
was whether or not the women preferred training without the men. The 
answer was predominantly ‘no’. By far the most desired training was 
English language training and computer training. 
 
When the research was over, we all sat together and looked at the data 
and I pointed out what, to me, looked like unusual findings but nobody 
made any comments. After prioritising the training we decided, looking at 
the numbers, to run two classes of English language and two of 
computing for 60 participants, 15 in each class. The classes would be run 
early in the morning and late in the day as requested in the surveys.  
 
On the morning of the first session of training, I walked into the classroom 
expecting to see a group of market women. Instead, it was a group of 
what seemed like university students, which in fact it was, as I 
established after further enquiries. 
Continued 
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Talking with the staff, I managed to find out what had happened. 
Apparently, when they went to the market the women said that they didn’t 
want any more training. They wanted their older children to learn English 
so they could get a job. Nor did they want training just for women, they 
wanted their sons included.  
 
Technically, most of the participants who attended the training were 
connected to the market women in some way through a relative or friend. 
Whatever their connection, they wanted and felt they needed the training 
and nearly every training session was full. Nobody was paid to attend, 
neither was food or transport provided. Some participants made small 
donations for their attendance. All KBH staff were aware of what was 
happening.  
 
In the end, KBH’s goal was to assist market women to achieve greater 
economic security. The market women believed that by sending their 
adult children to English classes they were ensuring that their children 
had the best access to jobs and through them, their own economic 
security was assured. While the indicators for the success of the project 
may have been skewed, the results were nevertheless excellent in terms 
of what the market women valued and wanted to achieve.  
A credit to the APHEDA coordinator at the time was that she saw this as 
a positive rather than a negative outcome: that is to say that people who 
wanted and valued English language training and did not have access to 
it, whether market women or not, were able to take advantage of the 
training.  
 
Another positive aspect of this scenario for KBH was that many of the 
students became voluntarily involved in the expressional arts project and 
as such became involved in delivering community health and well-being 
messages ‘Timor style’ in Dili and surrounding villages.  
 
 
These types of outcomes (as in Box 7.2) do not always fit so easily with international 
donors as they did with APHEDA.  
7.10 Donor Dependency  
Donor dependency is one of the fundamental issues for local NGOs and this is 
openly recognised by international aid workers. In an environment dominated by 
international aid and development agencies and organisations, as one experienced 
interviewee noted, local NGOs cannot survive without international funds (KI.3). This 
circumstance, KI.3 notes, pressures local NGOs to fit themselves to the donor 
criteria for funding which “skews the way things are done and what the priorities are” 
(KI.3). The skewing process relates to the shaping process for example a local NGO 
must apply to its own objectives and outcomes and even to the choice of target 
group, to fit the needs of the donor. To obtain funding most local NGOs have little 
choice but to engage in this process and during the transition stage this pressure 
increases even more (KI.3, KI.9, KI.12). The question is how far should that process 
go? This was a question KBH was forced to continually ask itself as demonstrated in 
Boxes 5.4, 5.5, 5.6.  
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For most local NGOs dependent on international funds, there is no clear answer and 
most find themselves in a balancing act running the risk, no matter what they do, of 
being judged negatively. One interviewee, a bilateral agency Head, viewed a 
readiness to adapt to donor needs as a lack of managerial and leadership focus, 
claiming that local NGOs “in trying to do too many things, would change projects to 
match donor criteria and didn’t know what to specialise in” (KI.11). Another bilateral 
agency Head summed up the issue in perhaps a more pragmatic way by seeing it 
as a “delicate balancing act”. The challenge for the local NGO was to be broad 
enough in their diversification to meet the donor criteria, yet specialised enough to 
be good at what they do (KI.12). Both views highlight the problem that local NGOs 
are often at the mercy of the whims of the donor bodies and must engage in this 
precarious balancing act to survive - but it is an act where the weights and 
measures keep on changing.  
7.11 Relationships between International and Local Organisations and Staff 
Most interviewees were open and frank about the limitations and weaknesses in the 
work practices of international donors and staff in relationship to their work with local 
NGOs. KI.13 noted, international NGOs “have too much money but not enough 
planning” and as a consequence of this there was pressure to achieve results 
quickly without enough concern for local interests. This assertion was backed up by 
KI.14 and KI.15, while KI.5 added that international NGOs often take advantage of 
local NGOs to reach communities but then do not provide enough funding to cover 
the costs (a negative aspect of partnership engagement felt by KBH in its 
negotiations with a multilateral agency as described in Box 5.4).  
Another interviewee talked about how the bureaucratic arm of their organisation was 
hampering their ability to work closely with the community (NGOs). On the one 
hand, strict accountability procedures were enforced while on the other hand, not 
enough time and resources were allowed for capacity building and supporting local 
NGOs to increase their capacity to deal with the change (KI.9). This situation left 
project staff, those working with local NGOs, in the difficult situation of explaining to 
local NGOs that the organisation was in Timor-Leste to assist them and to reach the 
community but the system they worked within was making that difficult if not 
impossible to do. Box 6.3 exemplifies the consequences for KBH, as a small NGO, 
coming up against the bureaucratic arm of a multilateral agency and the inflexibility 
of such systems. KBH had very limited power to argue their position or to negotiate 
an early resolution to the problem. Despite implementing a successful project, as 
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judged by the MLA project staff, KBH would have collapsed financially if not for 
financial support from APHEDA.  
It was not only systemic problems within major institutions that international staff 
were critical of, but also the pressure that was exerted on international staff to “toe 
the agency line”. Again, an interviewee was openly frank in talking about the 
pressure international staff were under in their role as the intermediaries between 
their donor organisation and the local NGOs. This sense of frustration is summed up 
by KI.13, who observed that “many international aid workers are frustrated by the 
system” in that “they were asked [by their organisations] to do one thing, but forced 
to do another” in order to reach targets imposed by out of country management 
(KI.13). The observations of both KI.9 and KI.13 concur with McKechnie’s (2004) 
contention, pointing to World Bank research on outcomes for countries recovering 
from conflict, that “Donor country policymakers [out of country] rarely understand 
either the project planning, design, procurement, delivery and construction process 
or the institutional constraints of project implementation”.  
Both KI.5 and KI.9 observed that there was a high turnover of international staff 
which led to poor capacity building with local NGOs as they had “little time to get to 
know locals and to build rapport with them”. There was general agreement by 
several interviewees that like local NGOs experiencing high staff turnovers in some 
situations, inexperienced international staff were promoted above their skill and 
experience level. As a consequence, inexperienced people were often placed in 
decision making roles where the results of their decisions might have dramatic 
impacts on the lives of local people 
7.12 Transition Issues 
In describing the stages of long-term development, KI.12, the Head of a major 
bilateral agency, described the stage as one where funding requirements were 
much stricter and more focused on specific targets and those who obtained funds 
must account much more thoroughly for their project expenditures and meet set 
indicators. While each phase had its own rules, regulations and staff, there were no 
formal procedures for assisting local NGOs through the transition from one phase to 
another. The situation was further complicated by new international staff who were 
struggling themselves to come to terms with new conditions and regulations (KI.12). 
KI.9 noted that the new phase also put greater stresses on international staff who 
were not given enough time to identify and fix problems, find solutions, or to build 
the capacity of local NGOs to meet the new stricter criteria.  
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Interviewees from across the spectrum of donor organisations and agencies agreed 
that the transition into long-term development, although not clearly defined in the 
same way by every organisation, meant greater pressures on local organisations to 
conform to stricter funding criteria and accountability procedures and to fit within a 
much narrower and more specific target band (KI.9, KI.12, KI.2, KI.3, KI.5, KI.6). All 
agreed that these stricter regulations would put local NGOs under much greater 
stress but few organisations had put in place a plan for assisting local NGOs to 
negotiate this new stage.  
In terms of the ‘balancing act’, the weights and measures are dramatically changed 
again. Local NGOs are left to navigate their way through this new phase largely 
unaided, with few sign posts and many road blocks.  
7.13 Summary of Findings  
The majority of respondents were openly critical of many of the internal leadership 
and management practices of local NGOs, particularly as they related to the 
recruitment of staff, the lack of strong leadership and management, and poor 
financial management and accountability. While they generally related most of these 
issues to an inevitable outcome of a largely poorly skilled population, there was only 
limited analysis of these issues in relation to the post-conflict, post-emergency 
environment. There was even less recognition that these internal issues, in many 
instances, emerged directly as a response to externally imposed conditions and 
regulations, that is, management and organisation structures and financial and 
administrative accountability systems. The lack of questioning and analysis of these 
systems seemed to suggest that the majority of respondents saw these systems as 
‘givens’ - part of what local NGOs should conform to without question. Indeed, it 
would be a rare international aid and development professional who would question 
such things as open and transparent financial accountability and compliant and 
transparent management and leadership. However, in accepting these systems and 
structures as ‘givens’, there is no room for indigenous or local practices to emerge 
or to be considered. It also places local NGOs in the spotlight in terms of justifying 
their activities and actions, while there are few checks and balances on international 
agencies and organisations and evaluation in terms of compliance and 
accountability.  
In terms of external pressures and donor interface issues, most respondents were 
equally open but more mindful and reflective about the pressures on local NGOs to 
conform to donor expectations and criteria without adequate support, financial and 
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otherwise, from donors. Many were also critical of international donor organisations, 
for their lack of understanding of local issues - particularly when inappropriate 
decisions were made outside the country, leaving in-country staff to carry them out, 
and failing to leave adequate time for international staff to build strong relationships 
with local NGOs. They were also critical of international donors for wasting money 
on inappropriate activities, discounting local knowledge and skills, running 
roughshod over local NGOs by making use of local NGOs, without providing 
adequate support for them and pressuring local NGOs to conform with funding 
criteria determined ‘outside’ the country. 
In discussing the transition stage specifically, bilateral and multilateral staff, as well 
as international aid staff, recognised that there was much greater pressure during 
this time, on local NGOs to fit donor criteria, and that their own agencies often 
lacked adequate procedures for assisting local NGOs through the transition. In 
some agencies this situation was exacerbated by increased internal pressures to 
achieve results and to adhere to specific targeted areas. Interviewees were also 
cognisant of the fact that the high turnover of international staff and the time 
constraints on international project workers inhibited the proper capacity building of 
local staff during this time.  
The findings from interviews with international aid and development practitioners, as 
presented above, are both interesting and enlightening and provide a different 
understanding and view of  issues and challenges faced by local NGOs in the 
development environment. While there are local NGOs in Timor-Leste that have a 
‘voice’ that is heard, many work in relative silence adapting and adjusting their work 
practices and criteria to meet the needs of donors without realising that other local 
NGOs are also experiencing the same difficulties. Just as it is a rare international aid 
and development professional who would question the model, few local NGOs can 
afford to question it. To do so and to work outside it would be to cut themselves off 
from the supply of funds.  
The next chapter draws together the main findings of the thesis and interprets them 
in relation to key ideas in the development literature as explored in Chapter Four.  
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 Chapter Eight 
The Invisible Barriers  
 
8.1 Introduction  
One of main purposes of the thesis was to identify and document the obstacles 
faced by a local NGO working in Timor-Leste. I did so with a view to informing those 
aid and development practitioners and researchers preparing to enter the field of the 
potential challenges faced, so they could better prepare themselves for the 
experience and, as a result, more effectively engage with local NGOs and local staff 
in meeting the needs of the local community. I did so largely under the assumption 
that what was missing from existing research was the information necessary to find 
solutions to the challenges and difficulties faced by NGOs. 
Through the course of my research, however, I came to understand in a somewhat 
different light, some of the difficulties and challenges faced by local NGOs. In many 
cases, the major obstacles to the successful participation of an NGO in the post-
conflict, post-emergency context of Timor-Leste were less tangible than the surface 
issues identified in the study (as outlined in Chapters Six and Seven). These less 
tangible, or invisible barriers, were not so much the product of mistaken action or 
obliviousness on the part of multilateral and bilateral agencies and international aid 
organisations or a lack of experience and ineptitude on behalf of local NGOs, but 
rather the outcome of deliberate and strategic actions of governance. Therefore, 
having knowledge of a NGO’s struggles alone, as identified from a local perspective 
in Chapter Six and largely acknowledged by international workers in Chapter Seven, 
will not necessarily lead to these issues being corrected, even when all parties 
involved recognise the problems and are in agreement about a common course of 
action to address the problems (as illustrated in Box 6.3). The good intentions of 
international personnel will not necessarily translate into action or altered ways of 
working, even for senior people with a good grounding of the local cultures in which 
they work (as seen in the interviews with international workers).  
The main purpose of the literature review in Chapter Four was to place the aid 
intervention in Timor-Leste within the larger framework of development and through 
the exploration of post-development writing and Foucauldian theories that challenge 
preconceived notions of development, power and governance. It then becomes 
possible to explore alternative ways of understanding the factors at play behind the 
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scenes of the challenges and obstacles faced by local NGOs as identified in 
chapters Five, Six and Seven. Attention is shifted away from what local NGOs ‘need 
to do to become stronger,’ to the factors which shape the reality of working life in 
Timor-Leste in ways seen and unseen and which are perhaps seldom evident in the 
examination of individual problems and singular encounters. I argue that it is these 
underlying factors behind the presenting ‘obstacle/challenge’ that are the real 
barriers to the successful participation of local NGOs in the post-conflict, post-
emergency environment.  
The following discussion firstly highlights the theoretical frameworks explored in 
Chapter Four which will be used to discuss the ‘undercurrents’ that permeate and 
flow through all action and thinking within the aid environment in Timor-Leste. Using 
language as a starting point, the discussion then explores how thought, action and 
ideology are governed and controlled by the subtle mechanisms of liberal 
governance in the aid environment, which often renders those in discord with that 
model, both local and international actors, powerless and frustrated (or fighting a 
faceless tiger as described in Chapter Four). The chapter also explores the ways in 
which a small, local independent NGO becomes tied into a global system and what 
that means for the organisation in terms of what it must concede and what it can 
keep of its own identity in the various partnerships it makes with the international 
world.  
8.2 Theoretical Framework  
The first section of the literature review in Chapter Four sought to place the aid 
intervention in Timor-Leste within the larger framework of development by gaining a 
broad understanding of the historical, political, social and economic underpinnings of 
the international aid industry or the apparatus of development. In doing so it 
determined that the ‘apparatus’ was underpinned by western liberal ideologies which 
informed both its economic rationalist policies as well as its neoliberal forms of 
governance in terms of aid and development assistance and humanitarian 
intervention. It also found that despite its ‘failures’, the apparatus of development 
was continually able to repair and transform itself in order to maintain its control of 
not only the targets (countries, communities and individuals) and the activities and 
interventions related to aid and development but also the thinking and discourse 
around development.  
The second section of the literature review, through an exploration of post-
development writings, attempted to break free of that thinking and to take apart the 
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dominant western liberal model of development, particularly in terms of its 
operations in Timor-Leste. This was done not only to analyse what was happening 
there but to imagine other possibilities and ways of thinking and acting within that 
environment. More significantly the literature review offers, through Foucault’s 
theory of liberalism as a technique or rationality of government, a way of critiquing 
the aid industry without seeing it as necessarily negative or repressive. For example, 
‘good governance’ is not necessarily a bad thing, on the contrary clear, open and 
ethical lines of operation are positive characteristics of good management and 
leadership. It is the unseen conditions and regulations of action and behaviour 
embedded within the notion of ‘good governance’, that are at the centre of this 
investigation, i.e. if you do not fit this model/criteria then you will not get this funding.  
Also at the centre of the investigation is the way language is used as a mechanism 
or technique of liberal governance in aid and development interventions as part of 
an enculturation process. As described in Chapter Four, when the aid world makes 
an intervention, such as in Timor-Leste, it must not only restore peace but install 
democratic government and governance. It cannot do this by force but by 
systematically persuading local people that they are now included in decision-
making and power distribution and indeed in control of their own conduct.  
Lastly, the literature review sought to define the role of local NGOs themselves 
within the international aid and development world. It sought to determine: 1) how 
local NGOs are linked to the external/global market; 2) the agendas behind the 
‘partnerships’ that international aid organisations, multilaterals and bilateral agencies 
forge with local NGOs; 3) how international governments indirectly govern local 
NGOs by directing ODA funds through their own international NGOs; and 4) how 
international NGOs, bilateral and multilateral agencies, legitimate to their donors 
(public and private), their own role in aid interventions in fragile states, through their 
partnerships with local NGOs.  
8.3 Language as a Mechanism of Governance  
Language, as illustrated in Chapters Six and Seven, is both an important cultural 
determinant and a powerful technological tool which can be wielded effectively to 
both include and exclude development actors, particularly by those with the power 
and motivation to do so. The issue of language, however, has much deeper and 
wider meaning and implications in the aid world as explored in Chapter Four, 
because of its links to power and governance. Here, language can be used in 
another sense, as a powerful mechanism for shaping and guiding the way people, 
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communities and societies think, feel and act. In this way language can be seen 
directly as a tool of government or a strategy for ‘conducting conduct’ for strategic 
purposes. To this end language, in a Foucauldian sense (see Chapter Four), can be 
redefined, appropriated, and reconceptualised. Each of these processes is 
discussed below in reference to the Timor-Leste context.  
The redefinement, appropriation, and reconceptualisation of language  
Language in the aid world is different in meaning to its common usage. New ways of 
talking about things, and new ways of conceiving concepts are introduced. 
Language is ‘jargonised’, familiarised and popularised so that everybody is talking 
and thinking the same, and writing in the same discourse. Therefore, the language 
that local organisations are required to learn, or to grapple with, is not simply English 
or another foreign language. Local people are also learning the language of 
development - the jargon, the ‘buzzwords’ - the language that will enable them to 
take part in the conversation about the recovery of their own country.  
The ‘new’ language is also the language that a local NGO needs to work with to 
obtain funding from international donors. It is embedded in every proposal and 
guideline and it soon becomes part of the local lexicon, whether or not English has 
been learned as a language, or the words used actually have shared meaning. As 
local people become familiar with the jargon, and familiar with the language 
favoured, if not required, by donors, it also starts to seep into monitoring, evaluation 
and narrative reports. In the end it is easier for locals (as well as internationals as 
outlined in Box 8.1) to adopt the jargon rather than to explain a term that is in itself 
ambiguous.  
Box 8-1 The meaning minefield 
 
Many times in the field I was asked by local staff to explain a particular 
term, such as gender mainstreaming, or good governance, or to explain 
the difference between the endless array of outcomes, outputs, results, 
reached objectives, etc., which they had come across in an aid 
application or similar document, or a word which they could not find in the 
English dictionary. Or if they could find it, it had a vastly different meaning 
to what was intended in the document. I would try my best to make sense 
of the meaning for them, usually inadequately. They would then carry 
away a distorted idea of what that word or concept meant. Nevertheless, 
the word or concept would start to appear in the proposals and narrative 
reports they were writing and it would be used in conversations and 
during training sessions, sometimes with great emphasis.  
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The aid jargon starts to be used in local communications and ‘consultations’ with 
communities and soon it ‘trickles down’ until it becomes part of the lexicon of village 
life, at least in their relationships with the outside world.  
The language or ‘jargon’ of development is not always new but often carefully 
chosen and appropriated from other sources. In this way liberalism as a form of 
governance embeds other sources of meaning to give ‘old’ language more power 
(O'Malley 1998). In many instances the ‘old’ language belonged to local/indigenous 
people themselves as it speaks of liberation, equality, empowerment - terms which 
embody ‘grassroots’ organisations (see KBH’s vision and mission statements in 
Chapter Five) and have strong, emotional ties to community. So it is that the 
language that once had local meaning is returned with new meanings and 
conditions attached. For example, ‘empowerment’ and ‘equality’ once used to 
denote freedom from an external oppressor are now more associated with internal 
‘gender relationships’ and personal motivation and ambition.  
Accordingly, in this new environment, words such as ‘community’, ‘participation’, and 
‘partnership’ take on a life of their own and are used freely and compellingly in 
documents generated by multilateral and bilateral agencies and international aid 
organisations alike to describe their own relationships with local communities and 
organisations within the aid and development context. The familiarity of the words 
can be beguiling and appear to denote inclusivity, and, as Macgregor (2007) notes, 
could be mistaken as the language of grassroots organisations (see Chapter Four) 
and as such be difficult to reject. They appear, as O’Malley (1998) posits (see 
Chapter Four), to locate rule within the everyday lives of local people. In this way 
language as mechanism of liberal governance not only enlists support at a local 
level but embeds responsibility for the ‘conduct of conduct’ in the hands of local 
people, that is, as long as local NGOs and communities comply with the new 
conditions that are now attached to the appropriated and redefined language.  
If for instance a local NGO is not seen to be acting responsibly or fails to comply 
with the principles of good governance, penalties apply. For example, they are cut 
from funding altogether as in the case of the NGOs that spoke out against 
Australia’s policy on Timor oil (Chapter Seven), or funding is withheld until they get it 
right (Box 6.1).  
Language as a mechanism of governance also works in other ways in the aid world 
by playing a part in changing the way we think about things, rendering them 
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thinkable in a certain way. Complicated concepts such as ‘development’, ‘peace’ 
and ‘community’ are redefined, reworked into a language that makes these 
abstractions identifiable, measurable and therefore manageable. For example, 
previously concepts such as ‘community’ and ‘freedom’ were difficult to define in 
terms of a set of measurable aspects; rather they were an elusive combination of 
factors, circumstances and people. Now these concepts are defined as families, 
women, men, unemployed, special interest groups, etc., and we must interact with 
them and talk about them as such - how many women benefited from the project? 
What does your project do for unemployed people of the community? Just as post-
development writers (Chapter Four) at the macro level argue that the discourse of 
development itself suddenly identified and defined ‘The Third World’ by labelling it 
‘underdeveloped’, and as such rendering every aspect of the lives of ‘Third World’ 
people open to scrutiny, measurement, problematisation and ultimately intervention, 
the language of development on the ground at the micro level does a similar job.  
In much the same way, the ‘history’ of a local organisation is redefined. It is no 
longer a history of its people and their struggle, the organisation itself and its story. 
There is a prescribed story for the aid world, and it is this story that appears in 
funding applications, evaluation documents and organisation profiles. Its gives an 
historical background, the organisation’s vision, mission, objectives, aims, past 
work, target community, future plans and goals, training methodology, organisation 
management structure and financial accountability processes. In short, it is the story 
that any international donor would be familiar with and would expect to see if they 
were to contemplate entering into a partnership with a local NGO.  
Instead of being a ‘real’ story, it becomes a set of quantifiable elements: it is the 
projects they have run, to what effect, with whom, how much money they spent, and 
how many people per dollar they have assisted. It is the building and the staff, the 
organisational structure and the list of international organisations they have worked 
with, or have been supported by in the past. It is the implications of dependability, 
reliability, effectiveness and passive adoption of the values and procedures of 
funding bodies that may be transferred through the description of each.  
In this new description of an organisation everything is made to serve a purpose or it 
is excluded from the definition. Originally, KBH (through its founding organisations) 
was comprised of young radicals who fought for the liberation of their country and 
equality for its people. It was this factor that attracted APHEDA to the groups and 
that gave the groups their legitimacy. However, in the post-emergency environment 
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radicalism is no longer an attractive feature and to obtain bilateral support KBH had 
to reflect a new type of organisation and minimise its overt links to more ‘radical’ 
groups (in terms of the narrow definitions), or suffer the penalty of no funding 
(Chapter Six).  
Every aspect of project design, community consultation, evaluation and monitoring 
also becomes quantifiable, reportable, a form, a list – a component of a logical 
framework matrix. This person was asked for permission, this building was 
rehabilitated, this child benefited in this way, this lesson was learned, – tick, tick, 
tick. As an international interviewee said in Chapter Seven, local communities learn 
to ‘play the game’. Everyone working in aid learns to ‘play the game’.  
The ‘unwritten ground rules’ or ‘sub texts’ of the language of development and its 
uses as a tool and mechanism of governance, if not understood by a local NGO 
(and indeed the international staff who work with them or for them), can shape the 
NGO in ways that it does not understand and therefore cannot respond to. NGOs 
need to be educated about the way these systems operate so that they can decide 
what they want or do not want to change, or they can at least understand why they 
are being asked to conform to a certain way of working and decide whether or not it 
is worth the price.  
8.4 The Laying of One System over Another  
One of the driving factors in choosing the topic for my research revolved around my 
perception during my first visit to Timor-Leste in 2002, of the differences between 
the world of the aid worker and the lives of local people. In Chapter Three I 
introduced some aspects of what the aid world is like on the ground. In Chapter Two 
I also discussed the privileged position of international workers in Timor-Leste. 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven explored, directly and indirectly, a deeper view of both 
worlds. My intent was to highlight differences in the two worlds and the difficulties 
that are created when International aid practitioners and the organisations and 
agencies that they represent, fail to see these differences and why they exist. This 
lack of perception can lead to a ‘blaming the victim’ mentality. For instance, if there 
is a general perception among international workers that weak leadership is an 
issue for local NGOs, the assumption is born that Timorese people are weak leaders 
rather than considering the fuller picture as presented in Chapter Six. This picture 
traces problems back to the legacy of long-term conflict and occupation, and the 
resultant lack of skilled, experienced people to lead. It also traces it to the need for 
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local NGOs to conform to new and unfamiliar styles of leadership and governance, 
as well as to the drain of good leaders into international higher paying jobs.  
In the post-independence vote world of Timor-Leste there was not so much a clash 
of cultures but a blanketing effect where the new dominant culture - represented by 
the international aid industry - overlaid existing political structures, institutions and 
social and economic frameworks (Chapter Three). The old familiar, if dangerous, 
landscape was hidden and changed and local people struggled to find what was 
once familiar (Chapter Three), and even if they were to succeed in finding it, it had 
changed as new conditions and regulations were imposed.  
In this newly revealed world, democracy and liberal governance became the norm 
and a rapid re-education of civil society ensued to acculturate people into the new 
style of government in which they needed to take part. However, cultural and social 
systems change slowly, and democracy in Timor-Leste did not come with the same 
social security safety nets that ensure, at least to some degree, a redistribution of 
wealth, social services and resources to the less well-off, as they do in established 
Western democracies. Local people, poorer and more disadvantaged than ever from 
long-term occupation, found themselves in the short-term reliant on handouts from 
the aid world while in the long-term remained dependent on the familial and village 
systems to maintain their economic and social security. It is little wonder that local 
NGOs in a post-conflict environment, where they are constantly searching for funds 
and engaged in crisis management, ‘keep a toe in both camps’. Should violence 
erupt again they must be able to retreat quickly to their home villages to protect their 
families and so they must maintain ties with local leaders at home.  
The overlaying, and at times suffocation, of local ways creates a dual system, but 
only one system can be right or at least recognised by the dominant culture. This is 
not to say that local people capitulate in deference to the implanted system. Rather, 
local NGOs become very proficient at both working around the ‘accepted system’ 
(Box 7.2) to achieve their goals, and utilising international staff to their advantage. It 
is not a one way process. However, liberal governance subtly modifies the existing 
system; not by punishing but by correcting, never acknowledging problems but 
‘finding new solutions’ or ‘new ways of working (see Chapter Four). Returning again 
to the analogy of the faceless tiger, (see Chapter Four) it is difficult to see what you 
are fighting.  
 125 
In this new environment the principles of ‘good governance’ become enshrined in 
the newly developing constitutions and organisational and management structures 
of emerging local NGOs, which, dependent on overseas aid, are eager to comply, at 
least superficially. After all, the principles of good governance, which define good 
leadership, management, financial accountability and compliance, provide the 
framework by which a local NGO will successfully be able to govern itself (although 
the structures and mechanisms it embodies may be largely foreign to them). They 
also provide the NGO with the best chance of obtaining funds. Nevertheless, the 
principles of good governance become the standards on which they are judged and 
on which they judge themselves and each other.  
All of this would be fine perhaps, or at least acceptable, if we could be sure that the 
vision and mission that a local NGO owns for itself, its client group and its country, 
were not only shared by the international aid industry but also respected and upheld 
by it. While many international aid and development practitioners work tirelessly to 
ensure the best results for local people, and do so because they honestly believe in 
and work towards humanitarian goals, they are often hampered by circumstances 
outside their control as the international respondents in Chapter Seven openly 
stated. While those on the ground might be in tune with the aspirations of local 
NGOs and cognisant of the difficulties they face in meeting externally imposed 
conditions, they can do little to alter the agendas of those outside the country who 
are guided by and accountable to external authorities and influences and the 
inflexible bureaucratic systems that underpin them.  
8.5 The Developer and the Developed 
KBH is a small actor on a much bigger stage. In some ways the criss-crossing local, 
national and international networks make it look as if KBH it is caught in a web, 
which in many ways it is. While KBH calls itself an independent NGO, it is not. It is 
dependent on international funds (primarily through APHEDA) which shape its 
character and agenda. APHEDA, while also ‘independent’, is nevertheless 
responsible to its donors - primarily Australian Union members - and as such must 
be seen to be spending money in support of its stated vision/mission and goals. Not 
to do so would mean a cut in funding. 
In 2002-2004, APHEDA’s financial support of KBH was partially reliant on funding 
from AusAID (the aid arm of the Australian government responsible for dispersing 
Australia’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). As such KBH became 
indirectly responsible to AusAID, and through AusAID, KBH became accountable to 
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the Australian Government and its people. Equally, every connection KBH makes 
with an international organisation, whether a multilateral or bilateral agency or an 
international aid organisation, ties it and binds it in similar ways, and every string or 
thread has a set of conditions and regulations attached. Therefore, a small local 
NGO may believe it is independent but by entering into any relationship with an 
international organisation or agency it puts itself into the hands of forces it cannot 
see and is ill-placed to understand.  
In negotiating with the aid world a small NGO like KBH would seem to hold few 
cards. Local NGOs are often lured, during the emergency and post-emergency 
stages of post-conflict recovery, into international partnerships and alliances which 
are not always based on a shared vision or a shared agenda. These relationships 
can lead to unequal relationships where the local NGOs can be ‘swallowed up’ or 
where internationals run roughshod over their local partners as observed by an 
international worker (Chapter Seven). They are, to use Stiglitz’s analogy (see 
Chapter Four), like a small boat with an inexperienced crew cast in a vast ocean and 
subject to being swamped at any time.  
They are also, as Fowler (1997) outlines (see Chapter Four), subject to intense 
scrutiny about nearly every aspect of their history, their structure, their 
vision/mission and objectives. International agencies and organisations do not lay 
themselves open to the same scrutiny. Nor are they always open about where their 
money comes from and to what conditions they are tied, or what political and 
economic motives drive their action.  
8.6 Conclusion  
As is often the case when working ‘on the ground’ in a rapidly changing environment 
such as the post-conflict, post-emergency environment of Timor-Leste from 2004-
2006, it was sometimes difficult to see beyond the immediate crisis or challenges 
faced everyday by local NGOs, to understand the goings on in the broader context 
of international aid and development policy. Thus there is a temptation to see issues 
and challenges faced by the local NGO merely in the light of what is happening at 
that time, within that space, and as a result of that immediate environment, rather 
than the causal factors behind it. For example, a small NGO that is continually 
searching for funds to run projects and pay staff, is overloaded with reporting 
requirements to meet donor agendas and also works in an unstable political 
environment, is in a constant state of crisis management. In this state, blame is 
easily attached to weak leadership and poor management, but simply changing one 
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set of leaders for another or giving them another course on leadership and 
management without addressing the underlying conditions, just treats the symptom 
rather than the cause.  
Using the results of the study as presented in Chapters Six and Seven, namely that 
language, the lack of strong leadership, and financial management are the basic 
impediments to the successful participation of the local NGO, it would be easy to 
point to all the things an NGO might do to overcome these challenges; indeed they 
are obvious. It could be recommended that NGOs in Timor need language lessons, 
capacity building, technical support and advisers. They also need advice on how to 
play the system; they need guidance on how to present information so that it seems 
to be an extension of the donor organisation; they need to organise themselves in 
such a way that they can take advantage of that system. Pursuing the same line, 
recommendations to international practitioners might sound like this; “if you want to 
work with local NGOs you need to be more flexible, more supportive, more 
understanding of the difficulties they face”. To international organisations; “you could 
provide more operational funds, accept the realities of working in this country, the 
lack of qualified staff, the cultural boundaries at play, time, distance etc”. And yet it 
appears that having such knowledge has had seemingly little impact on the way that 
players in the development world continue to conduct themselves. The same 
mistakes continue to be made despite the embracing language of development and 
the endless repetition of lessons being learned over and over again.  
The following chapter concludes the thesis and reflects on what can be taken from 
this study and to use that much used phrase, what “lessons can be learned”.  
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 Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
 
9.1 Introduction 
In the post conflict, post-emergency environment of Timor-Leste a gap exists 
between rhetoric and practice. International aid practitioners who work on the 
ground in Timor-Leste recognise its existence and often feel helpless and 
constrained by their organisation’s policies and practices, in trying to close the gap. 
It often appears that while the international aid world has taken on the 
language/discourse of inclusivity, partnerships, community based, bottom-up action, 
it overlays that upon a model of development and reconstruction that remains 
predicated on neoliberal, western, economic rationalist, principles. The ‘lessons 
have been learned’ and have informed the new language of development and the 
‘conduct of conduct’ within the development field but the underpinning institutions 
and structures remain rooted in the past. In this environment local NGOs, assisted 
by well intentioned international aid practitioners, are often caught trying to bridge 
the gap as they struggle to reconcile the needs of their local communities to the 
often unrealistic consultation and implementation time-lines, lack of adequate 
funding and resources, and externally determined priorities of the aid industry. 
Perceived strengths or weaknesses in this context are not necessarily based upon a 
local NGO’s ability to deliver a service to its community but rather upon its 
effectiveness in shaping itself to externally determined factors, sometimes seen and 
often invisible. It is the invisible challenges, as I have argued, that are the real 
barriers for local NGOs. 
This study looked at the barriers to the successful participation of an NGO in Timor-
Leste in the post conflict, post-emergency environment of aid and reconstruction, 
2004-2005. Through ethnographic research a detailed picture of the NGO was 
obtained, barriers to the successful participation of the NGO were identified, and 
each was discussed in terms of: Internal factors (internal responses to externally 
imposed conditions); External factors (arising from direct contact with the aid 
industry); and Unseen barriers (forces at play that are invisible to the NGO). This 
chapter brings together the threads of the research as explored in the previous 
chapters, outlining the main conclusions of the study in relation to the overall 
research objectives. ‘Lessons learned’ are reflected upon in order to inform aid and 
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development policy in this area and to potentially guide future research into the 
subject. 
9.2 Achieving the objectives  
Building a detailed picture  
The primary purpose of this research was to gain a comprehensive picture of what it 
was to be a local NGO in the specific, post-conflict, post-emergency environment, of 
Timor-Leste. Immersion in the field over an extended period allowed me to build up 
a multi dimensional picture of KBH, its history, its culture, and the story of its birth as 
an NGO in 2002.  
As a participant observer, and as an adviser, I was able to share and participate in 
every aspect of the life of KBH and its staff. I came to know not only KBH staff and 
their families, their experiences and history, but an extended network of young 
people who worked for similar NGOs and who shared a common passion for 
working for their country and for their people. Through close contact with these 
groups I came to understand the organisation in a way perhaps not afforded by 
short-term research field trips, often undertaken by consultants and researchers.  
Through my experience at KBH I was also given the opportunity to witness the 
deeply felt ideological perspectives and heart-felt conviction of the staff and Board 
members of KBH. These convictions followed through into their work and into their 
relationships with their client communities and gave them the courage and strength 
to keep going on in the face of whatever barriers they encountered.  
9.3 The History and Culture Shaping the NGO 
The first objective of the study was to document the operations of KBH, including its 
historical and ideological underpinnings, values and beliefs in order to understand 
how these elements shaped, and continue to shape, the work and structure of the 
organisation. Using the ethnographic methods outlined above, the study 
documented the operations of KBH as an organisation and a complete overview of 
KBH was formulated. This enabled me to identify the major ideological and historical 
factors that influenced the work of the organisation.  
Firstly, KBH and its founding organisations had strong links with liberationist 
ideologies and principles drawn from South America. While these ideologies ran 
counter to mainstream aid and development models, these values remained 
strongly embedded in the workplace practice, the organisation’s vision, mission and 
 130 
objectives as well in the hearts and minds of KBH staff. These values incorporated 
socialist democratic philosophy and ideology and directly influenced the kind of 
organisations that KBH sought to work with, and the international organisations 
willing to work with it. 
Secondly, KBH’s vision and mission of social justice, and liberationist ideologies 
were largely informed by the experiences of KBH staff and Board members, in the 
student movements, solidarity groups and national resistance movements, alive in 
Timor in the time of Indonesian occupation. These principles influenced heavily the 
staff’s approach to community work and their choice of education and training 
pedagogy. This shared vision also influenced the type of education and training 
courses they implemented, such as simple plough making, sustainable agricultural, 
and literacy; and the disadvantaged communities they targeted for assistance.  
Lastly, the historical experience of the staff informed the way they worked and 
conceived of their role within the Timorese community. Most staff had experienced 
in some way the Indonesian occupation and the overwhelming oppression and 
violence of that period at a time in their lives when they were young university 
students. They all felt a genuine commitment to collective action and to social 
responsibility. This was evidenced in the way the organisation was formed and 
structured, and the way founding partners worked together cooperatively to form 
KBH. The ideological principles, beliefs, and history of KBH staff, and the founding 
partners, had a great impact on how the organisation was constituted and run. It 
also influenced the international partner it chose to work with during the post-
emergency phase (APHEDA), and the way KBH worked and interacted with the 
community.  
In the early period when funds were readily available and relatively free of attached 
regulations and conditions, KBH was easily able to maintain its vision and mission, 
and to implement its work in its own way (particularly with support from APHEDA as 
a sympathetic partner). However, as the post-emergency phase began to transition 
into long-term development, the operating environment for local NGOs became 
much more formalised and tightly structured. Because of these circumstances, KBH 
was forced to interact with a much wider group of international donor bodies. 
Suddenly KBH was no longer able to follow its own initiatives but was beholden to 
the directives of international donor organisations. These new directives threatened 
to shape not only how it worked, and who it worked with, but its organisational and 
management structure.  
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9.4 Characterising Interactions between the Two Worlds 
The second objective of the study was to identify and describe the organisation’s 
interactions and co-relationship with the international aid world, focusing on how the 
organisation was shaped by, and in turn shaped, that interaction. This objective was 
achieved by collecting field notes and conducting interviews with local and 
international staff. Extended immersion in the field afforded me many opportunities 
to experience first-hand relations between local NGOs and the major aid bodies, 
and how these relationships shaped the local organisation in diverse and subtle 
ways. 
Three main factors were found to characterise the relationship between the NGO 
and the international aid world. These factors acted upon the NGO to shape it and 
guide its interaction with the outside world. Firstly, unequal power relations arising 
from funding dependence caused the NGO to change itself in order to conform to 
donor expectations and demands. Because the local NGO was beholden to the 
funding body it was often the case that the NGO had to change its own way of 
working rather then risk losing much needed funding. It also needed to change its 
structure in order to find approval, and to alter its operations in order to make itself 
more amenable to donor ways of working. 
Secondly, these two worlds (that of the local NGO and the aid industry) remained 
increasingly separate throughout this period. The lack of understanding, (or 
apparent misunderstanding), between the two, resulted in an inability to bridge this 
gap. As a result, donors were neither attuned nor sympathetic to the needs of the 
NGO. This lack of perception translated in real terms to the NGO not receiving the 
necessary training, support, resources, salaries and operational funds to do their 
jobs well. In addition, unrealistic expectations and impossible time constraints were 
imposed on the local NGO, shifting the onus of responsibility to the NGO for the 
success or failure of projects.  
Differing motivations also marked relations between the two bodies. It was often the 
case that where the motivations or goals of an NGO did not coincide with that of a 
donor, they were simply dismissed or went unacknowledged. Competing goals were 
often a source of confusion for local NGOs, which were often at a loss to explain 
donor disapproval when results aligned with the NGO’s own notion of success. Such 
distance also led to injustices arising from donor policies that sought to look after a 
donor’s own interests before that of the local NGO, for example, unequal pay and 
conditions.  
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From the time the aid world arrived in Timor-Leste, there emerged a two worlds’ 
divide, the aid world on one side, and the local NGOs and the local community on 
the other. Often it was left to the NGO to straddle this gap. This shaped the 
organisation in major ways; physically, by altered organisational structures; 
behaviourally, through changed ways of working on the ground; and psychologically, 
through changed expectations and notions of self-determination.  
However, while local NGOs are dependent on international donors, this is a co-
dependent relationship. Donor organisations are also dependent on local NGOs as 
their link to local communities, and the means by which they maintain their 
legitimacy as ‘aid’ actors. If local NGOs were better informed about these 
relationships, they would be better able to negotiate them to their advantage and to 
the advantage of the communities they represent. Not by engaging in the ‘game 
playing’ but by open negotiation.  
The third objective of the study was to identify the major challenges faced by the 
NGO in maintaining its vision and mission and conducting its activities as it 
navigates the transition from post-emergency to long-term development. This 
information was collected through participatory observation and interviews with local 
and international staff. The findings were grouped under three headings each of 
which represents a particular group of major barriers to the effective participation of 
a local NGO in the recovery of its country: Internal factors, external factors and 
unseen factors. 
Internal 
Internal challenges were seen as ‘internal’ in as far as they required an internal 
response to externally imposed conditions. That is, the adaptation to: new language 
and communication technologies; new styles of governance in leadership and 
organisational management; and new financial accountability processes and 
procedures. All of these challenges were coupled with the lack of experienced and 
skilled staff knowledgeable in the way an NGO in the post-emergency phase should 
operate, and even less experienced in how a NGO should be run after the transition 
in to long-term development prescribed by the aid industry. These challenges were 
also related to low salaries and the lack of job security for local staff, and the 
tendency to hire family and friends over merit-based employment criteria, due in part 
to the complex Timor-Leste familial system, and issues of obligation and security. 
 133 
These challenges affected the NGO in major ways. Firstly, they were blocked from 
communicating with donors, engaging in debate and accessing knowledge therefore 
limiting the degree of control or say they had in projects. The NGO also found itself 
operating in a new environment in which a new system overlaid the existing one. 
The system was not only unfamiliar and discordant with Timorese systems, but it 
necessitated the dependence on international staff, who in turn served as a kind of 
‘Trojan Horse’ for the importing of new ideological perspectives that may have 
subverted the original ideological basis of the NGO. New notions of ‘good 
governance’ also devalued existing systems and rendered them increasingly 
impracticable in the new environment. Anything that is not aligned with the dominant 
culture is rendered obsolete by it. In its wake, the local NGO is left struggling to 
maintain its legitimacy and to keep its ‘head above water’. More importantly, the 
NGO ends up serving the needs of the aid industry rather then the communities they 
set out to serve. 
External 
The ‘external’ issues, also referred to in this thesis as interface issues, related more 
directly to KBH’s direct contact with the aid industry, and its daily interactions with 
the international aid world. These interactions included: 1) the maintenance of  
existing ideologies, vision and mission in a world dominated by an apposing 
ideology; 2) attempts to develop and maintain equal partnerships and other 
relationships while reliant on donor funding; 3) attempts to establish legitimacy in the 
minds of donors; 4) attempts to maintain integrity and independence in representing 
community needs against donor-driven criteria for project implementation and aid 
targets; 5) attempts to meet unrealistic timelines and expectations while under 
funded and understaffed; 6) and the difficulty in trying to build strong networks with a 
culture that, maintains its distance and appears to know best.  
The external challenges for the NGO here are great and can be seen to work on the 
organisation in the following ways. Firstly, moving outside the prevailing systems of 
operation and the dominant ideology can lead to retribution. Secondly, the NGO 
may end up committing to jobs that they are not capable of doing or working in ways 
that go against their beliefs. New rules and regulations come into effect and they 
must be learned and abided by, or else penalties are incurred, often typified by the 
withdrawal of funding support. 
Instead of two groups working together and the interface being located at the site of 
the junction between the implementing partner (the local NGO) and funding 
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organisations (the donor) and the target community, the interface is instead located 
between the donor and the NGO. The local NGO as the one caught in the middle is 
the one which must negotiate this terrain, attempting to satisfy both sides, and 
generally sacrificing its own interests in the process. This sacrifice can be monetary, 
through having to make up for inadequate pay or resource provisions, or 
operationally through changing its processes and approach in order to consider the 
donor’s objectives and desires.  
Where the NGO cannot meet with donor directives or live up to donor expectations it 
must change. When faults or gaps occur in the arrangement between donor and 
NGO then the NGO must make up the difference. Where barriers exist, it is mainly 
left to the NGO to absorb the responsibility and deal with difficulties encountered. 
This means, at the end of the day, that the people the aid world are supposedly 
there to support are actually in many ways supporting the aid world, often 
camouflaging the inability of these players (international donor organisations) to 
work competently and conscientiously in the post-emergency context. 
Hidden barriers 
Hidden or underlying factors also present challenges that act as real barriers to the 
effective participation of a local NGO in the post-conflict, post-emergency 
environment. These unseen barriers are hidden in the ‘sub-text’ of development 
embedded in its language, the invisible blanketing of existing systems with new, and 
the subjugation of the NGO within the larger system. 
Whilst the factors themselves might be invisible, the effects of these hidden 
challenges are all too visible and real. Through the use of language as a mechanism 
of governance, NGOs are increasingly governed, manipulated, and directed by the 
very words used to define them, and to describe the work they do. This language 
permeates the field of work in which they operate and shapes the mentality of staff 
in subtle and deliberate ways towards new ways of thinking and acting that are 
aligned with the will of the governing bodies.  
Through the unspoken overlaying of a foreign system of government on top of that 
of the existing system, brings with it, a myriad of subtle judgments and a devaluing 
of traditional systems and ways of working. The new system brings with it entirely 
different ways of working and staff struggle to change whilst all the while problems 
are located in the NGO rather then in the directives that are being imposed upon 
them.  
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9.5 Conclusions 
The NGO is one small independent actor in a sea of giant corporations including UN 
agencies, international financial institutions, large international aid organisations, 
and foreign governments. Each organisation comes with its own directives, motives 
and agendas, and the local NGO can be ‘swallowed up’ by the sheer number of 
bodies it must serve. The work of the local NGO becomes the work of translating 
reality into a format palatable for the international head office; fiddling with numbers, 
changing roles, obscuring results, all so that the donor organisations can say they 
have achieved their objectives to meet their own externally imposed regulations and 
expectations. It is the inability to understand or detect the subtle mechanisms of 
governance that often limits the degree to which an NGO can be said to act self-
determinedly or in full awareness of the situation as it navigates a path through this 
foreign and often baffling post-emergency environment. 
Many of the challenges faced by local NGOs identified in this study are a direct 
result of operating in this post-conflict environment to a largely characterised by the 
rushed imposition of a new western-style governing body over existing or colonial 
forms of governance. This supplanting or overlaying means that local organisations 
find themselves having to contend not only with a foreign language but foreign 
systems and structures that dictate how they will operate and manage their 
organisations. Such problems, however, are not dissimilar to those of other 
developing nations struggling to find their way in the global context. It is not a unique 
experience for a new nation’s survival in this environment to be contingent on its 
ability to effectively align itself with the aims of prevailing rationalities and forms of 
governance.  
Another interesting conclusion has been the particular way in which these larger 
global trends manifest themselves in the minutiae of the donor-NGO relationship on 
the ground in Timor-Leste, in the directives the international donor imposes in order 
to carry out its mission, and the major challenges faced by the NGO in rising to meet 
these demands. More often than not, the everyday operations of the organisation 
are changed, staff apply themselves to learning new behaviours and different ways 
of working, and the overall objectives, mission and vision of the NGO become 
second in importance to the donor criteria upon which their successful fulfilment are 
contingent. 
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9.6 Lessons Learned?  
What might aid practitioners take from this research? That we have a responsibility 
as aid professionals to understand the meanings behind the conditions and 
regulations we ask local NGOs to comply with: that we listen more and direct 
less; and that we ensure that what we think is best for local people is really 
what they want and what will work for them in the long run. Nothing strong 
can be built without a foundation — Timor-Leste NGOs have a foundation 
and they need time, support and space to build the structure that best suits 
their needs in their country. That is, it is not good enough to transpose a set 
of ‘blue prints’ from one country to another and impose them on a community as if 
one shape fits all — it does not work in the west, so why should it be any different in 
a developing country? Finally, aid practitioners ‘on the ground’ must continue to 
pressure their organisations to make institutional and structural changes to their 
systems so that they can respond more flexibly and less prescriptively to the needs 
of local organisations.  
What might international aid organisations take from this? That they should be as 
open to scrutiny by local NGOs as local NGOs are to their scrutiny — local NGOs 
need to know who they are dealing with and what agendas they are meeting. Their 
donors need to be aware that funds do not need to be spent in a single year but 
spread across an extended timeframe, and used when the country is most able and 
ready to make use of it effectively. That time-lines, funding models and expectations 
need to be realistic. That progress in post-conflict countries is slow and erratic and 
often entails, for a local NGO, three steps forward and two steps back. Violence can 
re-emerge at any time, and while the aid world can be air-lifted out when conflict 
threatens their safety in the new democracy, local people must stay and maintain 
their safety in the best way they can.  
What might researchers take from this? Ethnographic research can yield rich and 
detailed insights to complex situations such as in the post-conflict, post-emergency 
world of Timor-Leste. In conducting this type of research, however, the researcher 
must continually challenge their own preconceived values and beliefs they take to 
the field, their own actions within the field; and the story they bring from the field. 
They can also tell a story that is unable to be told in any other way. By this means, 
they can inform, even if in a small way, the discourse of development.  
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We need to listen to dissenting voices, as these are catalysts of change. We also 
need to be aware that when liberalism subsumes its opposition and takes on its 
language, in doing so it also subsumes meaning, and twists it, often depriving the 
very people who need it most, of the language of their struggle and potentially their 
movement forward. 
9.7 Future Research  
This research was primarily explorative. It is the type of research that brings to the 
surface issues that need pursuing in much more depth. It has certainly highlighted 
the need for further investigation into the gap between rhetoric and practice; and 
why it should occur when one party at least is aware of its implications and the 
difficulties it presents for local players in developing nations. 
Perhaps we might also do well to examine development not from the point of view of 
criticism but truth seeking and critical analysis. Injustices may lay hidden under 
emotional responses longer than if they are simply and openly talked of, in clear 
terms, and understood as the differing motivations of the various parties involved. 
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Endnotes 
 
                                               
1
 Timor-Leste became the official name for Timor-Leste in 2002. Local people refer 
to it as Timor Lorosae. Others may refer to it as East Timor. 
2
 These stages are broad terms that reflect the stages of aid intervention rather than 
Timor-Leste’s progress. They are characterised differently by different aid 
organisations and agencies but for this research and the sake of clarity the 
emergency period represents post 1999 to 2002; post-emergency represents 2002- 
2004, long term development represents 2004 onwards. 
3
 The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) 
records officially document the violence and human rights abuses which took place 
before 1975 until after independence. 
4
 Hunt ( 2004), notes that in Timor-Leste the difference between NGOs and CSOs is 
hard to define however Holloway sees them as quite different (2004). 
5
 In late 2000 Brunnstrom was commissioned by Oxfam to report on local NGOs 
while Hunt has written a comprehensive history of NGOs preceding the 
independence vote to 2004.  
6
 See Hunt 2004, for a more detailed account of the tensions that developed during 
this time. 
7
 Multilaterals are international financial institutions including the World Bank and the 
IMF and all the United Nations agencies such as UNESCO, UNICEF, and the ILO.  
8
 Bilateral agencies such as AusAID, CIDA, JICA, are responsible to one 
Government and represent that Governments overseas development interests. 
9
 The non-formal sector is outside the formal primary, secondary and tertiary system 
and usually involves participants with little or no formal education. The focus of this 
type of education is on vocational/livelihoods training which will result in direct 
income generating activities for participants.  
10
 Some became key informants  
11
 Local language. 
12
 A multinational force authorised by the United Nations security council charged 
with restoring peace and security in Timor-Leste.  
13
 On 20 May, 2002 The United Nations formally handed over administration to the 
democratically elected government and East Timor formally became Timor-Leste.  
14
 McKechnie is the Country Director for Afghanistan, Butane, Maldives, and 
regional programs in South Asia Region, World Bank.  
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15
 Richard Halloway in a paper titled What is Civil Society in Timor Leste? Examines 
the definition of civil society organisations and NGOs and draws a distinction 
between them.  
16
 Most of this section draws heavily on the work of Janet Hunt who made a full and 
extensive study of NGOs in Timor-Leste before and after 1999, documenting their 
history and contribution to the resistance struggle and their continuing part in the re-
building of Timor-Leste.  
17
 Jose Ramos Horta was the 1996 joint winner of the Noble Peace prize and in 
2002 became the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the new Timor-Leste Government. 
18
 Brunnstrom unashamedly focuses largely on the views of local NGOs in an 
attempt, as she describes to redress the imbalance.  
19
 Ishuka does not cite any local NGO workers in this paper. The one NGO worker 
he cites is a foreign worker, working with a local organisation.  
20
 The reestablishment of the NGO forum was supported by the UN OCHA, see 
Hunt 2003, for a more detailed history.  
21
 KL.32 is a young female NGO worker involved in a women’s NGO before and 
after independence. 
22
 see world bank and un docs  
23
 APHEDA- Union Aid Abroad (Australian People for Health, Education and 
Development Abroad) is the overseas aid agency of the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions. 
24
 Timor-Leste solidarity partners. 
25
 As APHEDA was at the time seeking funding from AusAID for capacity building, 
support from AusAID this was an essential element of that funding. 
26
 The rent paid to KBH was much appreciated for it was a vital source of income for 
KBH, who were responsible for financing the maintenance and security of the 
building on a monthly basis. 
27
 APHEDA’s funding at this stage was through union donations and AusAID, ANCP 
funding.  
28
 There is a difference in opinion as to the exact percentage depending on the 
survey: 6 of May 2001 Report from The Asia Foundation, entitled Timor-Leste 
National Survey of Voter Knowledge (Preliminary Findings).“27% of Timor-Leste 
between the ages of 35-50 can speak Portuguese, as opposed to only 11% of those 
under 25”.  
29
 The use of the Trojan Horse metaphor was inspired by the work of Dominique 
Temple who referred to NGOs as Trojan Horses. The text appeared in  
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Rahnema, M & Bawtree, V 1996, The post-development reader, Zed Books, New 
Jersey.  
30
 From interviews with two CEOs of bilateral organisations.  
31At the time of the interviews four of the fifteen internationals interviewed worked for 
multilateral agencies (United Nations agencies), three worked for bilateral agencies 
(for example, US Aid and AUSAID) (two of this group were senior managers), five 
worked for international non-government organisations, two worked for local 
government supported by bi-lateral funding, and one like myself, worked for a local 
NGO.  
32
 Many volunteer organisations pay for Tetun language courses for their volunteer 
staff either on arrival in Timor-Leste or prior to departure from their home country, 
and in some cases both.  
